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Abstract - English
This thesis focuses on financial reporting with a particular emphasis on financial re-
porting for banks in the first two chapters and on auditors’ incentives in the third
chapter. The first part of my thesis (chapter 1 and chapter 2) concerns the link be-
tween accounting rules and the financial system. Financial statements are key inputs
to compute the regulatory capital of financial institutions and, therefore, play a major
role in the efficiency and the stability of the financial system. However, the role of
accounting standards on banks’ behaviors has been the subject of academic research
mostly since the 2007-08 financial crisis. In particular, fair value accounting has been
blamed for increasing systemic risk during the crisis. Loan loss provisioning, securiti-
zation and derivatives are the three other important aspects of financial reporting for
banks that have been heavily debated since the crisis. The other part of my thesis
(chapter 3) concerns the analysis of auditors’ incentives and the regulation of the audit
industry. Financial reporting is not the only way accounting has been implicated in
the past crisis and in recent corporate scandals. Indeed, the major accounting firms
have also been directly targeted in part because of the provision of non-audit services
to their audit clients.
The main objective of the first chapter is to understand the role of fair value ac-
counting, taking into account the possibility for banks to use their private information
(Level 3 reporting) to compute fair values. Namely, I analyze a model of prudential
regulation to shed some light on banks’ incentives to use Level 3 reporting and on
the economic consequences they entail. I bring in accounting measures as the pri-
mary inputs into capital requirements set by a regulator to efficiently allocate control
rights within a bank and to provide managerial discipline. My analysis of the Level
3 reporting externalities highlights an interesting tradeoff between transparency and
financial stability. On the one hand, Level 3 reporting reduces the ability for a bank’s
stakeholders to extract information from financial statements of similar banks. On
the other hand, Level 3 reporting decreases systemic risk caused by mark-to-market
accounting. Further, manipulation makes Level 3 reporting less desirable, which may
in turn increase systemic risk. I believe that the framework of this chapter offers other
opportunities to study the real-effects of fair value accounting that have not yet been
explored.
The second chapter of this thesis is co-authored with Jeremy Bertomeu of the Uni-
versity of California San Diego and Haresh Sapra of the University of Chicago. In this
chapter, we tackle the question of the optimal loan loss provisioning system for banks.
In particular, we develop first a framework to study how accounting measurement and
prudential regulation interact to affect a bank’s incentives to originate credit. Our
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main result is that the accounting measurement system and bank leverage are policy
tools that should be used in tandem, generating more value than systems that rely
either on accounting regulation or on prudential regulation. Then, we use our results
to shed some light on the current debate on the appropriate loan loss provisioning
model for banks. We show that while banks engage in excessive risk-taking under an
incurred loss model, an expected loss model can lead to excessive liquidations. More
interestingly, we show that as credit conditions in the economy improve, the optimal
measurement system moves towards an expected loss model. Conversely, as credit con-
ditions deteriorate, the optimal measurement regime tilts more towards an incurred
loss model.
The third chapter of this thesis moves away from financial reporting for banks to
focus on the analysis of auditors’ incentives to deliver high audit quality. In particular,
I try to understand the impact of the provision of non-audit services (NAS) on audit
firms’ incentives, in order to conclude on the best way to regulate this industry. I be-
lieve that a better understanding of auditors’ incentives is necessary to design better
regulations. To that end, I develop a framework that provides new insights into the
incentive effects of NAS on auditors. I show that it can be optimal for the investors
of a client firm to let the external auditor provide NAS because of an incentive ex-
ternality. Indeed, the possibility of providing NAS contingent on detecting financial
misstatements increases the auditor’s incentives to exert audit effort. However, despite
this positive externality, the provision of NAS may decrease perceived audit quality,
which may in turn render the provision of NAS by auditors undesirable. Thus, my
analysis uncovers an interesting tradeoff for regulators between the positive incentive
effect and the decrease in audit quality. Removing the current restriction on contin-
gent audit fees may offset this ex post decrease in audit quality while preserving the
ex ante incentives.
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Abstract - French
Cette thèse de doctorat porte sur le reporting financier avec un accent particulier sur
l’information financière des banques dans les deux premiers chapitres et sur les in-
citations des auditeurs dans le troisième chapitre. La première partie de ma thèse
(chapitre 1 et chapitre 2) concerne le lien entre les règles comptables et le système fi-
nancier. Les états financiers sont des intrants clés pour calculer le capital réglementaire
des institutions financières et, par conséquent, jouent un rôle majeur dans l’efficacité
et la stabilité du système financier. Cependant, le rôle des normes comptables sur les
comportements des banques a fait l’objet de recherches universitaires principalement
depuis la crise financière de 2007-2008. En particulier, la comptabilité à la juste valeur
a été accusée d’accroître le risque systémique pendant la crise. Les provisions pour
créances douteuses, la titrisation et les produits dérivés sont les trois autres aspects
importants de l’information financière pour les banques qui ont été largement débattus
depuis la crise. L’autre partie de ma thèse (chapitre 3) concerne l’analyse des incita-
tions des auditeurs et la régulation de l’industrie de l’audit. L’information financière
n’est pas la seule façon dont la comptabilité a été impliquée dans la crise passée et dans
les récents scandales financiers. En effet, les grands cabinets comptables ont également
été ciblés directement en partie en raison de la prestation de services non liés à l’audit
à leurs clients d’audit.
L’objectif principal du premier chapitre est de comprendre le rôle de la comptabil-
ité à la juste valeur, en tenant compte de la possibilité pour les banques d’utiliser leur
information privée (reporting de niveau 3) pour calculer les justes valeurs. À savoir,
j’analyse un modèle de réglementation prudentielle pour faire la lumière sur les incita-
tions des banques à utiliser les rapports de niveau 3 et sur les conséquences économiques
qu’elles entraînent. J’introduis des mesures comptables en tant qu’intrants primaires
dans les exigences de fonds propres établies par un organisme de réglementation afin
de répartir efficacement les droits de contrôle au sein d’une banque et de fournir une
discipline de gestion. Mon analyse des externalités de reporting de niveau 3 met en
évidence un arbitrage intéressant entre la transparence et la stabilité financière. D’une
part, les rapports de niveau 3 réduisent la capacité des parties prenantes d’une banque
à extraire des informations des états financiers de banques similaires. D’un autre côté,
les rapports de niveau 3 réduisent le risque systémique causé par la comptabilisation à
la valeur de marché. En outre, la manipulation rend le signalement de niveau 3 moins
souhaitable, ce qui peut à son tour augmenter le risque systémique. Je crois que le
cadre de ce chapitre offre d’autres occasions d’étudier les effets réels de la comptabili-
sation à la juste valeur qui n’ont pas encore été explorés.
Le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse est co-écrit avec Jeremy Bertomeu de l’Université
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de Californie à San Diego et Haresh Sapra de l’Université de Chicago. Dans ce chapitre,
nous abordons la question du système optimal de provisionnement des pertes sur prêts
pour les banques. En particulier, nous développons d’abord un cadre pour étudier
comment la mesure comptable et la réglementation prudentielle interagissent pour af-
fecter les incitations d’une banque à obtenir un crédit. Notre résultat principal est
que le système de mesure comptable et l’effet de levier bancaire sont des outils poli-
tiques qui devraient être utilisés en parallèle, générant plus de valeur que les systèmes
reposant soit sur la réglementation comptable, soit sur la réglementation prudentielle.
Ensuite, nous utilisons nos résultats pour faire la lumière sur le débat actuel sur le
modèle approprié de provisionnement des pertes sur prêts pour les banques. Nous
montrons que si les banques prennent des risques excessifs dans le cadre d’un modèle
de pertes encourues, un modèle de pertes attendues peut entraîner des liquidations
excessives. Plus intéressant, nous montrons qu’à mesure que les conditions de crédit
s’améliorent dans l’économie, le système de mesure optimal évolue vers un modèle de
pertes attendues. À l’inverse, à mesure que les conditions de crédit se détériorent, le
régime de mesure optimal s’oriente davantage vers un modèle de pertes encourues.
Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse s’éloigne des rapports financiers pour les ban-
ques afin de se concentrer sur l’analyse des incitations des auditeurs à fournir une
qualité d’audit élevée. En particulier, j’essaie de comprendre l’impact de la four-
niture de services autres que d’audit (NAS) sur les incitations des sociétés d’audit,
afin de conclure sur la meilleure façon de réguler cette industrie. Je crois qu’une
meilleure compréhension des incitations des auditeurs est nécessaire pour concevoir de
meilleures réglementations. À cette fin, je développe un cadre qui fournit de nouvelles
perspectives sur les effets incitatifs des NAS sur les auditeurs. Je montre qu’il peut
être optimal pour les investisseurs d’une entreprise cliente de laisser l’auditeur externe
fournir des NAS en raison d’une externalité d’incitation. En effet, la possibilité de
fournir des NAS en cas de détection d’anomalies financières augmente les incitations
de l’auditeur à exercer un effort d’audit. Cependant, en dépit de cette externalité
positive, la fourniture de NAS peut diminuer la qualité perçue de l’audit, ce qui peut à
son tour rendre la fourniture de NAS par les auditeurs indésirable. Ainsi, mon analyse
révèle un arbitrage intéressant pour les régulateurs entre l’effet d’incitation positif et
la diminution de la qualité de l’audit. L’élimination de la restriction actuelle sur les
honoraires d’audit conditionnels peut compenser cette baisse ex post de la qualité de
l’audit tout en préservant les incitations ex ante.
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Chapter 1
Fair Value Accounting,
Transparency and Financial
Stability
1.1 Introduction
While accounting standards have gradually evolved towards the use of fair value mea-
surements, very little is known on the desirability of using banks’ private information
(Level 3 reporting) to compute fair values. In this paper, my objective is to shed some
light on banks’ incentives to use Level 3 reporting and on the economic consequences
they entail.1 To that end, I develop a framework which brings in accounting measures
as the primary inputs into capital requirements set by a prudential regulator to ef-
ficiently allocate control rights within a bank and to provide managerial discipline.2
Then, I analyze the externalities of the optimal measurement rules for one bank in
a multi-bank economy and uncover an interesting tradeoff. On the one hand, Level
3 reporting decreases the consistency and the comparability of financial statements,
1The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB , 2011) and the International Accounting Stan-
dard Board (IASB , 2011) define fair value as “the price that would be received to sell an asset (...)
in an orderly transaction.” They have developed a methodology that categorizes into three levels the
inputs to valuation techniques used to measure the fair value. For assets listed on liquid markets, the
fair value is the market price (Level 1 input), which is both the most relevant and reliable information.
I discuss in more details the fair value reporting guidance in the appendix 2.
2The allocation of control rights within a bank is a major reason for the regulation of bank capital
structure (e.g. Acharya et al., 2016; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994c).
Moreover, capital requirements are largely based on accounting inputs: see, e.g., the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/other-publications-reports/Keydifferences-document-public.pdf), the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/CCAR/201503-
comprehensivecapital-analysis-review-preface.htm) and the Bank for International Settlements
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf).
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which in turn reduces the ability for a bank’s stakeholders to extract information from
financial statements of similar banks. On the other hand, Level 3 reporting decreases
systemic risk caused by mark-to-market accounting (i.e. fair value with observable
inputs). Indeed, under mark-to-market accounting, liquidation decisions are based
on public information, which may trigger simultaneous inefficient liquidations. Fur-
ther, manipulation makes Level 3 reporting less desirable, which may in turn increase
systemic risk. Standard setters and prudential regulators, who may have conflicting
interests, should carefully investigate the tradeoff between transparency and financial
stability.
Understanding the economic consequences of using banks’ private information to
compute fair values is an important policy concern given that most of the assets
accounted for with fair value are not traded on liquid markets. Therefore, both noisy
public information (Level 2 input) and banks’ private information (Level 3 input)
are available to compute their fair values. Although several empirical studies (e.g.
Hanley et al., 2018) provide evidence that firms strategically choose the fair value
classification levels of their assets, standard setters lack a framework to assess the costs
and benefits of Level 3 reporting. Understanding the tradeoffs at stake is even more
important for prudential regulators given the debate that has been raging for years
about the role of fair value accounting for financial stability. Namely, many academic
researchers, policymakers and other practitioners have blamed mark-to-market for
increasing systemic risk.3 Banks have been at the forefront of this debate because
they are key players in the economy and carry significant amounts of fair valued assets
and liabilities. My formal analysis of Level 3 reporting highlights that systemic risk
may be reduced by allowing banks to report more assets into the Level 3 category.
I draw my conclusions from a standard model of prudential regulation à la De-
watripont and Tirole (1994c). There is a moral hazard problem within a bank and
formal incentive schemes (bonuses, stock options) are limited by imperfect verifiability
of bank performance. As a result, additional incentives are provided to the banker
by the threat of external involvement by the prudential regulator. The banker de-
rives private benefits from running the bank and prefers a low level of intervention.
The prudential regulator should promise a low level of intervention in case of good
performance and a high level of intervention in case of bad performance to provide
managerial discipline. Reliable accounting information increases the ability of the
prudential regulator to monitor the banker’s behavior, increasing the probability that
3Laux and Leuz (2010) provide an overview of this debate. For critics of fair value accounting, see,
for example, “Are the Bean Counters Ensuring a Crash?” The Economist, March 6, 2008; “The Crisis
and Fair Value Accounting,” The Economist, September 18, 2008 and “Mark-to-Market Accounting
Exacerbates the Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2008. See also Cifuentes et al. (2005a),
Heaton et al. (2010a) and Securities and Exchange Commission (2008).
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the bank’s asset is of high quality.
I add a fair value measurement friction to this standard model of prudential regu-
lation and make explicit the type of accounting information available to the prudential
regulator. There are two sources of information available to decide of the intervention
policy: a public Level 2 input and a Level 3 input, which is private information to the
banker. If the asset is reported at Level 3, the external auditor audits the banker’s as-
sumptions and the Level 3 input becomes public. Hence, Level 3 reporting reveals the
banker’s private information but there is an audit cost borne by the bank’s investors.
The optimal intervention policy that maximizes the bank’s value has intuitive fea-
tures. When the Level 2 input is informative enough, the banker uses Level 2 reporting
and the intervention decision is based on the Level 2 input. Otherwise, when the Level
2 input is noisy, the prudential regulator relies on the Level 3 input. Interestingly,
the asset is reported at Level 3 and there is no intervention if and only if the Level 3
input is good information on the asset quality and the Level 3 reporting cost is low.
This optimal intervention policy admits a realistic implementation using an appropri-
ate capital structure, whereby the banker is allowed to use Level 3 if the reporting
cost is low and shareholders keep the control if and only if the reported book value
is above a capital requirement set by the prudential regulator. Control should shift
from shareholders to the prudential regulator if the banker does not meet the capital
requirement.
After analyzing the optimal fair value reporting decision for a single bank, I inves-
tigate the optimal fair value standards in the full-fledged multi-bank model. I extend
the model to a continuum of ex ante identical banks and the Level 2 inputs are en-
dogenized as prices quoted by a broker. In equilibrium, some banks have high quality
assets and others low quality assets. The uninformed broker quotes a price for a high
(resp. low) quality asset based on the information he obtains by observing a sam-
ple of financial statements of banks that have assets similar to this high (resp. low)
quality asset. However, there is a misclassification risk in case of Level 3 reporting.
Specifically, Level 3 valuations are based on bankers’ assumptions and hence, reduce
the consistency and the comparability of financial statements. It is harder for the
broker to compare the different assets and the quoted prices are noisier. Thus, Level 3
reporting leads to a negative informational externality. On the other hand, upon suffi-
ciently bad public information, Level 2 reporting triggers simultaneous liquidations by
distressed banks, which may depress the liquidation values of the assets as in Plantin
et al. (2008a). Level 3 reporting, by relying on bankers’ private information, then acts
as a circuit-breaker and leads to a positive payoff externality. Hence, there is a tradeoff
between increasing the use of Level 3 reporting to reduce systemic risk by relying more
10
on the bankers’ private information, and restricting Level 3 reporting to increase the
comparability and the informativeness of financial statements. The optimal Level 3
reporting cost is endogenously determined taking into account this tradeoff. This pa-
per is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to offer an analytical framework to
analyze this key tradeoff for standard setters and prudential regulators in the context
of fair value accounting.
Finally, Level 3 reporting has been heavily criticized by some practitioners and
accounting researchers (e.g. Acharya and Ryan, 2016a; Buffett, 2002; Weil, 2007) be-
cause of potential manipulation of Level 3 inputs. I show that, when the banker is able
to manipulate the distribution of the Level 3 input, there is indeed a unique degree
of manipulation in equilibrium. My analysis underscores that prudential regulators
internalize the resulting decrease in the informativeness of those inputs when setting
capital requirements and that Level 3 reporting still provides some valuable informa-
tion to prudential regulators. However, the manipulation of the Level 3 input, which
reduces the use of Level 3 reporting, may in turn increase systemic risk.
To illustrate the main results of the paper, take the example of mortgage backed
securities (MBS), which were at the heart of the 2007-08 financial crisis. An example of
a Level 2 input is the credit spread over the risk-free rate based on the most comparable
index (e.g. CMBX index). A banker might use a Level 3 input in its valuation
model, such as adjustments for differences between the index used and the actual
asset. My model predicts that banks adjust the public index data to compute the fair
values of their MBS holdings only when this public index is noisy, the bankers’ private
information is good news on the quality of the MBS holdings and the Level 3 reporting
cost is low. Moreover, my multi-bank analysis suggests that reclassifications by banks
of MBS into the Level 3 category may have reduced systemic risk during the crisis
(Laux and Leuz, 2010).
The one-bank model has important predictions for auditors and auditing standard
setters. The audit of fair value classifications is an important subtask in auditing the
overall fair value reporting process because of the ambiguity in fair value estimation
guidance.4 For instance, Glover et al. (2016) and Earley et al. (2015) underline that
some audit partners consider the classification of Level 2 versus Level 3 to be the
most important aspect of the overall fair value process. Hanley et al. (2018) provide
evidence that insurance companies strategically use Level 3 reporting to meet capital
requirements while Altamuro and Zhang (2013) show that managers use their discre-
4It is well documented that firms have some discretion when deciding to report an illiquid asset at
Level 2 or Level 3 (e.g. Altamuro and Zhang, 2013; Earley et al., 2015; Hanley et al., 2018; Hendricks
and Shakespeare, 2013). The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2017) has just proposed
new auditing standards related to fair value.
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tion to generate more accurate fair value estimates. Thus, my results contribute to
the understanding of banks’ incentives to use Level 3 reporting and why estimates of
a similar asset may differ across banks.
The findings of the multi-bank model are relevant to accounting standard setters
and prudential regulators. As stressed earlier, there is a global debate since the 2007-08
financial crisis on the role of fair value accounting. Opponents of fair value accounting
argue that it can lead to a feedback loop between falling market prices and sell-offs if
banks are not able to deviate from market prices.5 Proponents of fair value claim that
it provides more relevant accounting numbers but standard setters constrain deviations
from market information mainly because Level 3 reporting decreases the consistency
and the comparability of financial statements, which are important characteristics
(FASB , 2011). As noted by Laux and Leuz (2009), the fair value debate is “far from
over” and, in particular, the relevance-reliability tradeoff is “at the heart of the de-
bate when to deviate from market prices in determining fair value.” I provide a new
mechanism which links mark-to-market to systemic risk: sufficiently bad public signals
trigger simultaneous liquidations, which are inefficient when the market’s demand for
the assets is less than perfectly elastic. Furthermore, I highlight an important tradeoff:
allowing banks to deviate from observable inputs reduces systemic risk but decreases
the consistency and the comparability of financial statements. This result echoes the
classic tradeoff between transparency and financial stability.
1.1.1 Literature review
First of all, this paper is related to the agency theory and performance evaluation
literature.6 In a seminal contribution, Hölmstrom (1979) derives a necessary and
sufficient condition for imperfect information of the unobservable effort to be of value.
As in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994c), I use a model of prudential regulation based
on an agency friction within a bank that I augment with a fair value measurement
friction. Optimal capital requirements are derived from fair value measurements, which
use both Level 2 and Level 3 inputs.
An interesting parallel can be drawn with Verrecchia (1986), in which a principal
may find it optimal to let an agent take a costly action which leads to more precise
5For instance, the International Monetary Fund (2008) states that: “fair value accounting gives
the most comprehensive picture of a firm’s financial health...investment decision rules based on fair
value accounting outcomes could lead to self-fulfilling forced sales and falling prices when valuations
fell below important thresholds.” (https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/)
6Lambert (2001) reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. Beatty and
Liao (2014) emphasize that agency problems are core issues in the theory of banking but there are
surprisingly few papers analyzing agency issues at the intersection of the banking literature and the
accounting literature.
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reports, and with Gigler and Hemmer (2001), in which an agent may become informed
and voluntarily disclose some private information at a cost before the financial report
is produced. Similarly, the variance investigation literature (e.g Baiman and Demski,
1980; Dye, 1986) uses agency models in which the principal has the choice to produce
costly information. In my setup, the banker has the discretion to report the asset at
Level 2 or Level 3. Level 3 reporting is similar to a costly investigation of the banker’s
private information and leads to more precise reports. I find that the extent to which
the prudential regulator allows the banker to use Level 3 reporting depends upon the
improvement in fair values as an indicator of the banker’s ex ante effort when Level 3
reporting takes place versus the cost of Level 3 reporting.
This paper belongs to a burgeoning strand of the banking literature studying the
role of fair value accounting. On the one hand, a part of this literature emphasizes the
potential contagion effect caused by mark-to-market accounting. Allen and Carletti
(2008a), Cifuentes et al. (2005a) and Heaton et al. (2010a) highlight this effect using
exogenous capital requirements whereas in Plantin et al. (2008a), a manager is focused
on short-term earnings. Bhat et al. (2011) and Khan (2014) provide empirical evidence
of this contagion effect during the Great Recession. On the other hand, Laux and Leuz
(2010) and Barth and Landsman (2010a) argue that this effect is negligible. I provide a
novel channel that links mark-to-market accounting and systemic risk: relying only on
observable information may lead to simultaneous liquidations. Yet, I add a dimension
to the debate on the role of fair value accounting and argue that the systemic risk
caused by mark-to-market may be reduced by allowing banks to use Level 3 reporting.
This paper intends to contribute to our understanding of the role of transparency
in the banking system. Goldstein and Sapra (2014) review the tradeoffs related to
transparency in financial systems. Dang et al. (2017) argue that banks are optimally
opaque in order to avoid runs. In the same vein, Gao and Jiang (2016) show that
reporting discretion reduces panic-based runs. Burkhardt and Strausz (2009) find that
transparent accounting can worsen the asset substitution effect of debt. I emphasize
that standard setters and prudential regulators should tradeoff between comparability
of financial statements and systemic risk.
Some recent theoretical papers study the real effects of accounting standards (e.g.
Bleck and Liu, 2007; Caskey and Hughes, 2011; Marinovic, 2016; Otto and Volpin,
2017).7 Kanodia and Sapra (2016a) underscore that identifying the real economic
consequences of accounting standards is of first-order importance to the accounting
discipline. I extend this literature by focusing my analysis on the design of optimal fair
7There is also a large literature studying the real effects of voluntary disclosures by firms. For
instance, Bertomeu et al. (2011) predict a negative association between firms’ cost of capital and the
extent of information firms disclose.
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value accounting standards and by stressing some real effects of fair value accounting
on financial institutions’ behaviors and on financial stability.
Lastly, my model is closely related to Plantin and Tirole (2017), who analyze the op-
timal accounting information in an agency setup with two signals. My baseline model
differs in two ways from theirs: the costly signal is certified with an audit instead of
a resale decision and this signal imperfectly reveals the asset quality. Besides those
two differences, my multi-bank model has a completely different focus and uncovers a
different tradeoff for regulators. Specifically, they show that relying on public informa-
tion (“marking-to-market”) dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness
of public signals. On the contrary, in my model, it is the use of private information
(“Level 3 reporting”) which reduces the comparability of financial statements and may,
in turn, leads to a negative informational externality.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 3.3, I develop the baseline
model, discuss the main assumptions and characterize the optimal intervention policy.
In section 1.3, I study the externalities of Level 3 reporting in a multi-bank equilibrium.
I analyze the impact of manipulation of the banker’s private information in section
3.3.4. In section 1.5, I discuss some implications of the results and section 1.6 provides
concluding remarks.
1.2 The baseline one-bank model
1.2.1 The setup
My baseline one-bank model builds on a standard model of prudential regulation à
la Dewatripont and Tirole (1994c), to which I add a fair value measurement friction.
There are four stages, t = 0, 1, 2 and 3. The timing of the model is summarized in
Figure 1. There are two risk-neutral players involved in an asset - a “bank”: the banker,
who manages the bank, and the prudential regulator, who maximizes the investors’
utility. The “bank” could be any regulated financial institution: commercial bank,
insurance company, pension fund, securities market institution...
The banker must select an asset (e.g. a loan portfolio) at t = 0. There are two
types of assets: high quality assets (H) and low quality assets (L). Both types entail
the same initial investment outlay at t = 0. The probability q ∈ {qL, qH} of having
a high quality asset depends on the banker’s initial non-observable effort at t = 0.
If the banker exerts high effort, which is socially efficient, then this probability is
high (q = qH ∈ [0, 1]). Otherwise, if the banker shirks and exerts low effort, this
probability is low (q = qH −∆q = qL ∈ [0, 1]). The banker incurs a private cost K > 0
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when exerting high effort. For example, a banker can improve the expected return on
loans that the bank originates by screening loan applicants to identify better quality
borrowers.
The main friction, above and beyond this moral hazard problem, is a fair value
measurement issue. The prudential regulator has potentially access to two types of
information to decide of the intervention policy: a public information (Level 2 input)
and a private information to the banker (Level 3 input). The Level 2 input and the
Level 3 input are signals on the asset quality, realized at t = 1, which may be used in
the fair value reporting process.8
At t = 2, the prudential regulator has to take an action A ∈ {C, S}. The payoff of
the asset depends on both the asset quality and the action A. Action C (continuation)
yields the banker a private benefit B > 0 (perks, social status, ego) and an expected
cash flow η to the investors at t = 3. In contrast, action S (liquidation) yields no
private benefit to the banker and a cash flow L to the investors. I assume that the
banker does not value monetary transfers.9 His salary is equal to the salary in an
alternative job and is normalized to zero. For an asset of quality Q ∈ {L,H}, the
expected continuation payoff η takes the value ηQ > 0, with ηL < ηH . Similarly, the
liquidation payoff L takes the value LQ > 0, with LL = ηL + l < LH = ηH , where
l > 0 is fixed.10 High quality assets are not bank-specific can be sold to any bank
as risk-free assets: their liquidation value LH is equal to their final payoff ηH . Low
quality assets can be seen as risky loans with an expected payoff ηL. They can be
restructured, say, by liquidating a safe asset held as collateral, for an immediate cash
payment LL = ηL + l.
The distribution of the two inputs is the following. First, the public Level 2 input
is a continuous signal p ∈ R distributed according to the density fH for high quality
assets and fL for low quality assets. The two distributions satisfy the classic monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP), i.e.
fH(p)
fL(p)
is strictly increasing in p.
8Throughout the paper, unless otherwise mentioned, I study the accounting treatment of an asset
that is reported at fair value (see the appendix 2 for a discussion on the relevant assets).
9It is a well-known idea that formal incentive schemes (bonuses, stock options), while useful, do
not fully resolve the agency problem (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). A number of models prevent
the use of managerial monetary incentives schemes or equity (see, among others, Grossman and Hart,
1986). The results can be generalized under some assumptions to the opposite case with no private
benefit but monetary transfers (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994a).
10The optimal intervention policy is similar if l < 0 (see proof of Proposition 1). In the appendix
3, I also show that the results hold if the liquidation value of the high quality asset is strictly smaller
than its final payoff (LH < ηH).
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Thus, the larger (resp. lower) is the observable input, the more likely the asset is a
high (resp. low) quality one. I assume that the image of fH/fL is (0,+∞) to avoid
corner solutions. The Level 2 input can be observable quoted prices for identical or
similar assets in markets that are active or not. I endogenize the Level 2 input in
section 1.3 in the full-fledged model with multiple banks.
Second, there is a binary Level 3 input s ∈ {g, b}, which is private information
to the banker, and can be either good (s = g) or bad (s = b). The banker learns
the value of the Level 3 input s at t = 1. To capture the idea that the unobservable
input is noisy even in absence of the banker’s influence, s is assumed to be imperfectly
correlated with the asset quality. The distribution of the Level 3 input is defined by
the following conditional probabilities:11
P (s = g | H) = 1 and P (s = g | L) = βL = 1− P (s = b | L).
I endogenize the precision of the Level 3 input and let the banker manipulate its
distribution in section 3.3.4.
The banker is in charge of preparing the financial statements and chooses the
classification level of the asset. The only constraint will be an endogenous cap on
the Level 3 reporting cost set by the prudential regulator. Depending on the level of
the inputs used in the valuation, the asset is reported at Level 2 or Level 3. Hence,
if the banker uses only the Level 2 input, the reported fair value, FV (p), is a Level
2 valuation. Otherwise, if the banker uses both the Level 2 input and the Level 3
input, then the reported fair value, FV (p, s), is a Level 3 valuation. In both cases,
the valuation method is public. If the asset is reported at Level 3 in the financial
statements, the Level 3 estimate FV (p, s) is then audited by the external auditor and
the Level 3 input s becomes public.
In case of Level 3 reporting, the investors bear an audit and a reporting cost c, which
is distributed on [0,+∞) according to the density g.12 The distribution of c is common
knowledge and the cost is publicly realized at t = 2. The banker reports the asset at
Level 2 when indifferent between the two levels because this is the preferred choice of
the investors. The optimal distribution of the cost c is endogenously determined in
section 1.3.4, given the externalities of Level 3 reporting in the multi-bank economy.
Coming back to the introductory example of MBS, originators have access to de-
11The results would still hold with an other distribution of s as long as s is informative enough. In
particular, assuming that P (s = g | H) = βH < 1 yields similar results as long as βH is close to one
(see the appendix 3 for robustness checks).
12The cost of observing the Level 2 input is zero for simplicity. As in Plantin and Tirole (2017),
the qualitative results would not be affected by the introduction of a positive cost, lower than the
Level 3 reporting cost.
16
✲t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
r r r r
The prudential regulator sets
the intervention policy, the
banker exerts effort and
the asset quality is fixed.
The Level 2 input p
is revealed and the banker
learns the Level 3 input s.
The Level 3 cost c is realized,
the banker reports at Level 2 or
Level 3, s becomes public in case of
Level 3 and the prudential regulator
chooses A ∈ {S,C}.
The asset return
is realized.
Figure 1: Timeline of the one-bank model
tailed information about the borrower that is usually not disclosed to the outside in-
vestors, such as the payment-to-income ratio of the borrower or the number of points
paid at origination. This private information could help originators to make adjust-
ments13 to the public credit spread and to better predict future cashflows of those
securities. If this private detailed information is used to compute the fair value of the
securities, the auditor has to discuss and certify the banker’s assumptions. As a result,
the private information becomes known to the outside investors.
I assume that the parameters are such that the investment in an asset is socially
desirable only if the banker exerts high effort.14 Further, the private cost of effort K
is assumed to be sufficiently small such that effort incentives can be provided only
using the Level 2 input.15 The prudential regulator maximizes the expected utility of
the investors subject to the constraint that induces the banker to exert high effort.
I assume away any renegotiation and the prudential regulator has full commitment
power. However, as in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994c), the results are robust to
renegotiation as long as the banker may lose his private benefit after continuation is
chosen if he has to make concessions to prevent liquidation (see the appendix 3 for
robustness checks).
1.2.2 Discussion of the main assumptions
I discuss in this subsection the main assumptions of the model.
Action A For simplicity, I consider only two regulatory actions. Action C can be
interpreted as a continuation, no intervention, or as an expansion in the scope of the
bank’s activities. Similarly, action S admits several interpretations: a liquidation, a
reorganization, a partial asset sale or a downsizing of the bank. More broadly, the
model focuses on external interference as a managerial discipline device and action S
13The valuation of MBS requires detailed assumptions on the prepayment risk, the default risk and
the interest rate risk.
14This is equivalent to assume that qHηH +(1− qH)ηL+B−K > I > qLηH +(1− qL)(ηL+ l)+B,
where I is the initial investment in the asset.
15I state formally this assumption in the proof of Lemma 2.
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represents any regulatory intervention. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, a US banking regulator, can force a bank to stop some activities with
“Cease & Desist Orders”. Action S can also be interpreted as a “Prompt Corrective
Action” that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
requires U.S. bank regulators to take to resolve the problems of financial institutions
(Bushman and Landsman, 2010b).
Contingent Level 3 and reclassification Level 3 reporting is contingent on
the realization of the observable Level 2 input p, which is consistent with empirical
evidence. Altamuro and Zhang (2013) examine the determinants for banks of Level 2
versus Level 3 classification for mortgage servicing rights. They find that the Level 3
choice is contingent and negatively associated with changes in housing prices. More-
over, Hanley et al. (2018) find that insurers that report at Level 3 have significantly
larger fair value inflation than insurers who report at Level 2 for the same asset at the
same point in time.
Standard setters allow firms to move assets into the Level 3 category when the
public information becomes too noisy (e.g. Altamuro and Zhang, 2013; Kohlbeck et al.,
2017; Laux and Leuz, 2010). Hanley et al. (2018) point out that changes in level over
time are strategic and linked to firms’ characteristics. For instance, for a given security,
they observe transfers from Level 2 to Level 3 whenever insurers experience a decline
in regulatory capital.
Level 3 reporting cost Another key assumption of the model is the cost of re-
porting assets at Level 3. First, auditors should work harder to audit less reliable
Level 3 valuations. Indeed, they have more information to process and should dis-
cuss insiders’ assumptions.16 Further, the risk of misstatements is higher for Level
3 valuations. There is empirical evidence that Level 3 reporting is associated with
higher audit fees.17 Then, in practice, a reporting company should provide detailed
explanations of the valuation techniques and the inputs used to value a Level 3 asset
in the footnotes of the financial statements. Consistent with reporting costs associ-
ated to Level 3 reporting, Altamuro and Zhang (2013) and Botosan et al. (2011) find
that Level 3 classification is more likely to be chosen by larger banks with Big Four
auditors.
16Auditing standards explicitly entail the auditor to test “management’s significant assumptions”
(PCAOB AU 328).
17Ettredge et al. (2014) find a positive link between audit fees and the use of Level 3 inputs in the
banking industry. Likewise, Kohlbeck et al. (2017) provide evidence that transfers into the Level 3
category are positively associated with audit fees.
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1.2.3 Benchmark models
I start by solving two benchmark cases, which correspond to the second-best solution
and to a clear cut Level 2 asset. First, the second-best solution to this agency problem
is attained when the Level 2 input p is perfectly informative, i.e. it reveals the quality
of the asset: p = g for a high quality asset and p = b for a low quality asset.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the public signal is perfectly informative. The optimal in-
tervention policy is characterized by any π ∈ [K/(B∆q), 1] such that if the public
information is good (p = g), the prudential regulator chooses continuation with proba-
bility π and liquidation with probability 1− π. Otherwise, if the public information is
bad (p = b), the prudential regulator chooses liquidation.
The incentive-compatibility constraint that ensures that the banker exerts effort is
BπqH − K ≥ BπqL. The probability π is optimally set by the prudential regulator
such that this constraint is satisfied. In this second-best environment, the utility of
the banker when this constraint binds, i.e. π = K/(B∆q), is Ubanker = qLK/∆q. This
is a classic result of the agency literature. Next, I solve another benchmark with no
possibility of using the banker’s private information and the asset is always reported
at Level 2 in the financial statements.
Lemma 2. Suppose that there is no Level 3 input. The optimal intervention policy is
characterized by a cutoff σ such that FL(σ) − FH(σ) = K/(B∆q). If p > σ, the pru-
dential regulator chooses continuation, and if p < σ, the prudential regulator chooses
liquidation.
Proof. See the appendix.
In this second benchmark, the observable input is the only way for the prudential
regulator to measure the asset quality. Hence, for high values of p, the banker is
rewarded whereas the asset is liquidated for low values of p. The cutoff σ is set such
that the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding. Under the optimal intervention
policy, the expected utility of the banker is Ubanker = qLK/∆q + B(1 − FL(σ)). The
banker is strictly better-off than in the second-best world with π = K/(B∆q) because a
low quality asset may sometimes generate a sufficiently good Level 2 input, i.e. p ≥ σ.
1.2.4 The optimal intervention policy
The first proposition of the paper gives the optimal intervention policy in the general
model for an asset with both a Level 2 input and a Level 3 input.
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Proposition 1. The optimal intervention policy (p, p¯, c¯) is as follows:
• if p < p, the banker reports the asset at Level 2 and the prudential regulator
chooses liquidation;
• if p < p < p¯ and the cost of Level 3 reporting is low (c < c¯), the banker reports
the asset at Level 3 when the banker’s private information is good (s = g) and
the prudential regulator chooses continuation. Otherwise, the banker reports the
asset at Level 2 and the prudential regulator chooses liquidation;
• if p¯ < p, the banker reports the asset at Level 2 and the prudential regulator
chooses continuation.
Proof. See the appendix.
This optimal intervention policy has intuitive features. Indeed, for extreme values
of p, the Level 2 input is relevant enough and the banker reports at Level 2 whereas,
for intermediate values of p, the Level 2 input is too noisy and the prudential regulator
needs to rely on the Level 3 input. This is in line with FASB/IASB fair value guidance
which does allow managers to make the argument that Level 3 fair values are preferable
when Level 2 inputs are low quality (Altamuro and Zhang, 2013).
For intermediate realizations of the Level 2 input (p < p < p¯) and a low realization
of the Level 3 reporting cost (c < c¯), Level 3 reporting is only used if the banker’s
private information is good (s = g). However, the investors then infer that a banker
using Level 2 reporting has a bad private signal (s = b). Level 3 reporting, which
makes the private signal public, is a way for the prudential regulator to verify that the
banker’s private information is good. The cap c¯ on the Level 3 reporting cost is set
such that the incentive-compatibility constraint that ensures that the banker exerts
high effort binds.
Note that the Level 3 reporting cost c plays a key role in my model. This cost
is similar to the proprietary cost upon disclosure in Verrecchia (1983) in the sense
that it prevents the banker to always report the asset at Level 3. Nevertheless, even
if this cost is arbitrarily close to zero, the main interesting features of the optimal
intervention policy still hold. Indeed, it is still optimal to use Level 3 reporting only
when the Level 3 input is good information on the asset quality to provide incentives
to the banker. Furthermore, for low realizations of p, it is still optimal to use Level
2 reporting because even a good Level 3 input would not sufficiently improve the
prudential regulator’s posterior belief.
Corollary 1. If the Level 2 input is sufficiently informative and/or the informativeness
of the Level 3 input is too low relative to the Level 3 reporting cost, the asset is never
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reported at Level 3, i.e. G(c¯) = 0. In particular, there exists β¯L such that, if βL ≥ β¯L,
then G(c¯) = 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
This corner solution G(c¯) = 0 corresponds to the second benchmark model with
no use of Level 3 input. This is akin to a clear cut Level 2 asset as in Lemma 2. On
the other hand, if the likelihood ratio fH/fL were bounded, it could be a case with
continuation of the bank only in case of Level 3 reporting. In the appendix 4, I solve
for the optimal intervention policy in that latter case.
1.2.5 Implementation with capital requirements
The optimal intervention policy derived in Proposition 1 is uniquely and fully char-
acterized by two thresholds, p and p¯, on the Level 2 input and a cap c¯ on the Level
3 reporting cost. I now discuss a simple and intuitive implementation of this opti-
mal intervention policy using an appropriate capital structure when action A is non-
contractible. In this subsection, I assume that a high quality asset is riskless with a
constant payoff ηH whereas a low quality asset is risky with an expected payoff ηL.
In practice, banks’ depositors are dispersed and lack the competence or incentives
(e.g. free-riding problem) to monitor bankers’ behaviors. This free-riding problem
creates a need for a representative of the depositors. As a result, the prudential regu-
lator is more biased towards the depositors, which raises the issue of commitment to
the optimal intervention policy when action A is non-contractible. Indeed, depositors,
with their concave return structure, favor liquidation. Conversely, shareholders, with
a convex return structure, favor continuation. Hence, outsiders upon whom control
is conferred must be given incentives to intervene in the proper way. I denote D the
value of deposits to be reimbursed at t = 3.
In effect, bankers report one book value per asset or per class of assets in the
financial statements. In my setup, this reported book value is the fair value of the asset.
For a financial asset, the fair value is the expected liquidation value if I interpret the
latter as the resale price. Thus, in case of Level 2 reporting, the book value is FV (p) =
E(L | p).18 Similarly, in case of Level 3 reporting, the book value is FV (p, s) = E(L |
18I consider the simplest pricing model, which is the expectation of the future payoff conditional
on the inputs used. Pricing models can be quite complex and in particular, the determination of the
discount rate is important for the valuation of MBS. I remain agnostic about the specific valuation
model used.
In line with practice, I do not condition with respect to the realization of the cost of Level 3
reporting. This would lead exactly to the same implementation.
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p, s). The following lemma compares the book values at the thresholds of the optimal
intervention policy.
Lemma 3. At the thresholds of the optimal intervention policy, the book values under
Level 2 and Level 3 reporting are equal: FV (p¯) = FV (p, s = g)
def
= BV .
Proof. See the appendix.
The prudential regulator requires the expected value of the bank’s assets to be
larger than BV in order to choose continuation. Next, I shall restate the optimal
intervention policy set by the prudential regulator when the intervention policy is
solely based on the financial statements of the bank, i.e. on the book value FV (p)
(resp. FV (p, s)) in case of Level 2 (resp. Level 3) reporting, and on the Level 3
reporting cost.
Proposition 2. If D > LL = ηL + l, the optimal intervention policy can be imple-
mented as follows. The prudential regulator sets a threshold BV and leaves to the
banker the discretion to use Level 2 reporting or Level 3 reporting when the cost c is
lower than c¯.
• If the banker reports at Level 2 (resp. Level 3) and the book value FV (p) (resp.
FV (p, s)) is larger than BV , then the shareholders keep the control rights and
chooses continuation;
• otherwise the control rights shift to the prudential regulator who chooses liquida-
tion.
Proof. Direct consequence of Proposition 1.
Given this capital structure, depositors are strictly better-off in case of liquidation:
for a low quality asset, their payoff is LL = ηL+l in case of liquidation, which is greater
than their expected payoff in case of continuation. Conversely, shareholders get zero in
case of liquidation of a low quality asset and strictly prefer continuation to “gamble for
resurrection”. Indeed, the payoff of the low quality asset may be greater than D at the
final stage t = 3.19 Shareholders are biased towards continuation whereas depositors
are biased towards liquidation. Thus, this optimal capital structure implements the
optimal choice of action by investors, namely action C when the reported book value
is larger than BV and action S when the reported book value is lower than BV .
19The expected payoff of depositors in case of continuation of the low quality asset is
E(min(D, R˜)) < ηL + l, where R˜ is the final payoff of a low quality asset with E(R˜) = ηL.
The expected payoff of shareholders in case of continuation of a low quality asset is E(max(0, R˜−
D)) ≥ 0.
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The optimal intervention policy is similar to capital requirements for banks or in-
surance companies.20 In line with practice, Lemma 3 states that capital requirements
are not contingent on the reporting level of the assets. As in Dewatripont and Ti-
role (1994c), capital rules are a means to efficiently allocate control rigths between
shareholders and depositors, thereby indirectly influencing the incentives of banks’ in-
siders. The model predicts that banks’ insiders use their discretion to classify assets
at Level 3 and meet capital requirements set by prudential regulators when the pub-
lic information is not good enough. This is consistent with several empirical studies
(e.g. Hanley et al., 2018) which find that financial institutions actively manage the
accounting treatment of their assets to increase regulatory capital.
One interesting feature of the optimal intervention policy is that the banker has
the discretion to choose between Level 2 and Level 3 reporting and, in equilibrium, he
only classifies an asset at Level 3 when the Level 3 input is good news on the quality
of the asset (s = g). Hence, this result could explain the empirical results of Hanley
et al. (2018), who find that, for insurance companies, the same asset can be reported
at the same point in time at Level 2 or Level 3 depending on the company. When
the asset is reported at Level 3, the reported price is higher than the Level 2 reported
price. This prediction of the optimal intervention policy is also consistent with Laux
and Leuz (2010) who argue that banks exercise substantial discretion in fair valuing
their assets and provide evidence that points more toward overvaluation.
Corollary 2. For a deterministic cost c, p and p¯ decrease in the Level 3 reporting
cost c. When c is sufficiently large, the optimal intervention policy is as in the second
benchmark with a Level 2 input but no Level 3 input, i.e. p = p¯ = σ.
Proof. See the appendix.
In case of a deterministic Level 3 reporting cost c, the banker uses less Level 3
reporting as the cost increases and the thresholds converge toward the cutoff σ of the
Level 2 benchmark. When the cost of Level 3 reporting is too high relative to the
informativeness of the Level 3 input, the prudential regulator does not find it optimal
to let the banker classify the asset at Level 3. In that latter case, the prudential
regulator relies only on the Level 2 input, as in Lemma 2.
Corollary 3. As the precision of the private signal s increases, the upper threshold p¯
increases whereas the lower threshold p decreases for sufficiently low βL.
In the limiting case of a perfectly informative private signal (βL = 0), there is no
lower bound on the public signal (p = −∞).
20For a fixed amount of deposits D in the bank, setting a constraint on the value of the asset or on
the equity E is similar: BV > BV is equivalent to E > E = BV −D.
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Proof. See the appendix.
The higher the precision of the private signal (the lower βL), the larger the range of
the Level 2 input in which the prudential regulator relies on Level 3 reporting. In the
extreme case of a perfectly informative private signal (βL = 0), the prudential regulator
chooses continuation if the Level 3 input is good even for very low realizations of the
Level 2 input p. In that latter case, the optimal intervention policy is similar to the
optimal contract derived in Plantin and Tirole (2017).
Under the optimal intervention policy, the banker’s expected utility is
Ubanker = qL
K
∆q
+B
(
1− FL(p¯) + βLG(c¯)(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
. (1.1)
The banker’s expected utility is composed of two terms. The first term, qLK/∆q, is
the second-best utility that would prevail absent measurement frictions, as in Lemma
1 with π = K/(B∆q). The second term is the rent that the banker gets in case
of continuation of a low quality asset for a high Level 2 input, 1 − FL(p¯), or for
a noisy Level 2 input but a good private signal and a low Level 3 reporting cost,
βLG(c¯)(FL(p¯)−FL(p)). Corollary 3 implies that the banker’s expected utility increases
with the probability βL to get a good Level 3 input given a low quality asset. As a
result, the banker is willing to increase ex ante this probability βL. I analyze the
impact of the Level 3 input manipulation in section 1.4.
1.3 The full-fledged multi-bank model
This section is the core of the paper. I endogenize the observable input p in a multi-
bank economy and I investigate the externalities of the optimal measurement rules for
capital requirements set by the prudential regulator derived in section 3.3.21
1.3.1 The model
There is a continuum of banks with unit mass. Each bank faces the same situation
as that described in the previous section. In equilibrium, the prudential regulator
provides incentives to all the bankers to exert high effort, which in turn implies that a
fraction qH of banks have a high quality asset and a fraction 1− qH have a low quality
asset.
21Externalities from prudential regulatory rules may exist because of a lack of coordination among
the prudential regulators of different countries or among the prudential regulators within the same
country (e.g. OCC, FDIC and Fed in the US). Equivalently, a single prudential regulator may use
only microprudential regulations.
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t = 2− t = 2 t = 2+
r r r...... ......
The Level 3 costs c are realized,
the bankers report at Level 2 or
Level 3.
The broker observes two
samples of banks with assets
similar to asset aH and aL.
He quotes the two prices
FV (pH) and FV (pL).
The bankers observe pH
and pL and publish
new financial statements.
The prudential regulator
chooses A ∈ {S,C}.
Figure 2: Timeline of the multi-bank model
The timing is similar to the baseline model except for the reporting stage, t = 2,
which is now decomposed into three dates: t = 2−, t = 2 and t = 2+. The timeline of
this multi-bank model is summarized in Figure 2.
At t = 1, the private Level 3 inputs are realized and are independent across bankers.
Further, each banker also observes an arbitrarily weakly informative exogenous Level
2 input on the quality of his asset. Those Level 2 inputs are i.i.d. across banks with
assets of the same quality. For instance, the bankers with assets of the same quality
observe a very noisy index at different points in time (e.g. S&P’s Case–Shiller Home
Price Indices).
At t = 2−, the publicly observable costs c of Level 3 reporting are realized and are
independent across banks.22 The bankers report simultaneously their financial state-
ments for the first time. At this date, each banker only observes a weakly informative
Level 2 input and his private signal. Hence, if a banker decides to report at Level
2, only the weakly informative Level 2 input becomes public. Otherwise, if a banker
reports at Level 3, both the weakly informative Level 2 input and his private signal
become public.
At t = 2, a third-party (e.g. a broker) quotes a price for a high quality asset aH and
a price for a low quality asset aL. However, the broker does not know the quality of the
assets aH and aL. The broker is perfectly competitive and quotes the price FV (pH)
(resp. FV (pL)) at which he is willing to buy/sell asset aH (resp. aL) by observing a
sample of financial statements of banks that have assets similar to asset aH (resp. aL).
For asset aH (resp. aL), the information pH (resp. pL) available to the broker is the
fraction of banks in his sample that meet the capital requirement.
Next, I describe how the broker’s samples of banks that have assets similar to asset
aH and asset aL are formed. To that end, I define an asset of quality Q ∈ {L,H} as
a Level 3 asset if a non-zero fraction of bankers with assets of the same quality Q use
Level 3 reporting. In contrast, an asset of quality Q is a Level 2 asset if all the bankers
22As mentioned previously, the cost of Level 3 reporting depends on some firms’ specific factors
(size of the auditor, asset...). Assuming independence is a simplification without loss of generality:
the results hold as long as correlation is not perfect.
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(except a measure zero) with assets of quality Q report at Level 2. As a result, in this
multi-bank setting, an asset has two characteristics: it is either a low quality or a high
quality asset and either a Level 2 or a Level 3 asset.
Definition An asset of quality Q ∈ {L,H} is a Level 3 asset if a non-zero fraction of
banks with assets of quality Q use Level 3 reporting. Otherwise, it is a Level 2 asset.
Consistency and comparability are the key determinants of the fair value hierarchy.
According to the IASB (2011), in order “to increase consistency and comparability in
fair value measurements”, the fair value hierarchy gives “the lowest priority to unob-
servable inputs (Level 3 inputs).” Accounting standard setters consider that Level 2
reporting is better than Level 3 reporting in terms of comparability and the possibility
for outsiders to identify the different banks’ assets.23 Therefore, I assume that, if asset
aH (resp. aL) is a Level 2 asset, the broker can perfectly identify the banks with similar
assets to asset aH (resp. aL), i.e. there is no misclassification risk.
Assumption 1. If asset aH (resp. aL) is a Level 2 asset, the broker’s observed sample
of banks with similar assets to aH (resp. aL) is only composed of banks with high (resp.
low) quality assets.
On the contrary and in line with the fair value classification, I introduce a positive
misclassification risk for Level 3 assets.24 Specifically, if asset aH (resp. aL) is a Level
3 asset, the broker cannot ascertain perfectly how similar the reporting assets are to
asset aH (resp. aL). The accuracy of his classification is denoted by α. Thus, if asset
aH (resp. aL) is a Level 3 asset, only a fraction α of the broker’s sample of banks
is formed with banks that have high (resp. low) quality assets. The broker does not
observe the realization of α, which is distributed on [0, 1] according to the density h,
which increases on [0, 1] with h(0) > 0. This assumption is broadly consistent with
Magnan et al. (2015) who find that analysts’ forecasts are more accurate for banks
that have a larger proportion of assets reported at Level 2 rather than Level 3.
Assumption 2. If asset aH (resp. aL) is a Level 3 asset, the broker’s sample of banks
with similar assets to aH (resp. aL) is composed of α banks with high (resp. low)
quality assets and, misleadingly, 1− α of banks with low (resp. high) quality assets.
At the last date of the reporting stage, t = 2+, a bank’s stakeholders (including
the banker and the prudential regulator) with a high (resp. low) quality asset observe
23There are more disclosure requirements in the financial statements for Level 3 assets precisely to
reduce this misclassification risk.
24More generally, assuming that the misclassification risk for Level 2 assets is positive but lower
than the one for Level 3 assets would not change qualitatively the results.
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the quoted price FV (pH) (resp. FV (pL)) of asset aH (resp. aL) and get the signal
pH (resp. pL). The bankers report simultaneously their financial statements for the
second time using the signals pH and pL as Level 2 inputs. As in the baseline model,
the prudential regulator then takes an action A ∈ {C, S}.
Note that the dates t = 2− and t = 2+ can be interpreted as two consecutive
reporting quarters. The investors of a bank incur the Level 3 reporting cost whether
the banker uses Level 3 at t = 2− or t = 2+. In equilibrium, the bankers report at the
same level at t = 2− and t = 2+.25
Definition An equilibrium of this multi-bank economy is characterized by an optimal
intervention policy (p, p¯, c¯) and two broker’s prices (FV (pH) and FV (pL)) such that
• given the broker’s prices (FV (pH) and FV (pL)), the optimal intervention policy
set by the regulator is (p, p¯, c¯);
• given the intervention policy (p, p¯, c¯), the banks report at Level 2 or Level 3 and
the broker sets the two prices FV (pH) and FV (pL).
1.3.2 Informational externality
I shall now solve for the two equilibria of this economy. First, there is an equilibrium
(A) with an optimal intervention policy (p
A
, p¯A, c¯A) similar to Proposition 1. In this
equilibrium, the Level 2 inputs pH and pL are noisy and banks with both high and
low quality assets meet the capital requirement only when using Level 3 reporting, i.e.
∀Q ∈ {L,H}, p¯A > pQ > pA. At t = 2, for asset aH , the fraction of banks that used
Level 3 reporting in the broker’s observed sample is distributed according to
banks with high quality assets
that are continued︷ ︸︸ ︷
αG(c¯A) +
banks with low quality assets
that are continued︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α)G(c¯A)βL ,
which implies that pH = α.26 Similarly, for asset aL, the fraction of banks that used
Level 3 reporting in his observed sample is distributed according to (1 − α)G(c¯A) +
αG(c¯A)βL, which implies that pL = 1− α. As a result, the likelihood ratio
fH(p)
fL(p)
=
h(p)
h(1− p)
increases in p because hL3 also increases in p.
25In the appendix 3, I show as a robustness check that the results of this section are the same in
case of a sequential game in which a large number N of banks publish sequentially their financial
statements and the broker updates the quoted prices by looking at those sequential reports.
26The fraction of banks using Level 3 reporting in the sample is pHL3 = αG(c¯A) + (1− α)G(c¯A)βL.
Hence, this signal is equivalent to pH = (pHL3/G(c¯A)− βL)/(1− βL) = α.
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Thus, the MLRP property is satisfied and I can apply the results of section 3.3.
The prudential regulator sets the capital requirement BV A based on the thresholds
p¯A and pA of the optimal intervention policy as in the baseline model in section 1.2.5.
This equilibrium only exists if the Level 2 inputs pH and pL are sufficiently noisy. I
assume that it is indeed verified, i.e. α and 1− α ∈]p
A
, p¯A[.27
In the other equilibrium (B), which corresponds to the second-best benchmark,
all the banks use Level 2 reporting. At t = 2, the aggregation by the broker of the
arbitrarily weakly informative Level 2 inputs reported at t = 2− is perfectly informative
because there is no misclassification risk for Level 2 assets. In this equilibrium, the
Level 2 inputs available at t = 2+ are perfectly informative: pH = 1 for banks with
high quality assets and pL = 0 for banks with low quality assets. As in Lemma 1, a
fraction π ∈ [K/(B∆q), 1] of banks with high quality assets are continued whereas the
other fraction 1− π of the banks with high quality assets and all the banks with low
quality assets are liquidated. The following lemma sums up this discussion.
Lemma 4. There are two equilibria:
(A) the banks with a good private signal (s = g) and a low cost of Level 3 (c < c¯A)
report at Level 3 and are continued. All the other banks report at Level 2 and
are liquidated;
(B) all the banks use Level 2 reporting and the Level 2 inputs are perfectly informative.
A fraction π of banks with high quality assets are continued and the other banks
are liquidated.
Proof. See the appendix.
A direct implication of Lemma 4 is that Level 3 reporting leads to a negative
informational externality.
Proposition 3. In equilibrium (A), banks do not use the socially optimal amount of
Level 3 reporting, which in turn implies that investors are better-off in equilibrium (B).
Proof. See the discussion above.
Investors are better-off in the second-best equilibrium (B) compared to equilibrium
(A). Indeed there is a misclassification risk for Level 3 assets and hence, in equilib-
rium (A), the Level 2 inputs are less informative for banks carrying Level 3 assets. In
equilibrium (A), banks do not internalize the decrease in the informativeness of the
public signals when using Level 3 reporting. Thus, due to this informational external-
ity, a social planner maximizing the investors’ surplus would be willing to increase the
27See the proof of Lemma 4 for a formal statement of this assumption.
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use of Level 2 reporting. This objective is in line with accounting standard setters’
goal of increasing transparency of financial statements. My findings may also recon-
cile the conflicting results of the empirical literature on the value relevance of Level
3 information. Using market prices, Kolev (2009), Goh et al. (2015) and Song et al.
(2010) find that Level 3 estimates are less value relevant than Level 2 and Level 1
estimates. Other studies using realized future cash flows (e.g. Altamuro and Zhang,
2013; Lawrence et al., 2015) conclude that Level 3 measurements are more efficient in
reflecting underlying intrinsic values. My one-bank model predicts that Level 3 fair
values are optimally greater and more value relevant than Level 2 fair values for the
same asset at the same point in time. Interestingly, I show in section 3.3.4 that this
is true even if Level 3 inputs are subject to manipulation. However, my multi-bank
analysis shows that fair values of Level 2 assets are more relevant than fair values of
Level 3 assets because of this negative informational externality of Level 3 reporting.
My analysis of this informational externality uncovers a drawback of Level 3 re-
porting. One important takeaway is that the fair value hierarchy may be endogenous
because the quality of the public information for one asset depends on the classification
levels of similar assets. I show that this endogeneity may lead to an inefficient equi-
librium. Using a different argument, Bleck and Gao (2017b) and Plantin and Tirole
(2017) also point out the endogeneity of the fair value classification by showing that
the attempt to extract information from market prices (Level 1 or Level 2 reporting)
may destroy the price informativeness. Next, I analyze a benefit of Level 3 reporting.
1.3.3 Payoff externality
There is a potential payoff externality in this multi-bank economy. Indeed, the Level 2
input is identical for the banks with similar assets, which in turn implies that the banks
with similar assets using Level 2 reporting have the same book value. Hence, Level
2 reporting may cause a negative payoff externality if banks simultaneously liquidate
their assets and the market demand for those illiquid assets is less than perfectly
elastic. This congestion effect for financial assets has been at the heart of the debate
on fair value accounting during the 2007-08 financial crisis. The main fear was that
fire sales may lead to a decrease in assets’ prices and this would negatively impact
banks’ balance sheets, as empirically shown by Bhat et al. (2011) in the case of MBS.
Therefore, if I interpret the liquidation decision as a resale decision and the liquidation
value as the resale price, simultaneous resale decisions may lead to a decrease of the
price because of the illiquidity of the market.
I model the congestion effect as follows. The liquidation price of an asset of quality
Q at an intermediate date, LQ(µQ) > 0, is a function of µQ, the fraction of the banks
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with an asset of quality Q which choose liquidation. There is a cutoff on the number
of liquidations µQ and a discount on the resale price δ ∈ [0, 1) such that if µQ ≥ µQ,
LQ(µQ) = δLQ. Otherwise, if µQ < µQ, LQ(µQ) = LQ. For simplicity, I assume
that µQ = 1.28 In other words, there is a drop in the liquidation prices when almost
all the banks with similar assets liquidate simultaneously. This way of modeling the
congesting effect is consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), who predict
sudden drops in market liquidity and hence, in market prices, for sufficiently large
shocks on traders’ capital.29 Those drops in prices are larger for risky and illiquid
securities. The reason is the existence of liquidity spirals caused by destabilizing
margins for traders. As a result, the parameter δ is a function of the illiquidity of the
resale market and of the riskiness of the asset. Specifically, the lower is the market
liquidity and the riskier is the asset, the stronger is the congestion effect (the lower is
δ).
Proposition 4. There exists a cutoff δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, if there is a sufficiently
strong congestion in the liquidation price (i.e. δ < δ¯), the investors are better-off in
equilibrium (A).
Proof. See the appendix.
As underlined in the introduction, mark-to-market accounting has been criticized
by some practitioners and academics for leading to contagion effects due to a feed-
back loop between illiquid markets, banks’ resale decisions and exogenous capital re-
quirements (Allen and Carletti, 2008a) or managerial short-termism (Plantin et al.,
2008a). In my setup, mark-to-market, or Level 2 reporting, increases systemic risk
because liquidation decisions for banks using Level 2 reporting are based on the same
public information. Therefore, upon sufficiently bad public information, Level 2 re-
porting triggers simultaneous liquidations by distressed banks. Those liquidations are
inefficient because of the congestion in the liquidation prices of the assets. Namely,
equilibrium (B) with only Level 2 reporting is worse than equilibrium (A) when δ is
sufficiently small, i.e. for risky and illiquid securities. Securities classified at Level
2 or Level 3 have precisely those properties. This result emphasizes the real effects
of fair value accounting on financial institutions’ behaviors and on financial stability.
28The results are robust for any µQ close to one. I provide in the proof of Proposition 4 the exact
lower bounds needed for µH and µL.
29Their model predicts that the effect of speculator capital on market liquidity is highly nonlin-
ear. Although a marginal change in capital has a small effect when speculators are far from their
constraints, this marginal change has a large effect when speculators are close to their constraints,
leading to a jump in illiquidity and prices. Duffie et al. (2007) also predict jump in prices as a result
of liquidity shocks.
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My analysis of this second payoff externality underscores a relative benefit of Level 3
reporting compared to mark-to-market accounting.
In the introductory case of MBS, if all banks use the same credit spread over
the risk-free rate (e.g. ABX index during the 2007-08 crisis) to compute fair values,
then all banks with similar MBS report the same book value and distressed banks
may be liquidated at the same time. On the other hand, if some bankers use their
private information on the borrowers to adjust for differences between the index used
and the actual asset, then there is some heterogeneity in the adjustments and the
assumptions made to compute fair values. Indeed, in equilibrium, some banks use
their private information to adjust public data but some banks do not because this
private information is bad news or because their cost of Level 3 reporting is too high.
Thus, under Level 3 reporting, banks with similar MBS report different book values,
which in turn leads to different liquidation decisions.
1.3.4 Optimal fair value accounting standards
After studying the two opposite externalities of Level 3 reporting, I shall now conclude
on the fair value accounting standards that a social planner maximizing investors’
surplus would set.30 To that end, I first state the following corollary that highlights
the optimal fair value standards.
Corollary 4. There is a tradeoff between comparability of financial statements and
systemic risk:
• if the congestion effect is not too severe (δ > δ¯), equilibrium (B) is efficient and
banning Level 3 reporting is optimal;
• otherwise, if the congestion effect is severe (δ < δ¯), equilibrium (A) is efficient
and the optimal accounting standards use both Level 2 and Level 3 reporting.
Further, δ¯ decreases in the probability qH to get a high quality asset.
Proof. Direct consequence of Propositions 3 and 4.
Increasing the use of Level 2 reporting may be socially optimal because it would
increase the quality of the public information. However, when banks use only Level 2
reporting, the banks with the same type of assets report the same book value, which
may lead to simultaneous inefficient liquidations. In other words, systemic risk is the
price to pay to increase the consistency and the comparability of financial statements.
The objective of standard setters is to increase transparency, whereas the objective of
30The social planner could be the prudential regulator or another public entity.
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prudential regulators is to increase financial stability (Barth and Landsman, 2010a).
My model underscores that those two objectives are in conflict when the congestion
effect is severe (δ < δ¯). In that latter case, a certain degree of opacity is optimal to in-
crease financial stability. An interesting analogy can be drawn with Dang et al. (2017),
who argue that banks are optimally opaque institutions to avoid runs. Goldstein and
Sapra (2014) also accent this tradeoff between transparency and financial stability in
the context of banks’ stress tests disclosure.
In normal times, there are more potential buyers for banks’ assets, which implies
that banks face less monopsony power (higher δ). On the contrary, during distressed
times, potential buyers are financially constrained and banks face more monopsony
power (lower δ). As a result, it could well be the case that the efficient equilibrium
is (B) under normal economic conditions and it switches to equilibrium (A) when
a financial crisis hits. Having flexible accounting standards and letting banks move
assets into the Level 3 category during financial collapses may therefore be the optimal
policy to increase financial stability. Level 3 reporting then acts as a circuit-breaker
and reduces systemic risk caused by mark-to-market. Laux and Leuz (2010) underline
that banks were able to use this accounting discretion during the 2007-08 financial
crisis. This policy could be more efficient to reduce systemic risk rather than isolating
the effect of fair value measures on regulatory capital, which would strengthen the
moral hazard problem between banks’ insiders and investors.31 I discuss in further
details the policy implications of the model in section 1.5.3.
One way for standard setters to influence the use of Level 3 reporting is to change
the Level 3 reporting cost. For instance, accounting standard setters may impose
standardized valuation models for Level 3 assets. This would increase the reliability of
Level 3 valuations and reduce auditing costs associated to Level 3 reporting. On the
other hand, increasing the reporting requirements would increase the cost.32 Auditing
standard setters can also influence the audit cost by requiring more due diligence and
disclosure requirements from auditors for Level 3 assets, which would in turn increase
audit fees. Increasing auditors’ litigation risks for mispricing would also increase audit
fees and reduce the use of Level 3 reporting. For example, Botosan et al. (2011)
provide evidence that auditors’ litigation risks limited the use of Level 3 reporting
during the 2007-08 financial crisis. In the following corollary, I shall solve for the
optimal distribution of the Level 3 reporting that maximizes the investors’ surplus.
31For instance by applying a filter on unrealized fair value gains and losses or by allowing financial
institutions to reclassify assets into the HTM category and use amortized cost (Huizinga and Laeven,
2012).
32For example, the FASB is currently proposing to eliminate the disclosure of transfers between
Level 1 and Level 2 category but they have increased the disclosure requirements for Level 3 (FASB ,
2016).
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This distribution of the cost is fixed by a social planner at t = 0−, anticipating that
capital requirements are fixed at t = 0, based on the banks’ financial statements.
Corollary 5. In order to maximize the investors’ surplus:
• if δ > δ¯, the social planner sets the Level 3 reporting cost to infinity, i.e. bans
Level 3 reporting;
• otherwise, if δ < δ¯, the social planner sets the minimum Level 3 reporting cost.
Proof. Direct consequence of Corollary 4.
In the first case, when the market’s demand for the assets is sufficiently elastic
(δ > δ¯), accounting standard setters and prudential regulators’ objectives coincide
and it is then optimal to ban Level 3 reporting. Otherwise, when the congestion effect
is severe (δ < δ¯), prudential regulators and standard setters should compromise on the
objective. As discussed above, there is a tradeoff between transparency and financial
stability. It is optimal to decrease the Level 3 reporting cost as much as possible.
An interesting extension of this model, which lies beyond the scope of this paper,
would be to consider explicitly two types of regulators, accounting standard setters
and prudential regulators, to study their optimal behaviors and the implementation
of the optimal fair value standards.33
1.4 Manipulation of the banker’s private informa-
tion
Up to this point, the precision of the Level 3 input, 1 − P (s = g | L) = 1 − βL,
has been exogenous. I now endogenize this precision as a costly choice of the banker.
In practice, manipulation of the banker’s private information is a major concern for
regulators and practitioners. Level 3 reporting is considered as the less reliable level.
For example, it has been compared by practitioners to “mark-to-myth” (Buffett, 2002)
or “mark-to-believe” (Weil, 2007). For the introductory case of MBS, Dechow et al.
(2010) provide evidence that managers are able to manipulate discount rates, which
are key inputs into the valuation process.34 Therefore, I assume that the banker can
increase by β ∈ [0, 1 − βL] the probability of receiving a good private signal (s = g)
33For a first step towards the understanding of the political economy of accounting choices, see
Bertomeu and Magee (2011).
34They find that, on average, discount rates are lower when firms report securitization losses than
when they report gains. Lower discount rates increase the fair value of retained interest, resulting in
smaller losses.
33
when the asset is a low quality one. The distribution of the Level 3 input becomes
P (s = g | H) = 1 and P (s = g | L) = βL + β = 1− P (s = b | L). (1.2)
The parameter β can be interpreted as the extra probability that the banker succeeds
in generating a good signal for low quality assets. For simplicity, the manipulation
decision is taken by the banker at t = 0 after the intervention policy is set but before the
effort decision. Hence, the manipulation level β does not depend on the effort decision
and on the Level 2 input. Of course, manipulation in practice can occur in all stages
of fair value reporting, both before and after the effort decision and the realization of
the public information. As a robustness check, I discuss the other possible timings of
manipulation in the appendix 3.
The private cost of manipulation for the banker is quadratic, kβ2/2, with k >
0. This cost covers all the costs to the banker of concocting and camouflaging the
falsification as well as the cost of bribing the auditor.35 The parameter k measures the
magnitude of all these effects. As in Laux and Stocken (2012), I consider separately in
the online appendix the impact of litigation risks for mispricing as well as reputation
costs.
The banker affects the distribution of the Level 3 input before having any private
information on the asset quality. This is similar to the “signal-jamming” literature
(e.g. Stein, 1989), whereby an agent takes a costly action that is intended to mis-
lead but actually misleads no one in equilibrium. Indeed, in equilibrium, the level of
manipulation β∗ is known by the prudential regulator.
Definition I define k as the reliability of the Level 3 input.
I assume that the reliability of the Level 3 input is large enough in order that the
equilibrium level of manipulation is interior.
Lemma 5. In the single-bank model, as long as k > k¯, there is a unique equilibrium
level of manipulation β∗ ∈ (0, 1). This equilibrium level of manipulation β∗ decreases
in the reliability of the Level 3 input and increases in the private benefit B.
Proof. See the appendix.
The first part of Lemma 5 confirms the existence of a unique level of manipulation
in equilibrium as long as the prudential regulator finds it optimal to let the banker
35For instance, the banker might understate the discount rate for the future cash flows of a given
security to boost the fair value. With probability β, the external auditor accepts the discount rate
and with probability 1 − β, the auditor requires a reevaluation of the fair value. Orchestrating this
manipulation is costly to the banker.
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use Level 3 reporting, i.e. the Level 3 input is sufficiently informative (see Corollary
1). The second part provides some comparative statics. In particular, the higher is
the benefit of manipulation or the smaller is the banker’s private cost of manipulation,
the higher is the extent of manipulation. This prediction is in line with the empirical
evidence that weaker corporate governance (lower cost k) implies less relevant Level 3
information (Song et al., 2010). However, it is worth underlining that, even if Level 3
reporting is subject to manipulation, it still provides some valuable information to the
prudential regulator. More generally, it is not because an accounting system is subject
to earnings management that this system is not desirable (Barth and Taylor, 2010).
Lemma 6. The optimal intervention policy for a single bank is such that p¯(β∗) in-
creases and p(β∗) decreases in the reliability of the Level 3 input.
If the reliability of the Level 3 input is too low (k < k¯), then the optimal intervention
policy relies only on the Level 2 input.
Proof. Direct consequence of Corollary 3 and Lemma 5.
As in Gao (2015), the optimal accounting thresholds of the intervention policy de-
pend on the equilibrium level of manipulation. The higher is the manipulation, the less
informative the banker’s private signal is. Hence, the prudential regulator relies more
on the public signal as manipulation increases. The prudential regulator internalizes
the decrease in the precision of the Level 3 input caused by manipulation when setting
the optimal intervention policy. Next, I analyze the impact of manipulation in the
multi-bank economy.
Proposition 5. If the reliability of the Level 3 input is too low, then the only equilib-
rium in the multi-bank economy is the equilibrium (B) with no Level 3 reporting.
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemma 6.
In the multi-bank economy, when manipulation is too high, banks do not use
Level 3 reporting and the only equilibrium is (B). An important takeaway from
this analysis is that manipulation of Level 3 inputs may increase systemic risk in the
economy. Indeed, manipulation decreases the informativeness of Level 3 inputs, which
may increase systemic risk according to the results of section 1.3. Manipulation of
Level 3 inputs entails a social cost. As a result, the social planner should increase the
reliability of Level 3 inputs. Another counterintuitive solution would be to expand the
use of Level 3 reporting when Level 3 inputs are subject to manipulation to decrease
systemic risk.
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Another implementation problem of Level 3 reporting that may arise is the litiga-
tion and reputation risks that preparers face when deviating from observable informa-
tion to compute fair values (Laux and Leuz, 2009; Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 2008). Preparers of financial statements may be reluctant to deviate from low
market prices and to report higher Level 3 fair values when being exposed to litigation
and reputation risks resulting from mispricing errors. In the online appendix, I study
a simple extension of the model with litigation/reputation risks and I point out that
those risks reduce the use of Level 3 reporting in equilibrium and may also increase
systemic risk.
1.5 Discussion
1.5.1 Fair value versus historical cost
The alternative accounting method to measure illiquid assets is the use of historical
cost accounting. For instance, financial assets classified as “held-to-maturity” (HTM)
under US GAAP are reported at amortized cost less impairment. In particular, the
lower-of-cost-and-net-realizable-value rule (LCNRV) requires a downward revaluation
of the book value of an asset from its current book value but does not allow an upward
revaluation. Using the baseline model, I shall compare the fair value accounting regime
and the historical cost regime with the LCNRV rule.36
Corollary 6. The cutoff on the reported book value of the optimal intervention policy
is greater than the historical cost (HC): BV > qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l) ≥ HC.
As a result, there are too many continuations under historical cost accounting.
Proof. See the appendix.
Under the LCNRV rule, the prudential regulator only has access to two truncated
signals. The optimal intervention policy would be for the prudential regulator to choose
continuation if the book value is HC and to choose liquidation whenever the reported
book value is lower than HC. The optimal intervention policy under historical cost
leads to too many continuations compared to the one under fair value and the pruden-
tial regulator (i.e. the investors) is worse-off. Historical cost accounting increases the
agency rents bankers are able to extract. This extension bears interesting relationship
to the regulatory forbearance observed during the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the
36The historical cost HC is unknown in this paper because I do not model the primary markets
for the assets. Nonetheless, HC is at most equal to the expected payoff of this asset at t = 0. This
implies that HC ≤ qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l).
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1980s and 1990s (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994c). At that time, historical cost was
the main accounting rule for financial instruments. Many insolvent S&L associations
were allowed to remain open, and their financial problems only worsened over time.
As a result, in 1991, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) pushed for immedi-
ate adoption of mark-to-market accounting for all debt securities. Thus, my paper
provides a rationale for the gradual move of accounting standards from historical cost
accounting towards the use of fair value measurements.
1.5.2 Empirical predictions
My findings generate a number of interesting empirical predictions. The main predic-
tion of the one-bank model is that Level 3 reporting is only used when the banker’s
private information is good information on the asset quality, above and beyond the
public information (Level 2 input). This prediction is easy to test and previous em-
pirical studies have already provided evidence of this effect. Contrary to some of
those previous studies, I claim that this effect is not necessarily due to manipulation
detrimental to investors but may be part of an optimal mechanism for the prudential
regulator to provide managerial discipline. My analysis highlights that discretion in
fair value estimates may be welfare improving (Barth and Taylor, 2010).
In the same vein, my model predicts that bankers use their discretion to classify
assets at Level 3, increase the fair value and meet capital requirements. This is consis-
tent with prior empirical studies that show that insurers (Ellul et al., 2015a; Hanley
et al., 2018) and banks (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012) use their discretion to manage
the accounting treatment of their financial assets to increase their regulatory capital.
Another intuitive empirical prediction of the one-bank model is that in equilibrium,
only banks with a low cost of Level 3 reporting classify assets at Level 3. This is in
line with Altamuro and Zhang (2013) and Botosan et al. (2011) who provide evidence
that large firms with a Big Four auditor are more likely to report an asset at Level 3.
Iselin and Nicoletti (2017) show that banks avoid costly disclosure of Level 3 assets
through changes in both asset composition and classification.
My analysis may also reconcile the conflicting empirical evidence from previous
research on the value relevance of Level 3 reporting. Level 3 reporting is valuable
because it adds some information in addition to the public information. As discussed
in section 1.3.2, value relevance studies using market prices to evaluate fair values
conclude that Level 1 and Level 2 fair values are more value relevant, while studies
using realized future cash flows to evaluate fair values conclude that Level 3 fair values
are more value relevant. My analysis suggests that bankers provide some valuable
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information on the asset quality when using Level 3 reporting, above and beyond the
public information. Importantly, this result holds even in the presence of manipulation.
However, fair values of Level 3 assets are less relevant than fair values of Level 2 assets
because of the negative informational externality of Level 3 reporting.
My multi-bank analysis might also explain the inconclusive nature of the preceding
empirical evidence on the role of fair value accounting during the financial crisis. While
fair value accounting is found to be associated with systemic risk in the financial system
(e.g. Bhat et al., 2011; Khan, 2014), multiple papers conclude that fair value accounting
played little or no role in the crisis (e.g. Barth and Landsman, 2010a; Laux and Leuz,
2010). Several studies also underscore that fair value does not contribute to procyclical
leverage (e.g. Amel-Zadeh et al., 2017). My results predict that the systemic risk linked
to fair value accounting depends on the possibility for banks to move assets into the
Level 3 category.
1.5.3 Policy implications
The predictions of the one-bank model may be of interest to auditors and auditing
standard setters, such as the PCAOB. Specifically, my results contribute to the under-
standing of banks’ incentives to use Level 3 reporting and why estimates of a similar
asset may differ across banks.
The full-fledged multi-bank model underscores a tradeoff for standard setters and
prudential regulators between having uniform and restrictive standards (Level 2 re-
porting), which can lead to systemic risk, and flexible standards (Level 3 reporting),
which provide potentially more relevant information but reduce the consistency and
the comparability of financial statements. This tradeoff, which relates to the relevance-
reliability tradeoff, is central to determine whether or not banks should be allowed to
use Level 3 reporting. Indeed, during the financial panic of 2007-08, regulators, banks
and investors pressured standard setters to ease the possibility for banks to move as-
sets into the Level 3 category because of sharp declines in quoted prices. The IASB
and the FASB issued several guidelines in that direction which have highlighted hesi-
tations of standard setters on this issue.37 This could be explained by the conflicting
interests between standard setters, who favor transparency, and prudential regulators,
who care about financial stability. But the relaxation of the fair value reporting rules
by standard setters during the crisis could be interpreted as an implicit acknowledge-
ment that in periods of bust, less information may be better (Bank for International
Settlements, 2015).
37For an overview of the FASB successive guidelines during the 2007-08 crisis, see Bhat et al. (2011).
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The results are important amid the debate on the impact of accounting rules on
financial stability. As commonly argued by the opponents of mark-to-market, carrying
assets valued with public market prices may lead to inefficient contagion effects in bad
times. I provide a novel channel that links Level 2 reporting and systemic risk: relying
only on public market data may lead to simultaneous liquidations. As a result, allowing
banks to deviate from public information and use the bankers’ private information to
compute fair values may mitigate this systemic risk. On the contrary, allowing banks
to reclassify assets into the HTM category in bad times and use historical cost seems
suboptimal. As shown in section 1.5.1, historical cost accounting may increase agency
costs associated to moral hazard problems. Fair value accounting yields better ex
ante decisions making by banks, especially in the presence of severe agency conflicts
(Lu et al., 2016). Moreover, historical cost accounting with impairment may not
protect against systemic risk because downward adjustments should be taken into
account. Another policy, which has been adopted by some countries, is a filter to
shield regulatory capital from fair value losses. My analysis suggests that this policy
also strengthens the initial moral hazard problem. This is consistent with Chircop
and Novotny-Farkas (2016b), who find that the removal of the fair value filter on
regulatory capital would reduce ex ante risk taking by banks. In the same vein, Ellul
et al. (2015a) find that the use of fair values in statutory accounting reduces ex ante
risk-taking incentives in insurance firms.
My multi-bank analysis also underlines that the endogeneity of the fair value clas-
sification is not neutral. Indeed, the quality of the public information available for
an asset depends on the classification level of this asset. This in turn implies that
fair value classification decisions by banks may lead to informational externalities in
equilibrium.
Lastly, the concern for manipulation is a substantial argument against Level 3
reporting but Level 3 inputs can be informative even if they are subject to manipulation
(Laux, 2012). Regulators internalize the potential manipulation of Level 3 inputs when
setting capital requirements. However, manipulation reduces the desirability of Level
3 reporting and may increase systemic risk.
1.6 Conclusion
While accounting standards have gradually evolved towards the use of fair value mea-
surements, very little is known on the desirability of using banks’ private information
(Level 3 reporting) to compute fair values. In this paper, my objective is to shed some
light on banks’ incentives to use Level 3 reporting and on the economic consequences
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they entail. To that end, I develop a model of prudential regulation à la Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994c), which brings in accounting measures as the primary inputs into
capital requirements set by a prudential regulator to efficiently allocate control rights
within a bank and to provide managerial discipline. I show that, for a single bank, it
is optimal to leave the choice between Level 2 and Level 3 reporting to the discretion
of the banker. In equilibrium, Level 3 reporting is only used by the banker to reveal
good information, above and beyond observable inputs, and to meet capital require-
ments. The predictions of the baseline model are consistent with empirical studies on
fair value accounting.
Then, I analyze the externalities of the optimal measurement rules for one bank
in a multi-bank economy and uncover an interesting tradeoff. On the one hand, Level
3 reporting decreases the consistency and the comparability of financial statements,
which in turn reduces the ability for a bank’s stakeholders to extract information
from financial statements of similar banks. On the other hand, Level 3 reporting
decreases systemic risk caused by mark-to-market (i.e. fair value with observable
inputs). Indeed, under mark-to-market accounting, liquidation decisions are based on
public information, which may trigger simultaneous inefficient liquidations. The full-
fledged multi-bank model sheds some light on the potential role of fair value accounting
during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Standard setters and prudential regulators, who
may have conflicting interests, should tradeoff transparency and financial stability.
Finally, Level 3 reporting has been heavily criticized because of potential manipu-
lation of Level 3 inputs. My analysis underscores that prudential regulators internalize
the resulting decrease in the informativeness of those inputs when setting capital re-
quirements and that Level 3 reporting still provides some valuable information to
prudential regulators. However, manipulation of Level 3 inputs, which reduces the use
of Level 3 reporting, may in turn increase systemic risk.
This paper is a first step towards a more comprehensive understanding of the
economic consequences of Level 3 reporting. I believe that this framework could be
used to address other questions related to Level 3 reporting. One important caveat
to my analysis is that I do not model the market liquidity for the assets held by the
banks. Therefore, an interesting extension of the model would be to consider another
equilibrium effect that Level 3 reporting may have on assets’ market liquidity. If
the bankers have different types of information on the value of their assets, Level 3
reporting may reveal their private information and increase the public information
available for those assets. This may, in turn, increase the market liquidity of those
assets. Another important route for future research would be to analyze the optimal
level of aggregation of fair values on banks’ balance sheets given the heterogeneity of
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their assets.
More broadly, the tradeoff between transparency and financial stability is key to
standard setters and prudential regulators. My analysis challenges the conventional
wisdom that higher accounting quality and improved transparency is always desirable
for the banking system in the context of fair value accounting. This tradeoff would
require further investigations to identify other desirable accounting properties for the
banking industry (securitization, loan loss provisioning...).
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Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
The optimal intervention policy rewards the banker if the public signal p is sufficiently
large. The incentive-compatibility constraint that ensures that the banker exerts effort
is
B
∫ +∞
−∞
(qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p))dp−K ≥ B
∫ +∞
−∞
(qLfH(p) + (1− qL)fL(p))dp,
which is equivalent to
B
∫ +∞
−∞
(fH(p)− fL(p))dp ≥
K
∆q
.
Define the threshold σ such that the incentive-compatibility constraint binds:
B
∫ +∞
σ
(fH(p)− fL(p))dp =
K
∆q
.
The optimal intervention policy is such that the prudential regulator rewards the
banker if and only if p is larger than σ.
Finally, I have assumed that K is small enough such that effort incentives can be
provided by using the Level 2 input only, i.e. K < K¯ = B∆qmaxλ(
∫ +∞
λ
(fH(p) −
fL(p))dp). This assumption guarantees the existence of σ.
Proof of Proposition 1
At t = 2, as part of the optimal mechanism, the banker makes a cheap talk report
r ∈ {g, b} on the signal s to the prudential regulator. To simplify the analysis, I apply
the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1981) and, hence, I can restrict the analysis to
direct mechanisms in which the banker truthfully reports the private signal, i.e. r = s.
I state the optimization problem for a fixed public cost c of Level 3 reporting and then
solve the case of a random cost.
The intervention policy set by the prudential regulator contains three elements.
First, πr(p) is the probability of reporting the asset at Level 3, contingent on a Level
2 input p and a report r. Then, vr(p) is the probability of continuation contingent on
a Level 2 input p and a report r. Finally, wr(p, s) is the probability of continuation
contingent on a Level 2 input p, Level 3 input s and a report r.
Lemma 7. In equilibrium, the prudential regulator always liquidates the asset when
the banker is caught lying (w∗g(p, b) = w
∗
b (p, g) = 0).
In equilibrium, the banker has incentives to report s truthfully. As a result, it
is optimal for the prudential regulator not to reward the banker after being caught
lying. Taking into account this lemma, the truthtelling constraints that ensure that
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the banker reveals the private information are
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g) ≥ (1− πb(p))vb(p), (1.3)
and
(1− πb(p))vb(p) + πb(p)wb(p, b) ≥ (1− πg(p))vg(p). (1.4)
The expected utility of the banker is
Ubanker(q) = B
∫ [
qfH(p)
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
+ (1− q)(1− βL)fL(p)
(
(1− πb(p))vb(p) + πb(p)wb(p, b)
)
+ (1− q)βLfL(p)
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)]
dp−K1{q=qH}.
The ex ante incentive-compatibility constraint of the banker is
Ubanker(qH) ≥ Ubanker(qL).
This is equivalent to
B
∫ [
(fH(p)− βLfL(p))
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− fL(p)(1− βL)
(
(1− πb(p))vb(p) + πb(p)wb(p, b)
)]
dp ≥
K
∆q
. (1.5)
This constraint ensures that the banker exerts high effort in equilibrium. If the
private cost of exerting high effort is too large, it is too costly and this is not possible
to induce the banker to exert high effort. Thus, I assume that the cost of effort K is
not too large, so that, high effort by the banker is optimal for the prudential regulator.
The expected utility of the prudential regulator is
Uinvestors(q) =
∫ [
qfH(p)
(
ηH − πg(p)c
)
+ (1− q)(1− βL)fL(p)
(
ηL + l − (1− πb(p))lvb(p)− πb(p)(lwb(p, b) + c)
)
+ (1− q)βLfL(p)
(
ηL + l − (1− πg(p))lvg(p)− πg(p)(lwg(p, g) + c)
)]
dp.
The prudential regulator’s optimization problem is
max
πg(.),vg(.),wg(.,.)
Uinvestors
subject to the constraints (1.3), (1.4) and (1.5).
The solution of this optimization problem yields the optimal intervention policy of
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this model. To solve this problem, I first state a lemma which is intuitive and simplifies
the analysis to get the optimal intervention policy.
Lemma 8. In equilibrium, it is never optimal to classify the asset at Level 3 after a
bad report (π∗b (p) = 0). Furthermore, v
∗
b (p) = (1− π
∗
g(p))v
∗
g(p).
This relaxes the incentive constraint and increases the utility of the investors.
Indeed, Level 3 reporting makes the banker’s private information public. The banker
wants to make a good report to induce continuation and, therefore, it is optimal for
the prudential regulator to verify only a good report (r = g).
First, suppose that the cost of Level 3 reporting c is a constant. The lagrangian of
the prudential regulator’s maximization problem is
L(vg(.), πg(.), wg(., .), λ) =
∫ [
qHfH(p)
(
− πg(p)c
)
+ (1− qH)βLfL(p)
(
− (1− πg(p))lvg(p)− πg(p)(lwg(p, g) + c)
)
+(1−qH)(1−βL)fL(p)
(
− (1−πg(p))lvg(p)
)
+λ
(
B(fH(p)−βLfL(p))(1−πg(p))vg(p)
+ πg(p)wg(p, g))− B(1− βL)fL(p)(1− πg(p))vg(p)
)]
dp,
where λ is the lagrange multiplier.
Taking the FOCs, the solution of this maximization problem is πg(p) = π1{p<p<p¯},
vg(p) = 1{p>p¯}, wg(p, g) = 1{p>p} with
fH(p)
fL(p)
= βL
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
and
fH(p¯)− fL(p¯)
fL(p¯)
qHfH(p¯) + (1− qH)βLfL(p¯)
(1− βL)fH(p¯)
= (1− qH)
l
c
.
The probability π is set optimally such that (1.5) binds.
Next, I suppose that the Level 3 cost is random. The prudential regulator can
achieve this optimal probability π of using Level 3 at the lowest cost by letting the
banker reports the asset at Level 3 if the cost is lower than some cap c¯. Therefore, the
prudential regulator optimally set c¯ such that π = G(c¯).
Under the optimal intervention policy,
Uinvestors = qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l)− l(1− qH)(1− FL(p¯))
−G(c¯)E(c | c < c¯)
(
qH(FH(p¯)− FH(p)) + (1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
−G(c¯)l(1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p)).
Thus, the optimal intervention policy solves
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min
p,p¯,c¯
l(1− qH)(1− FL(p¯))−G(c¯)l(1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
+G(c¯)E(c | c < c¯)
(
qH(FH(p¯)− FH(p)) + (1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
subject to the incentive-compatibility constraint
FL(p¯)− FH(p¯) +G(c¯)
(
FH(p¯)− FH(p)− βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
=
1
B
K
∆q
. (1.6)
The FOCs yield
fH(p¯)− fL(p¯)
fL(p¯)
qHfH(p¯) + (1− qH)fL(p¯)
(1− βL)fH(p¯)
=
G(c¯)((1− qH)lG(c¯) +
∫ c¯
0
cg(c)dc)∫ c¯
0
cg(c)dc
(1.7)
and
fH(p)− βLfL(p)
fL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)βLfL(p)
(1− βL)fH(p)
= βL
G(c¯)((1− qH)lG(c¯) +
∫ c¯
0
cg(c)dc)∫ c¯
0
cg(c)dc
.
(1.8)
The system {(1.6), (1.7), (1.8)} has one solution (p, p¯, c¯) which is the interior solu-
tion of the optimization problem. I rule out corner solutions for this problem.
Finally, I have assumed in the main text that l > 0. Assuming l < 0 yields exactly
the same optimal intervention policy (identical proof).
Proof of Corollary 1
It is optimal for the regulator to let the banker use Level 3 reporting if and only if the
utility of the investors under the optimal intervention policy derived in Proposition 1
is strictly higher than the utility of the investors in Lemma 2, i.e.
qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l)− l(1− qH)(1− FL(p¯))
−G(c¯)E(c | c < c¯)
(
qH(FH(p¯)− FH(p)) + (1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
−G(c¯)l(1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)−FL(p)) > qHηH +(1− qH)(ηL+ l)− l(1− qH)(1−FL(σ)),
which is equivalent to
l(1−qH)(FL(p¯)−FL(σ))−G(c¯)E(c | c < c¯)
(
qH(FH(p¯)−FH(p))+(1−qH)βL(FL(p¯)−FL(p))
)
−G(c¯)l(1− qH)βL(FL(p¯)− FL(p)) > 0.
The threshold β¯L ∈ [0, 1] is defined such that the above expression is equal to zero.
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Proof of Corollary 2
From the proof of Proposition 1, for a deterministic Level 3 reporting cost c, the upper
threshold p¯ is defined such that
fH(p¯)− fL(p¯)
fL(p¯)
qHfH(p¯) + (1− qH)βLfL(p¯)
(1− βL)fH(p¯)
= (1− qH)
l
c
The left-hand side increases in p¯, which implies that p¯ increases in the liquidation value
l. Furthermore, p¯ decreases in the Level 3 reporting cost c.
Finally, recall that
fH(p)
fL(p)
= βL
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
, which implies that p and p¯ have the same
monotonicity with respect to l and c.
Proof of Corollary 3
The function
fH(p)− fL(p)
fL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)βLfL(p)
(1− βL)fH(p)
increases in βL for p such that fH(p) > fL(p).
p¯ is such that fH(p¯) > fL(p¯), which implies that p¯ is decreasing in βL.
Moreover, we have
fH(p)
fL(p)
= βL
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
,
which implies that
fH(p)− βLfL(p)
fL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)β
2
LfL(p)
βL(1− βL)fH(p)
= (1− qH)
l
c
.
As a result, p increases in βL for small values of βL.
In the case of a perfectly informative private signal s (βL = 0),
fH(p)
fL(p)
= 0, which implies that p = −∞.
Further, in that latter case, for a deterministic Level 3 reporting cost c, p¯ is defined
such that
fH(p¯)− fL(p¯)
fL(p¯)
= (1− qH)
l
qHc
.
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Proof of Lemma 3
The fair value in case of Level 3 reporting is
FV (p, s = g) = E(L | p, s = g)
=
qHfH(p)ηH + (1− qH)fL(p)βL(ηL + l)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)βL
= (1 + βL
1− qH
qH
fL(p)
fH(p)
)−1ηH + (1 +
1
βL
qH
1− qH
fH(p)
fL(p)
)−1(ηL + l).
Furthermore, the fair value in case of Level 2 reporting is
FV (p¯) = E(L | p¯)
=
qHfH(p¯)ηH + (1− qH)fL(p¯)(ηL + l)
qHfH(p¯) + (1− qH)fL(p¯)
= (1 +
1− qH
qH
fL(p¯)
fH(p¯)
)−1ηH + (1 +
qH
1− qH
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
)−1(ηL + l).
Therefore,
fH(p)
fL(p)
= βL
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
implies that FV (p, s = g) = FV (p¯).
Proof of Lemma 4
In this proof, I provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
equilibrium (A). As shown in the main text, in equilibrium (A), the distribution of
the public signal in case of a high quality asset is fH(p) = h(p) and FH(p) = H(p).
For a low quality asset, it is such that fL(p) = h(1− p) and FL(p) = 1−H(1− p).
The maximization problem of the prudential regulator for an individual bank is
the following:
max
p¯A,pA,c¯A
UAinvestors = qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l)− l(1− qH)H(1− p¯A)
−G(c¯A)E(c | c < c¯A)
(
qH(H(p¯A)−H(pA)) + (1− qH)βL(H(1− pA)−H(1− p¯A))
)
− lG(c¯A)(1− qH)βL(H(1− pA)−H(1− p¯A))
subject to the (IC) constraint
1−H(p¯A)−H(1− p¯A) +G(c¯A)
(
H(p¯A)−H(pA)− βL(H(1− pA)−H(1− p¯A))
)
≥
1
B
K
∆q
.
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This optimization problem has a unique interior solution (p
A
, p¯A, c¯A) with a similar
structure to the optimal contract of the baseline model:
h(p¯A)− h(1− p¯A)
h(1− p¯A)
qHh(p¯A) + (1− qH)h(1− p¯A)
(1− βL)h(p¯A)
=
G(c¯A)((1− qH)lG(c¯A) +
∫ c¯A
0
cg(c)dc)∫ c¯A
0
cg(c)dc
and
h(p
A
)− βLh(1− pA)
h(1− p
A
)
qHh(pA) + (1− qH)βLh(1− pA)
(1− βL)h(pA)
= βL
G(c¯A)((1− qH)lG(c¯A) +
∫ c¯A
0
cg(c)dc)∫ c¯A
0
cg(c)dc
.
Therefore, this equilibrium always exists if the misclassification risk is sufficiently
important such that [0, 1] ⊂]p
A
, p¯A[.
Proof of Proposition 4
When the congestion effect is sufficiently strong, the investors are strictly better-off
in equilibrium (A) compared to equilibrium (B). Assume that δ = ηL/(ηL + l). This
implies that LL(µL) = ηL if µL ≥ µL and LL(µL) < ηL + l if µL < µL. I denote by
TWE the sum of the utilities of all the investors in equilibrium E ∈ {(A), (B)}.
In equilibrium (B), the surplus of the investors is
TW (B)(δ) = qHηH + (1− qH)δ(ηL + l).
I have assumed that [0, 1] ∈]p
A
, p¯A[, then the investors’ surplus in equilibrium (A)
is given by
TW (A) = qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l)−G(c¯A)E(c | c < c¯A)(qH + (1− qH)βL)
−G(c¯A)l(1− qH)βL ≥ TW
(B)(δ = ηL/(ηL + l)) = qHηH + (1− qH)ηL.
TW (A) is the surplus of the investors in the case with no public information. This
is equivalent to the Level 3 asset benchmark, with G(c¯A) = 1(1−βL)B
K
∆q
(see appendix
4).
In a nutshell, for δ = 1, TW (B)(δ = 1) > TW (A), and for δ = ηL/(ηL + l),
TW (B)(δ = ηL/(ηL + l)) < TW
(A). The function (TW (B) − TW (A))(δ) is continuous
and increases in δ. As a result, the intermediate values theorem implies that there
exists δ¯ such that if δ > δ¯, TW (B)(δ) > TW (A), and if δ < δ¯, TW (A) > TW (B)(δ). The
results hold as long as µH ≥ 1−G(c¯A) and µL ≥ 1− βLG(c¯A).
Finally, TW (A) − TW (B)(δ) = (1 − qH)(1 − δ)(ηL + l) − G(c¯A)E(c | c < c¯A)(qH +
(1−qH)βL)−G(c¯A)l(1−qH)βL. This last expression is increasing in ηL and decreasing
in qH .
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Proof of Lemma 5
The utility of the investors is the same to the one on page 43 taking into account
the new precision of the banker’s private information given by equation (1.2). The
expected utility of the banker when exerting high effort is given by
Ubanker(β) = B
∫ [
qHfH(p)
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
+ (1− qH)(1− βL − β)fL(p)(1− πg(p))vg(p)
+ (1− qH)(βL + β)fL(p)
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)]
dp− k
β2
2
−K.
Hence, the new incentive-compatibility constraint of the banker is
B
∫ [
(fH(p)− (βL + β)fL(p))
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− (1− βL − β)fL(p)(1− πg(p))vg(p)
]
dp ≥
K
∆q
.
After the intervention policy is set but before the effort is exerted, the banker
chooses β to maximize his expected payoff:
β ∈ argmax
β∈[0,1−βL]
Ubanker(β).
I define the optimal thresholds p(β) and p¯(β) as in section 1.2.4 and, in particular,
fH(p(β))
fL(p(β))
= (βL + β)
fH(p¯(β))
fL(p¯(β))
.
From (1.1), the expected utility of the banker is
Ubanker(β) = qL
K
∆q
+B
(
1− FL(p¯) + (βL + β)G(c¯)(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
− k
β2
2
.
Taking the first-order condition with respect to β yields
kβ∗ = B
[ direct effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
G(c¯)(FL(p¯)− FL(p))−
∂p¯
∂β
fL(p¯) + (βL + β
∗)
∂
∂β
(
G(c¯)(FL(p¯)− FL(p))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect effect
]
.
(1.9)
β∗ is positive as long as βL + β∗ is sufficiently small. On the left-hand side of this
equality, it is the marginal cost of manipulation for the banker. The expression on
the right-hand side is equal to the marginal benefit for the banker of increasing the
value of β. This marginal benefit is made up of two terms. The first term is the direct
benefit of getting a good Level 3 input (s = g) for a low quality asset, which implies
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that the prudential regulator chooses continuation for intermediate values of the Level
2 input and a low cost of Level 3 reporting. The second term reflects the dependency
of the optimal intervention policy (p, p¯, c¯) on the precision of the Level 3 input.
Next, I prove that β∗ is decreasing in k. By taking the derivative of (1.9) with
respect to k, we get
β∗ =
∂β∗
∂k
B
[
2
∂
∂β
(G(c¯)(FL(p¯)− FL(p))− (
∂2p¯
∂β2
fL(p¯) + (
∂p¯
∂β
)2f ′L(p¯))
− (βL + β
∗)
∂2
∂β2
(G(c¯)(FL(p¯)− FL(p)))− k/B
]
.
Furthermore, the equilibrium level of manipulation β∗ is positive and hence, the
right-hand side of the inequality is also positive. For sufficiently large values of k, the
last term in brackets is negative. Hence, this implies that
∂β∗
∂k
is negative. As a result,
β∗ decreases in the cost k.
Finally, note that the prudential regulator finds it optimal to use Level 3 reporting
as long as βL + β∗ < β¯L (see Corollary 1), which is equivalent to k > k¯.
Proof of Corollary 6
Let p∗ such that
fH(p
∗)
fL(p∗)
= βL. Note that fH(p¯) > fL(p¯) implies that
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
> 1 >
fH(p
∗)
fL(p∗)
. As a result of the MLRP property, p > p∗.
Moreover FV (p, s = g) > FV (p∗, s = g) = qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l).
As a result, FV (p, s = g) = FV (p¯) = BV > qHηH + (1− qH)(ηL + l).
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Appendix 2: Fair value reporting guidance
The IASB (IFRS 13) and the FASB (ASC 820) have very similar guidelines regarding
fair value reporting, which is mostly used for financial assets. Debt securities that are
classified as held-to-maturity under US GAAP or held-to-collect under IFRS are re-
ported at amortized cost. All the other debt securities are reported at fair value, which
include available-for-sale or held-for-trading securities under US GAAP. Minority eq-
uity passive investments are also reported at fair value. Lastly, there is a fair value
option that can be applied to accounts and notes receivables, and to some tangible
long-lived assets (e.g. investment properties under IFRS).
As mentioned in the introduction, there are three levels to the fair value hierar-
chy. Level 1 inputs are observable inputs that reflect quoted prices (unadjusted) for
identical assets in active markets (Listed equity securities traded in active markets
(NYSE, NASDAQ,...), on-the-run Treasury bonds, exchange-traded futures and op-
tions...). Level 2 inputs are inputs other than quoted prices included in Level 1 that
are observable for the asset either directly or indirectly (dealer quote for a non-liquid
security, provided the dealer is standing ready and able to transact, posted or pub-
lished clearing prices, if corroborated with market transactions...). Thus, both Level
1 inputs and Level 2 inputs are observable by the firms’ outsiders and therefore, both
are public information. As noted by Ryan (2008), there are two types of Level 2 es-
timates: adjusted prices of similar assets and observable inputs aggregated through
a model. Finally, Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs by the firms’ outsiders (in-
puts obtained from broker quote that are indicative or not corroborated with market
transactions, management assumptions that cannot be corroborated with observable
market data...). Those inputs are the insiders’ private information.
Depending on the level of inputs used in the valuation process, an asset is reported
at Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3. The level of classification of the asset is the lowest level
of the significant inputs used to get the fair value. Hence, in my framework, if both the
Level 2 input and the Level 3 input are used, the asset is reported at Level 3. Otherwise,
if only the Level 2 input is used, the asset is reported at Level 2. Some examples of
Level 2 assets are most U.S. public debt, short-term cash instruments and certain
derivative products. Furthermore, complex instruments (longer-dated interest rate
and currency swaps and structured derivatives), fixed-income asset-backed securities,
impairment testing of goodwill are examples of Level 3 assets.
Several empirical studies provide evidence of the coarseness of this classification
resulting in strategic reporting choices. For example, Hanley et al. (2018) show that
some insurers in the US deviate from the consensus level to a level indicative of higher
quality inputs to convey better asset liquidity. Moreover, Hanley et al. (2018) find
that banks and insurers strategically change the classification of their assets over time.
As a result, firms’ insiders have some discretion in the classification and can transfer
assets between the different levels.
When reporting Level 3 assets on its financial statements, a firm must comply
with more disclosure requirements. For instance, the firm must provide quantitative
information on the main unobservable inputs used in determining both recurring and
nonrecurring Level 3 measurements. Furthermore, the firm must provide a description
of the valuation processes and a description of the sensitivity of recurring Level 3
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fair value measurements to changes in the unobservable inputs. The objective of the
disclosure is not to enable outsiders to replicate the pricing models but to provide
information for users to assess whether the firm’s views about inputs differed from
their own and, if so, how to incorporate those views in their decisions. It is also to
facilitate comparisons across time and across different firms. Those required disclosures
impose a cost to firms carrying assets at Level 3. Note that the FASB is currently
proposing to eliminate the disclosure of transfers between Level 1 and Level 2 category
but they have increased the disclosure requirements for Level 3.
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Appendix 3: Robustness checks
Distribution of the Level 3 input s
I check that the optimal intervention policy of the baseline model holds for a more
general distribution of the Level 3 input. Assume that
P (s = g | H) = βH = 1− P (s = b | H)
and
P (s = g | L) = βL = 1− P (s = b | L).
The expected utility of the banker is
Ubanker(q) = B
∫ [
(qβHfH(p) + (1− q)βLfL(p))
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
+(q(1−βH)fH(p)+(1−q)(1−βL)fL(p))
(
(1−πb(p))vb(p)+πb(p)wb(p, b)
)]
dp−K1{q=qH}.
The ex ante incentive-compatibility constraint of the banker is
B
∫ [
(βHfH(p)− βLfL(p))
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− (fL(p)(1− βL)− fH(p)(1− βH))
(
(1− πb(p))vb(p) + πb(p)wb(p, b)
)]
dp ≥
K
∆q
.
I conjecture that for βH close to one, the optimal intervention policy has the same
structure as in the main text. Moreover, for all p between p and p¯,
fL(p)(1− βL)− fH(p)(1− βH) ≥ 0
I leave it to the reader to check that this last inequality holds after determining p and
p¯. As a result, π∗b (p) = 0 and vb(p) = (1− πg(p))vg(p).
For a constant cost of Level 3 reporting c, the Lagrangian of the prudential regu-
lator’s maximization problem is
L(vg(.), πg(.), wg(., .), λ) =∫ [
qHβHfH(p)
(
− πg(p)c
)
− (1− qH)(1− βL)fL(p)(1− πg(p))lvg(p)
+ (1− qH)βLfL(p)
(
− (1− πg(p))lvg(p)− πg(p)(lwg(p, g) + c)
)
+ λB
(
(βHfH(p)− βLfL(p))(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g))
− ((1− βL)fL(p)− (1− βH)fH(p))(1− πg(p))vg(p)
)]
dp,
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where λ is the lagrange multiplier associated to the (IC) constraint.
The solution of this maximization problem is πg(p) = π1{p<p<p¯}, vg(p) = 1{p>p¯},
wg(p, g) = 1{p>p} with
fH(p)
fL(p)
=
βL
βH
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
and
fH(p¯)− fL(p¯)
fL(p¯)
qHfH(p¯)βH + (1− qH)βLfL(p¯)
(βH − βL)fH(p¯)
=
(1− qH)
l
c
. The probability π is set optimally such that the (IC) constraint binds.
Hence, my results do not depend on the assumption P (s = g | H) = 1.
Payoff of the investors
I have assumed that the investors are strictly better-off with action S in case of a
low quality asset and are indifferent between action C and action S in case of a high
quality asset. The results of the paper are similar if the investors are strictly better-off
in case of continuation of high quality assets.
Assume that the investors get ηH for a high quality asset and ηL < ηH for a low
quality asset in case action C is chosen. If action S is chosen, the investors get the
liquidation value LH = LL = L such that ηL < L < ηH .
The ex ante incentive-compatibility constraint of the banker is
B
∫ [
(fH(p)− βLfL(p))
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− fL(p)(1− βL)(1− πg(p))vg(p)
]
dp ≥
K
∆q
.
For a fixed cost c, the expected utility of the investors is
Uinvestors(q) =
∫ [
qfH(p)
(
ηH+(1−πg(p))(1−vg(p))(L−ηH)−πg(p)((1−wg(p, g))(ηH−L)+c)
)
+ (1− q)(1− βL)fL(p)
(
L − (1− πg(p))vg(p)(ηL − L)
)
+ (1− q)βLfL(p)
(
L+ (1− πg(p))vg(p)(ηL −L)− πg(p)(wg(p, g)(L− ηL) + c)
)]
dp.
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The Lagrangian of the prudential regulator’s maximization problem is
L(vg(.), πg(.), wg(., .), λ) =∫ [
qHfH(p)
(
ηH +(1−πg(p))(1− vg(p))(L− ηH)−πg(p)((1−wg(p, g))(ηH −L)+ c)
)
+ (1− qH)(1− βL)fL(p)
(
L+ (1− πg(p))vg(p)(ηL − L)
)
+ (1− qH)βLfL(p)
(
L+ (1− πg(p))vg(p)(ηL − L)− πg(p)(wg(p, g)(L − ηL) + c)
)
+ λB
[
(fH(p)− βLfL(p))
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− fL(p)(1− βL)(1− πg(p))vg(p)
]]
dp,
where λ is the lagrange multiplier associated to the (IC) constraint.
The solution of this maximization problem is πg(p) = π1{p<p<p¯}, vg(p) = 1{p>p¯},
wg(p, g) = 1{p>p} with
fH(p)
fL(p)
= βL
fH(p¯)
fL(p¯)
and
fH(p¯)− fL(p¯)
fL(p¯)
qHfH(p¯) + (1− qH)βLfL(p¯)
(1− βL)fH(p¯)
=
L − (qHηH + (1− qH)ηL)
c
. The
probability π is set optimally such that the (IC) constraint binds.
Hence, the results of the paper hold with this different specification of the asset’s
payoff.
Sequential game
In the main text, I solve the multi-bank model using a simultaneous game. In this ap-
pendix, I show that the two simultaneous equilibria (A) and (B) are also the equilibria
of a sequential game with a large number of banks.
I suppose that there are N banks that publish their financial statements sequen-
tially. Each bank faces the same situation as in the baseline model. I denote by sn the
private information of the n-th bank. The first bank’s stakeholders have only access to
an arbitrarily weakly informative public signal. Therefore, as shown in the appendix
4, the prudential regulator chooses continuation if the cost of Level 3 reporting is lower
than c¯L3 and the private information is good s1 = g. Otherwise, the banker does not
report at Level 3 and the prudential regulator chooses liquidation. The second bank’s
stakeholders observe one public signal p2 ∈ {g, 0}, which is the book value of the first
bank and an arbitrarily weakly informative public signal. Given the misclassification
parameter α, we have
P (p2 = g | H)
P (p2 = g | L)
=
G(c¯L3)(α + (1− α)βL)
G(c¯L3)(1− α + αβL)
=
α + (1− α)βL
1− α + αβL
. (1.10)
The optimal intervention policy set by the prudential regulator for the second bank
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(p¯2, p2, c¯2) has a similar structure that the one in the baseline for a single bank. Assume
that it is such that p
2
< p2 = 0 < p2 = g < p¯2. Therefore, the second banker reports
at Level 3 if s2 = g and c2 < c¯2 and there is continuation. Otherwise, the banker
reports at Level 2 and there is liquidation.
The third bank’s stakeholders observe the reported book values of the first two
banks and an arbitrarily weakly informative public signal. Therefore, the public signal
p3 can take three values: p3 ∈ {gg, g0, 00}, which corresponds to the two banks have
reported at Level 3, one bank has reported at Level 3 and none of the bank has reported
at Level 3. Assuming that those signals are not informative enough, i.e. p
3
< p3 < p¯3,
the third banker also reports at Level 3 if s3 = g and the Level 3 reporting is low.
Otherwise, the banker reports at Level 2 and there is liquidation. Taking the limit of
this game when the number of banks N goes to infinity, there are two possible cases:
• the public signal becomes a continuous signal such that: pL3 = G(c¯)(α+(1−α))
for banks with high quality assets and pL3 = G(c¯)(1−α+α) for banks with low
quality assets. Bankers report at Level 3 if they have good private information
and their Level 3 reporting cost is low. Otherwise, they report at Level 2 and
there is liquidation. It is equilibrium (A);
• there is a cascade because, at some point, the public signal becomes too informa-
tive. In that case, all the subsequent banks report at Level 2 and their weakly
informative public signals become perfectly informative. We are then back in
equilibrium (B).
Therefore, both equilibrium (A) and equilibrium (B) are the equilibria of a sequen-
tial game with a large number of banks.
Renegotiation38
I discuss the robustness of the results of the baseline model to renegotiation. To check
robustness of the results, I analyze the polar case of perfect renegotiation. In that
case, the efficient ex post action is taken but the governance structure is meant to
force the banker to make concessions in case of bad interim information. The key
assumption that is crucial for the robustness of the results is that the banker’s utility
after renegotiation be increasing in the utility the banker would obtain in the absence
of renegotiation. As in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994c), I illustrate this assumption
with the following example but the idea applies to more general model.
The banker loses the private benefit B if action S is chosen or if, under the credible
threat of action S, the banker reduces the perks as part of reorganization package
imposed by the controlling party. The banker is assumed to be indispensable to im-
plement action C but is fired when S is chosen.
In order to determine the ex post efficient action, one has to compare the surplus
of liquidation, LQ, with the surplus of continuation, B + ηQ. I assume that B < l.
Hence, continuation is ex post efficient for a high quality asset and liquidation is ex
38This section summarizes and therefore, borrows without restraints from, detailed accounts by
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994c).
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Table 1.1: Pre- and post renegotiation actions and payoffs
Ex post efficient
action
Choice of A in
the absence of
renegotiation
Ex post choice
(after renegotia-
tion)
Who gets B?
Case 1 Action C Action C Action C Initial banker
Case 2 Action C Action S Action C Investors
Case 3 Action S Action C Action S Initial banker
Case 4 Action S Action S Action S Investors
post efficient for a low quality asset. The ex post efficient action maximizes B+E(η | I)
or E(L | I). I is the information available to the prudential regulator and depends on
the reporting level.
Renegotiations occur when the depositors have control and prefer ex post inefficient
action S and when the shareholders have control and prefer ex post inefficient action
C. The results hold if the threat of action S induces the banker to concede more of
B than when the banker has control and prefers action C. Assume for example that
the private benefit B is fully transferable; that is, the investors’ gain is equal to the
banker’s loss in private benefit. For instance, the banker could be forced to propose
a plan reducing the cost by B in order to keep the job, and fully internalizes the cost
reduction. This assumption simplifies notation but is not crucial.
Under the assumptions of Table 1, the results are robust to renegotiation. In-
deed, the optimal intervention policy between the prudential regulator and the banker
is similar. Moreover, there are continuations for sufficiently good information and
liquidations for sufficiently bad information.
Other possible timings of manipulation of s
In the main text, I have assumed for tractability that the manipulation is done before
the effort is exerted. Two other possible timings of manipulation are possible: after
the effort is exerted but before the realization of p or after the realization of p.
• First, the banker may be able to manipulate the distribution of s after the effort
decision but before the realization of p. The equilibrium amount of manipulation
is then the same as in the main text, to the extent that the optimal intervention
policy keeps the same structure (which is the case if the equilibrium level of
manipulation is sufficiently low).
• Otherwise, the banker may manipulate the distribution of s after the realization
of p.
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Lemma 9. For a public signal p such that there is continuation with Level 3
reporting, the equilibrium amount of manipulation is uniquely defined by
kβ∗(p) = G(c¯)
(1− qH)fL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)
B.
On the left-hand side of this equality, it is the marginal cost of manipulation
for the banker. The expression on the right-hand side is equal to the marginal
benefit for the banker of increasing the value of β. It is equal to the conditional
probability of having a low quality asset given p times the probability of con-
tinuation G(c¯) when the private signal is s = g times the private benefit B of
continuation.
The equilibrium level of manipulation β∗(p) is decreasing in p, for p such that
there is continuation with Level 3 reporting. The higher the observable input
p is, the lower is the probability to have a low quality asset. Note that the
banker manipulates the unobservable input only if there is continuation with
Level 3 reporting. Otherwise, the prudential regulator does not care about the
banker’s private information and there is no point for the banker of incurring a
manipulation cost.
In the two cases, there is a unique amount of manipulation in equilibrium and it
reduces the informativeness of the Level 3 input. Thus, my results do not depend on
the timing of the manipulation decision.
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Appendix 4: Benchmark Level 3 asset
I consider a Level 3 asset with no available Level 2 input, or, equivalently with a
sufficiently noisy Level 2 input. Therefore, the prudential regulator relies only on the
banker’s private information to solve the moral hazard problem.
The optimal intervention policy rewards the banker for a good signal and when
the cost c is not too high (lower than c¯A). The incentive-compatibility constraint that
ensures that the banker exerts effort is
BG(c¯A)(qH + (1− qH)βL)−K ≥ BG(c¯A)(qL + (1− qL)βL),
which is equivalent to
G(c¯A) ≥
1
B(1− βL)
K
∆q
.
Therefore, the prudential regulator rewards the banker for a good signal when c
is lower than c¯A with G(c¯A) =
1
B(1− βL)
K
∆q
, such that the incentive-compatibility
constraint binds.
Lemma 10 (Level 3 asset). The optimal intervention policy is characterized by a
cutoff c¯A such that:
• if c > c¯A, the banker does not report at Level 3 and the prudential regulator
chooses liquidation;
• if c < c¯A and s = g, the banker reports at Level 3 and the prudential regulator
chooses continuation. Otherwise, the banker does not report at Level 3 and the
prudential regulator chooses liquidation.
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Online Appendix: Liability and reputation risks
As discussed by Laux and Leuz (2009), another major issue for the practical implemen-
tation of Level 3 reporting is the possible litigation costs incurred by the bankers for
mispricing. Both managers and board members bear substantial litigation costs in case
of misreporting in the financial statements. Those litigation costs can include prison
terms and they have been increased by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The misre-
porting costs also capture expected reputation costs for the bankers (Karpoff et al.,
2008). Thus, I assume that the banker incurs a cost ρ when there is Level 3 reporting,
the private information is good (s = g) and the final payoff is low (η = ηL = 0). I
analyze the reporting choice of the banker depending on the litigation and reputation
costs ρ. For simplicity, I assume that the cost of Level 3 reporting is deterministic and
that probability to get a high quality asset when the banker shirks is zero, i.e. qL = 0.
A banker who observes a noisy Level 2 input and a good Level 3 input faces the
following tradeoff. On the one side, this banker wants to use the Level 3 input to
increase the reported fair value of the asset and meet the capital requirement set by
the prudential regulator. Nevertheless, if the litigation and reputation costs are too
high, the banker is not willing to disclose additional information to the prudential
regulator by using unobservable inputs. The regulator takes the expected litigation
and reputation costs into account when designing the intervention policy because the
incentive-compatibility constraint of the banker depends on ρ.
Lemma 11. For a single bank, there exists a cutoff ρ¯ such that
• if ρ < ρ¯, the optimal intervention policy is as in the baseline model;
• if ρ¯ ≤ ρ, there is no Level 3 reporting and the optimal intervention policy is as
in the benchmark model with a Level 2 asset.
Proof. I first state and prove the following result.
Lemma 12. For a given realization of the Level 2 input p, the banker does not report
the asset at Level 3 when
ρ > B
(
1 +
qHfH(p)
(1− qH)βLfL(p)
)
.
Proof. Suppose that the banker, after having exerted high effort, observes a noisy
realization of p (p < p < p¯) and receives a good private signal s = g. Then, the banker
should decide whether or not to classify the asset at Level 3.
We have the following conditional probabilities
P (asset H | p and s = g) =
qHfH(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)βL
and
P (asset L | p and s = g) =
(1− qH)βLfL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)βL
.
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The expected utility of the banker of using Level 3 reporting is
qHfH(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)βL
B +
(1− qH)βLfL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)βL
(B − ρ).
The banker only uses Level 3 reporting if this last expression is positive, which is
equivalent to
B > ρ
(1− qH)βLfL(p)
qHfH(p) + (1− qH)fL(p)βL
or
ρ < B
(
1 +
qHfH(p)
(1− qH)βLfL(p)
)
.
Then, I prove the general result. First, when ρ ∈ [0, B), the optimization problem
of the prudential regulator is to maximize the utility of the investors under the new
incentive-compatibility constraint of the banker:∫ [
fH(p)B
(
(1− πg(p))vg(p) + πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− βLfL(p)
(
B(1− πg(p))vg(p) + (B − ρ)πg(p)wg(p, g)
)
− (1− βL)fL(p)B(1− πg(p))vg(p)
]
dp ≥
K
∆q
. (1.11)
The FOCs yield
c
fH(p¯ρ)− fL(p¯ρ)
fL(p¯ρ)
qHfH(p¯ρ) + (1− qH)βLfL(p¯ρ)
(1− βL)fH(p¯ρ)
−
βL
1− βL
ρ
B
l
(1− qH)fL(p¯ρ)
fH(p¯ρ)
= l(1−qH)
and
fH(pρ)
fL(pρ)
= βL
fH(p¯ρ)
fL(p¯ρ)
−
νβLρ
νB − l(1− qH)qH
,
where ν is the lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint (1.11). The thresholds
p¯ρ and pρ are well defined because −fl/fH increases in p. We can rewrite (1.11) under
the optimal contract (p¯ρ, pρ, πρ):
B(FL(p¯ρ)− FH(p¯ρ)) + πρ(B(FH(p¯ρ)− FH(pρ)− (B − ρ)(FL(p¯ρ)− FL(pρ))) ≥
K
∆q
.
Next, for ρ ∈ [B, ρ¯), there is a new (IC) constraint because the banker does not
use Level 3 reporting when shirking. The new incentive-compatibility constraint of
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the banker is∫ [
∆qB(1− πg(p))vg(p)(fH(p)− fL(p)) + qHfH(p)Bπg(p)wg(p, g)
+ (1− qH)βLfL(p)(B − ρ)πg(p)wg(p, g)
]
dp ≥ K. (1.12)
Under the optimal contract (p¯′ρ, p
′
ρ
, π′ρ), (1.12) is equivalent to
qHB(FL(p¯
′
ρ)−FH(p¯
′
ρ))+π
′
ρ(qHB(FH(p¯
′
ρ)−FH(p
′
ρ
)+(1−qH)(B−ρ)(FL(p¯
′
ρ)−FL(p
′
ρ
))) ≥ K.
Finally, for ρ ∈ [ρ¯,+∞), the banker does not use Level 3 reporting even when exert-
ing effort. The cutoff ρ¯ is defined such that Uinvestors(p¯′ρ¯, p
′
ρ¯
, π′ρ¯) = Uinvestors(Lemma 2).
As a result, in that latter case, the prudential regulator only has access to the Level
2 input and the optimal intervention policy is similar to the one of the benchmark
model for a Level 2 asset.
Intuitively, for large expected litigation and reputation costs (ρ > ρ¯), the banker is
willing to use Level 3 reporting only for high realizations of the Level 2 input. However,
in that latter case, the prudential regulator does not find it optimal to let the banker
using Level 3 reporting because the Level 2 input is sufficiently informative. This is
consistent with the concerns raised by some market participants and relayed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (2008): “Potential legal exposure in many cases
deter the use of judgment” when computing fair values. Specifically, when the expected
cost of mispricing is high, bankers prefer to use only observable inputs even if those
inputs are very noisy.
Proposition 6. In the multi-bank model, if the litigation/reputation cost ρ is suffi-
ciently high, the only equilibrium is equilibrium (B).
Proof. Direct consequence of Lemma 11.
Similarly to the manipulation of the Level 3 input, litigation and reputation risks
for mispricing may increase systemic risk because banks’ insiders (e.g. managers and
board members) may be reluctant to deviate from public information. An impor-
tant takeaway for standard setters is that the implementation of accounting standards
should take into account the regulatory environment in which they operate (Laux and
Leuz, 2009).
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Chapter 2
Accounting versus Prudential
Regulation (joint with Jeremy
Bertomeu and Haresh Sapra)
2.1 Introduction
Prudential regulation typically relies on inputs from accounting numbers but, so far,
banking regulators and accounting standard setters seem to have worked independently
and therefore failed to operationalize their joint objectives. Perhaps, this is due to the
differing objective functions of both parties. On the prudential side, the mission of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is to “foster the stability, integrity, and
efficiency of the nation’s monetary, financial, and payment systems so as to promote
optimal macroeconomic performance" (Government Performance and Results Act An-
nual Performance Report, 2011) while, on the accounting side, standard setters such
as the Financial Accounting Standard Board aim at “providing financial information
about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors" (FASB
Concepts Statement No.8). Interestingly, the FASB explicitly mentions that concerns
for bank stability may be in conflict with its objective of providing useful information
to outsiders (FASB Concepts Statement No.8, 2011, OB 2 and BC 1.19-1.23).
We believe that the core of this problem is the lack of a framework that explains
the role that accounting measurement plays for banks that are subject to prudential
regulation. In this paper, we offer a parsimonious theory that investigates the economic
tradeoffs that tie decision-useful information in the accounting systems (accounting
regulation) to a concern for prudential regulation. Formally, we model two forms of
regulation in order to understand how they interact with each other and how they
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should jointly respond to agency problems in the banking sector. We admit that we
model a small subset of the vast set of questions faced by accounting and prudential
regulators. However, our model generates some simple and useful insights to a yet-
obscure problem and highlights the important role that accounting standards may play
in influencing a bank’s capital requirements.
We develop a simple model of a bank in which there are shareholder-debtholder
conflicts such that shareholders have incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking that
reduces the bank’s surplus. The banking regulator can mitigate such inefficiencies in
two ways: (a) by imposing capital requirements that constrain the ability of the bank’s
shareholders to originate risky loans and (b) by committing to a measurement system
that control the bank’s ex-post loan liquidation policy. We show that, in order to
provide ex-ante incentives to choose safe loans, the regulator will choose a liquidation
policy that is excessive from an ex-post perspective. However, absent a suitable re-
porting system, such ex-post excessive liquidation policy is not credible. Under a pure
prudential regulation setting that does not control the bank’s liquidation policy, i.e.,
when the measurement system is such that a state of the world that would cause a
loss is perfectly revealed, the regulator would optimally continue banks too often from
an ex-ante perspective. As a result, under a pure prudential regulation regime, a pru-
dential regulator imposes overly strict capital requirements (to solve the risk-shifting
problem), thereby constraining the bank’s ability to lend. Accounting regulation can
be designed ex ante to increase ex-post liquidations - similar to a conservative measure-
ment system which makes bad news more likely - which, in turn, reduces risk-taking
incentives and allows for lower capital requirements. Our main result is that the bank’s
optimal accounting measurement system and level of capital requirements depend on
each other and are therefore policy tools that should be used in tandem, generating
more surplus for banks than systems that rely either on accounting regulation or on
prudential regulation, even though each type of regulation might individually provide
incentives on its own.
Our model informs the recent debate surrounding the change in the way banks
would recognize losses on their loan portfolios. Under the new standards, banks would
no longer use an incurred loss model which has been criticized as delaying recognition
of losses as it only considers current and historical information to determine if a credit
loss exists. The new standards will require an expected loss model that measures
credit losses based on estimates of cash flows that the lender does not expect to collect,
which incorporates historical information, current conditions, and reasonable forecasts
of collectability. Stated differently, by recognizing losses earlier, the threshold for
recognizing losses are lower under the expected loss model relative to the incurred
loss model. Our model shows that such excessive liquidation under the “expected
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loss" model could indeed be efficient because it not only reduces the bank’s risk taking
behavior but it also increases the bank’s capacity to originate loans. More interestingly,
we show that as credit market conditions improve, an expected loss regime that induces
excessive liquidation becomes more desirable.
Literature review. From a theoretical standpoint, there is an extensive literature
that shows how agency frictions place bounds on the size of firms, see e.g., Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). We borrow heavily from these ideas in that in our model, a capi-
tal requirement on the bank bounds the size of its loan portfolio. To our knowledge,
this literature does not focus on the size of firms and the design of the information
system which we view as the novel elements of our model. Nevertheless, the general
question of the optimal design of an information system in response to agency prob-
lems has a long history in accounting, with contributions along two paths: first, in
Arya et al. (1997), and an ongoing follow-up literature, the design of the information
system can address commitment problems in dynamic contracting settings; second,
the real effects literature finds many environments in which price pressure will distort
investment decisions Kanodia and Sapra (2016b). Our model borrows from both types
of approaches, in that we examine an optimal contract with only partial commitment
but nest within this problem an investment decision. In summary, the theoretical side
of our contribution is to bring together the theory of the size of banks with that of
information system design in order to study their interactions.
There is a burgeoning strand of banking and debt-related literature in account-
ing, which takes specific institutional elements of these problems into a measurement
question Corona et al. (2013, 2014). However, the focus is different in that the vari-
able of interest is the degree of bank competition which we do not explicitly model.
The first study shows that fair-value may be strategically adopted in order to commit
some banks to exit ex-post and reducing competition. The second study examines
the channel through which more bank transparency can induce more risk-taking. A
primary difference with our question is that these studies take the capital requirement
as exogenous. Within this area, many other studies investigate the role of accounting
information given pre-existing capital requirements, see, e.g., Cifuentes et al. (2005b),
Allen and Carletti (2008b), Heaton et al. (2010b) and Bleck and Gao (2017a). In these
models, capital requirements are socially undesirable so they are not well-suited to
examine some of the questions we examine here.
Within this literature, the paper by Li (2017) is the closest to ours and deserves ad-
ditional comments. She analyzes risk-taking incentives in banks in presence of capital
regulation under different accounting regimes. She shows that the accounting regime
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✲t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
r r r r
The regulator chooses
a leverage multiplier A/E
and a reporting system m(s).
The bank invests A ≥ E.
The bank makes
a risk choice e ∈ {0, 1}
and gets a safe
or a risky loan.
The state of the world
s is realized, the
reporting system sends
m(s) and the regulator takes
the liquidation decision.
Payoffs are realized:
α for a safe loan,
β with prob. s and
0 with prob. 1− s for
a risky loan.
Figure 1: Model Timeline
that maximizes the social welfare is determined by a tradeoff between the social cost
of capital regulation and the efficiency of the bank’s project discovery efforts. In our
paper, there is no exogenous cost of capital regulation and the bank is not focused
on short-term earnings. We solve for the optimal accounting system given a tradeoff
between banks’ ex-ante risk-taking incentives and ex-post inefficient liquidations.
The impact of accounting standards on financial institutions’ behaviors has received
a great attention among academia since the 2007-08 financial crisis Acharya and Ryan
(2016b); Barth and Landsman (2010b); Bushman and Landsman (2010a). Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994b) show that historical cost accounting may reduce the ability of
prudential regulators to discipline banks. Some empirical studies provide evidence
that financial reporting indeed affects banks’ risk-taking incentives. For instance,
Chircop and Novotny-Farkas (2016a) suggest that extending the use of fair values for
regulatory purposes reduces ex-ante risk-taking. This is consistent with Ellul et al.
(2015b), who find that the use of fair values in statutory accounting reduces ex-ante
risk-taking incentives in insurance firms. In the same vein, Bushman and Williams
(2012) find that forward-looking provisions reflecting timely recognition of expected
future loan losses is associated with enhanced risk-taking discipline. Consistent with
those studies, we show how a well-designed accounting system may interact with a
bank’s capital requirements to control the bank’s risk-taking incentives.
2.2 The model
The timeline has four event dates, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, 3 and features a regulator,
a bank, and passive insured depositors. We present the timeline of the model in Figure
1.
At date t = 0, the bank invests an exogenous amount of equity E. The regulator
chooses a leverage multiplier for the bank, which we model as a maximum size of the
loan portfolio A ∈ [E,Amax], where Amax is chosen to be sufficiently large. Given size
A, the bank will borrow A − E from depositors, so that we shall think of A/E as
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permissible leverage. Deposits are perfectly insured for reasons outside of the model
(e.g., bank runs, risk-aversion by depositors).1 Thus, the pricing of deposits does not
incorporate the default risk of the bank. We normalize the interest rate of deposit, i.e.
the risk-free rate, to zero. The regulator commits to a reporting system that maps a
variable s, to an interim signal which will determine whether the bank is liquidated at
date t = 2. The state s has a distribution F (.) and a density f(.), with full support
on [0, 1].
At date t = 1, the bank makes a binary risk choice e ∈ {0, 1}.2 Conditional on low
risk, e = 1, the loan portfolio has a probability q ∈ (0, 1) to be safe and a probability
1−q to be risky. Conditional on high risk, e = 0, the probability that the loan portfolio
is safe is equal to zero.3 Safe loans return a payoff α regardless of the state s of the
world. Risky loans return β > α with probability s and 0 with probability 1 − s if
they are continued.
At date t = 2, the regulator optimally liquidates banks if the expected total payoff
from liquidation is greater than the expected total payoff from continuation. If the
safe loan is liquidated, we assume that the payoff from liquidation is α. However,
if the risky loan is liquidated, for simplicity, we assume that the equity holders in
liquidated banks with risky loans do not recover terminal dividends. This assumption
is consistent with most bank liquidations observed in practice Granja et al. (2017). It
can be micro-founded if banks cannot efficiently liquidate loans and, instead, requires
action by a regulator or a better-capitalized intermediary. Formally, we assume that
only the regulator can restructure a risky loan and recover, possibly over time, a payoff
L ∈ (0, 1), so that the residual surplus of the banker conditional on liquidation is zero
- we discuss in an extension a version of the model in which banks have some residual
equity left even after they liquidate.4
The decision to liquidate is made based on the information produced by the re-
1The deposit insurance is an inherent feature of the banking sector. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
model the bank’s role as a liquidity provider and rationalize the deposit insurance as a tool to prevent
bank runs. In the US, deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
2In this paper, we focus our analysis on the conflict of interests between stockholders and depos-
itors of the bank. Therefore, we assume that the bank’s manager acts in the best interest of the
shareholders.
3From linearity, the incentive-compatibility condition is unchanged if we assume, more generally,
that the probability of safe loans is reduced by ∆q ∈ (0, q).
4Note that, in our model, the risky loan changes payoffs in each state but not their probability.
Specifically, we interpret states as an aggregate state of the economy which makes risky loans more
likely to default, as in Furlong and Keeley (1989) or Hellmann et al. (2000), and, for our model of
conflict of interest between bank and regulator, emphasizes the fact that banks do not internalize
payoffs in the low state when they do not repay depositors. This also differs from other models, such
as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) or Bertomeu and Cheynel (2015),
where the state is idiosyncratic to the firm and, therefore, productive effort (by an entrepreneur)
affects the probability of each outcome.
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porting system. Without loss of generality, we set the number of signals equal to the
number of induced actions and use a binary signal structure m ∈ {0, 1}, where m = 1
induces liquidation and m = 0 induces continuation. With a slight abuse of language,
we define a reporting system as a probability m(s) ≡ E(m|s) ∈ [0, 1] that state s
triggers a liquidation signal.5 Because liquidating must be optimal when conditional
on receiving m = 1, we assume that
E(s | m = 1) ≤
L
β
≤ E(s | m = 0). (2.1)
At date t = 3, the loan payoffs are realized. The payoff π of the bank’s loan is
π = α if the loan is safe, π = L if the loan is risky and liquidated, or π = β with
probability s or π = 0 with probability 1 − s if the loan is risky and continued. The
regulator compensates depositors if the bank fails, π < A − E, which we assume is
financed via a frictionless ex-ante tax. The social surplus from the loans is measured
as Σ = E(π − 1)A where E(.) denotes the expectations operator.
Conditional on low risk, a liquidating bank receives an expected payoff
Ul = q(αA− A+ E)
and a continuing bank receives an expected payoff
Uc(s) = q(αA− A+ E) + (1− q)s(βA− A+ E).
The regulator chooses two policies, a leverage multiplier A and an optimal reporting
mechanism, to maximize the total surplus from the loans. The optimal reporting
mechanism is a control problem over the probability distribution of the liquidation
signal m. The regulator therefore maximizes
Σ = (qα + (1− q)E(mL+ (1−m)sβ)− 1)A (2.2)
subject to the following incentive-compatibility condition that induces the low risk
loan:6
5In practice, prudential regulators cannot liquidate a bank arbitrarily upon receiving some negative
news. Regulators may liquidate a bank that is violating the regulatory leverage constraint. Hence,
one way of interpreting our accounting system is that upon receiving bad news, the regulator forces
a bank to write-down the book value of the loan (via provisioning for loan losses) which, in turn,
implies that the bank will violate the regulatory leverage constraint. We discuss the provisioning
interpretation of our results in section 2.4.
6One potential solution to this risk-shifting problem would be to prohibit loans whose interest
rate is too high, which we do not allow in our model since we assume that loan characteristics are
not contractible. This is a strong assumption and, empirically, several institutional structures verify
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E[
αA− A+ E − s(1−m)(βA− A+ E)
]
≥ 0. (2.3)
Definition An efficient policy (A∗,m∗(.)) maximizes Σ subject to (2.1) and (2.3).
For the entire analysis of the model, we impose the following assumptions.
A0. The parameters of the model (L, Amax, E, α, β) satisfy
max(
αAmax − Amax + E
βAmax − Amax + E
,
1− qα
(1− q)β
− F (L/β)L/β))
<
∫ 1
L/β
sf(s)ds < min(
α
β
, 1/β − F (L/β)L/β)). (2.4)
A0 rules out degenerate cases for which the analysis of our model becomes straight-
forward. The first part of the left-hand side of the inequality implies that the bank
cannot achieve its first-best surplus by lending to the maximal extent Amax and imple-
menting the ex-post surplus-maximizing liquidation policy. The second part requires
the low risk portfolio to have positive value because, otherwise, the regulator would
always induce a bank of size zero.
Similarly, the first part of the right-hand side of the inequality rules out parameter
values in which the agency problem is so severe that the bank would lend only its own
equity. The second part of the right-hand side of the inequality guarantees that the
risky loan is value-destroying and therefore rules out a solution in which the regulator
prescribes risky loans with maximal size.
A bank balance sheet interpretation
While it is theoretically practical to define the information as a signal that triggers
liquidation, we can think as a real world implementation in terms of a constraint on
the bank balance sheet at an interim stage t = 2. To elaborate on this further, note
that when the bank starts, its balance sheet is given by
A = E +D,
where the deposit D is simply A−E, the amount the bank lends (at face value) minus
its starting equity.
characteristics of loans (e.g., qualified loans must satisfy certain borrower requirements). However,
not all loan characteristics are easily observable by regulators and issuing a set of acceptable interest
rates conditional on each type of loan would require a degree of regulatory control that is far beyond
current institutions.
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After receiving a negative news on the value of its loan at t = 2, i.e. m(s) = 1, the
bank should write down the value of its loan portfolio by taking a provision for loan
losses. The new balance sheet of the bank is
A2 = E2 +D,
where A2=A(qα+(1− q)L) < A is the new value of the bank’s loan portfolio after the
bad signal is received. Note that this is the expected loan payoff conditional and, later
on, we shall interpret these measurements as a form of expected loss. Assuming that
the bank does not value its federally-insured deposits at fair value (which is typically
not the case for commercial banks), the resulting equity is E2 = A(qα + (1 − q)L) −
(A− E). Hence, the new leverage of the bank is given by
A(qα + (1− q)L)
A(qα + (1− q)L − 1) + E
>
A
E
.
So that an interim capital ratio can be set to liquidate banks whose leverage becomes
higher than this new threshold.
2.3 Analysis
2.3.1 Prudential regulation benchmark
Before solving the general model in which the regulator chooses both the optimal
reporting system and prudential regulation, we first examine a benchmark setting in
which the regulator controls the leverage of the bank but takes as given a reporting
system that perfectly reveals the state. Formally, we assume that the regulator per-
fectly observes the state s and liquidates the bank whenever βs < L. We refer to this
setting as a (pure) prudential regulation benchmark because it ignores the optimal
design of the reporting system.
From A0, it follows that the regulator cannot induce a low risk portfolio if the
bank has zero equity and therefore we assume for this benchmark that the bank has
non-zero equity E to commit per unit of loan. Consistent with the existing literature
on financial intermediation Holmstrom and Tirole (1997); Biais et al. (2007), we show
that the regulator must impose a leverage A∗/E that is bounded by the incentive
problem.
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Proposition 7. Under prudential regulation, the optimal leverage is given by
A∗
E
=
1−
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds
1−
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds)
> 1. (2.5)
Equation (2.5) illustrates the tradeoff between continuing valuable risky loans and
increasing bank leverage. Specifically, if we denote the surplus from continuing risky
loans as Sc =
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds then,
∂A∗/E
∂Sc
= −
β − α
(1− Sc − (α− βSc))2
< 0,
implying that each unit of additional surplus from continuing a risky loan decreases
the size of the loan portfolio that the bank can manage. Further, the right-hand side
of (2.5) is greater than one (from A0), implying that there is always a low enough loan
portfolio size such that low risk can be induced.
Corollary 7. The optimal leverage A∗/E increases in the payoff α of the safe loan,
in the liquidation value L of the risky loan, and decreases in the payoff β of the risky
loan.
The only tool available to the regulator under prudential regulation is the capital
requirement. Hence, as the payoff of the risky loan in the good state increases, the
risk-shifting problem becomes more severe and the regulator reduces bank leverage.
Conversely, as the payoff of the safe loan or the liquidation payoff increase, the risk-
taking problem becomes less severe and the regulator increases bank leverage.
Substituting the optimal leverage from equation (2.5) in equation (2.2) yields the
following expression for the surplus of the bank as a function of the characteristics of
its loan portfolio:
Σ =
(1−
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds)(qα + (1− q)(LF (L
β
) + β
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds)− 1)
1−
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds)
E. (2.6)
As intuitive, the surplus is increasing in the liquidation payoff L. The surplus also
increases both as the likelihood q of the safe loan increases and as the profitability α
of the safe loan increases.
Closer inspection of equation (2.6), however, reveals that the impact of β on the
bank’s surplus is ambiguous due to two opposing effects of β on the bank’s surplus.
First, an increase in β makes the risky loan - which reduces expected surplus - more
attractive to banks and, as shown in Corollary 7, causes a reduction in the equilibrium
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leverage. A low risk portfolio increases surplus so the reduction in size is socially costly.
Second, an increase in β makes the risky loan more attractive because it implies a first-
order stochastic dominance shift in their payoff structure. Therefore, even though the
risky loan reduces social surplus under our maintained assumption A0, the adverse
impact of the risky loan on the bank’s surplus becomes more muted as β increases.
The latter effect increases the total surplus generated by banks.
2.3.2 Accounting regulation benchmark
We now contrast the (pure) prudential setting discussed above to a polar opposite in
which the regulator relies only on the design of a reporting system to discipline banks
but does not control the bank’s leverage. In essence, we are interested in a version
of the model in which the regulator does not impose any upper bound on the size
of the bank’s assets so that the bank’s leverage will be infinite. Accordingly, we set
E = 0 since the bank equity per unit of loan is nearly zero and refer to this as (pure)
accounting regulation because we entirely forfeit prudential tools to control banks.
Because the incentive-compatibility constraint is proportional to A, it can be
rewritten as either A = 0 or
E
[
α− 1− s(1−m)(β − 1)
]
≥ 0, (2.7)
and so that regulator maximizes Σ as defined in (2.2) subject to liquidations being
efficient in constraint (2.1) and incentive-compatibility in constraint (2.7).
Proposition 8. Let κ be given by
∫ 1
κ
sf(s)ds = (α − 1)/(β − 1). Under accounting
regulation,
(i) if L ≥ β
∫ κ
0
sf(s)ds/F (κ), the optimal policy is such that A∗ = Amax and the
reporting system issues a liquidation signal m(s) = 1 if and only if s < κ, where
κ > L/β;
(ii) otherwise, inducing low risk is infeasible.
Proposition 8 implies that if the liquidation value of the risky loan is high enough
(case (i)), the optimal accounting regulation can discipline the bank to choose the
low risk portfolio without any additional equity. However, the liquidation policy is
inefficient as the bank is liquidated over some states of the world with s ∈ [L/β, κ].
Therefore, in the absence of any prudential regulation, the need to provide ex-ante
disciplining incentives is in conflict with the ex-post efficient liquidation constraint.
Indeed, when the agency problem becomes sufficiently severe (case (ii)), the regulator
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is unable to commit to liquidate the loan portfolio sufficiently often to solve the risk-
taking problem and the bank cannot induce the low risk portfolio.
Corollary 8. Whenever A∗ > 0, the optimal threshold κ decreases in the payoff α of
the safe loan and increases in the payoff β of the risky loan.
Another key implication of the accounting benchmark (which we shall generally
demonstrate throughout our analysis) is given in Corollary 8. Absent any agency
problem, the total surplus is increasing in β because this raises the payoff from the
risky loan for any liquidation policy. However, when β is too large, it becomes infeasible
to induce the low risk portfolio and, therefore, more profitable risky loans reduce the
loan portfolio to zero.
This argument applies when switching from case (i) to case (ii) of Proposition 8
but we can also apply a similar logic within case (i) of the Proposition to show how an
increase in β may reduce total surplus via its effect on the liquidation choice. Rewriting
the total surplus after substituting (2.7),
Σ = Amax(qα + (1− q)(LF (κ) + β
α− 1
β − 1
)− 1).
Taking a total derivative with respect to β, the total surplus Σ is increasing in β if
and only if
α− 1
(β − 1)2
(
L
κ
− 1) > 0. (2.8)
The sign of the left-hand side of (2.8) has the sign of L/κ − 1 and depends only on
β and α via their effects on the liquidation threshold κ. We have shown that κ is
increasing in β in Corollary 8 and, further, this term is positive when κ is close to
L/β. Hence, the total surplus is either increasing or inverse U-shaped in β, with its
global maximum at the value of β that induces κ = L. Reinjecting this in the definition
of κ, the socially preferred payoff for risky loans is given by
β − 1 =
α− 1∫ 1
L
sf(s)ds
. (2.9)
In other words, our framework implies that the regulator may have an interior
optimum about which type of risky loans the banks should be allowed to engage in. In
particular, settings with higher safe loan payoffs and liquidation values are conducive to
lending to more risky loan. Vice-versa, environments in which risky loans become more
profitable, without any concurrent change in safe loans, will typically be detrimental.
As in Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008b), we next conduct a comparison of the two
modes of regulation taken in isolation and demonstrate that prudential regulation
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can do worse than accounting regulation. From a practical perspective, this result
contrasts with the predominant model of bank regulation which primarily relies on
controlling prudential tools. This is also, of course, an important step to motivating
a theory where both pieces are jointly optimized. In our model, comparing prudential
versus accounting regulation amounts to comparing total surplus when controlling only
the reporting system (pure accounting regulation) versus requiring bank equity and
controlling the amount of leverage (pure prudential regulation).
Corollary 9. Accounting regulation with zero equity is preferred to prudential regula-
tion if and only if L ≥ β
∫ κ
0
sf(s)ds/F (κ) + o(1/Amax).
The main insight from Corollary 9 is that accounting regulation may be too rigid
to tackle sufficiently important agency frictions but, if the risk-taking problem is not
too severe, accounting regulation is preferred to prudential regulation. Because the
regulator cannot commit to shut down banks if they have positive surplus, there are
limits on liquidations under pure accounting regulation can induce and these can be-
come insufficient to solve the agency problem. In this case, banks must be required to
hold additional skin in the game in the form of an equity contribution and an upper
bound on the size of their loan portfolio. Equivalently, the regulator imposes capi-
tal requirements. To summarize, accounting regulation become more efficient as the
liquidation values of risky loans improve relative to the maximal payoffs of such loans.
2.3.3 Joint prudential and accounting regulation
We next derive the optimal accounting standard when the regulator jointly optimizes
the reporting system and the capital requirement. Without loss of generality, we
decompose this joint choice as a choice of A and, for a given A, a choice of the
measurement m(.), hereafter, the subproblem. As we will demonstrate, the bank will
always choose to lend to the maximal extent allowed by the regulator, so we shall
equivalently refer to A as allowed bank leverage or the size of the bank.
We can simplify the analysis by noting that the subproblem is equivalent to maxi-
mizing a Lagrangian objective function that is pointwise linear in m(.), that is,
(P ) max
m(.)∈[0,1]
∫
((qα + (1− q)(m(s)L+ (1−m(s))sβ)− 1)A)f(s)ds
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s.t.
L
β
∫
m(s)f(s)ds−
∫
sm(s)f(s)ds ≥ 0 (2.10)∫
s(1−m(s))f(s)ds−
L
β
∫
(1−m(s))f(s)ds ≥ 0 (2.11)
αA− A+ E − (βA− A+ E)
∫
s(1−m(s))f(s)ds ≥ 0. (2.12)
where (2.10) and (2.11) are the left-hand and right-hand side of (2.1), respectively, and
(2.12) is the incentive-compatibility condition.7 We show next that the liquidation
policy must take the form of a threshold above which the bank is continued.
Lemma 13. A solution to (P) must be such that m(s) = 1 if and only if s < τ , where
τ ≥ L/β.
Lemma 13 contains two key parts, which we discuss separately. The fact that
only low states must be liquidated may seem surprising given that, in the incentive-
compatibility constraint, liquidating the loan conditional on higher states increases the
left-hand side of (2.12) the most. However, in the objective function, higher states also
improve the payoffs of the bank if the loan is continued and this latter effect dominates
the former effect.
To see why, we offer below a heuristic proof which carries the intuition better than
the formal proof. Assume that the incentive-compatibility condition binds (as will
turn out to be the case) so that∫
s(1−m(s))f(s)ds =
αA− A+ E
βA− A+ E
. (2.13)
This condition means that a sufficiently large fraction of the surplus from contin-
uation must be forfeited in order to solve the risk-taking problem. Intuitively, con-
tinuation gives the agent the ability to achieve the βs payoff and thus makes it more
difficult to induce the low risk choice. Note that this condition does not say whether
high or low states should be liquidated and, indeed, high states contribute more to this
constraint because they are multiplied by s (and affect a manager choosing high risk
the most). But, reinjecting in the objective function and regrouping terms, implies
Σ = A(qα + (1− q)
αA− A+ E
βA− A+ E
β − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=cst(A)
+A(1− q)E(m)L (2.14)
7Note that this is a relaxed version of the subproblem as we allow for a choice of m(s) on the unit
interval. However, the relaxed subproblem coincides with the original subproblem to the extent that,
as a result of linearity, the solution must be an extreme value of the set of feasible policies.
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where cst(A) is a function of A that does not contain m(.). Hence, once the
incentive-compatibility binds, the objective function is increasing in the probability
of liquidation. The policy that maximizes this probability while meeting incentive-
compatibility is therefore to shut down firms conditional on low states. To further
explain this feature of our model, note that the second term in (2.14) is the ex-
pected payoff from the risky loan, with the benefit being determined entirely from
the incentive-compatibility. In other words, the entire continuation surplus cannot be
increased beyond what is permissible by the risk-taking agency problem.
The second part of Lemma 13 demonstrates that the liquidation threshold is always
weakly greater than the first-best threshold τfb = L/β. Put differently, the equilibrium
may feature excess liquidations for incentive purposes. Liquidations, in this model,
serve a dual objective, namely, to shut down ex-post inefficient risky projects and
discipline ex-ante risk-taking.
The first objective is best solved by setting a threshold at τfb = L/β, such that
states below τfb induce a liquidation. This constraint is very similar to the ex-post
efficiency constraint in (2.1) except that, in the constraint, it is evaluated against the
perceived state revealed by the reporting system. If one were to focus only on the first
objective, the reporting system m(s) = 1 if and only if s < τfb were chosen.
The second objective requires to use liquidations to elicit a low risk portfolio. In
turn, inspecting (2.3), the incentive-compatibility condition becomes easier to meet
when E(sm) increases, that is, liquidating higher states of the world helps discipline
risk-taking. Whenever risk-taking incentives bind, the implied distortion must take
the form of more liquidations than would be demanded by the first objective.
Lemma 14. The efficient continuation threshold τ satisfies
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds =
αA− A+ E
βA− A+ E
. (2.15)
Lemma 14 demonstrates that the incentive-compatibility condition must bind. The
intuition for this observation in our model is straightforward. The first-best policy -
lending the maximal amount of loans with no distortion to liquidation - is infeasible
(from A0). Of interest, we can rewrite (2.15) as a statement about the leverage of a
bank, by dividing both sides of the right-hand side of (2.15) by E and solving for bank
leverage:
A
E
=
1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds
1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
. (2.16)
This characterization illustrates how, holding a liquidation threshold fixed, more lever-
age is possible if the payoff from safe assets increases or the payoff from risky assets
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Figure 2.1: A/E as a function of τ (IC constraint and isosurplus curves)
decreases.
To further characterize the optimal policies chosen by the regulator, we write the
optimal continuation threshold τ(A) in terms of A from (2.15). Applying the implicit
function theorem, this threshold is increasing, i.e.,
τ ′(A) =
(β − α)E
τ(A)f(τ(A))(βA− A+ E)2
> 0, (2.17)
which is intuitive because the risk-taking problem is more severe when the ratio of
loans to equity increases and thus requires a greater fraction of liquidation.
We have for now left aside the ex-post constraint E(s|m(s) = 1) ≤ L/β, which is
required for the bank to be credibly liquidated by the regulator. Yet, bringing back this
constraint yields another crucial implication of our analysis. The more A is increased,
the more difficult it becomes to meet the incentive-compatibility condition: to meet
this condition, τ(A) must increase to raise E(s | m(s) = 1). But, if A is set too high,
τ(A) will no longer satisfy E(s | s ≤ τ(A)) ≤ L/β. This implies an upper bound τ on
the liquidation threshold, defined by E(s | s ≤ τ) = L/β, and an implied upper bound
on the size of the bank A, where τ = τ(A).
Reinjecting the optimal leverage (2.16) into the social surplus (2.2), this problem
can be rephrased as choosing the optimal liquidation threshold to maximize
Σ(τ) ≡
(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ) + β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)− 1)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
E (2.18)
with a necessary condition for an interior solution given by Σ′(τ) = 0.
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We show next that the regulator would always choose to distort the ex-post liq-
uidation threshold, i.e., choose τ > τfb = L/β. As a corollary, the optimal reporting
system induces a greater bank size and higher efficiency than a reporting system in
which s is perfectly revealed. We prove this statement in the next proposition.
Proposition 9. The efficient continuation threshold τ(A∗) is set at a level strictly
higher than the first-best continuation threshold τfb = L/β.
Recall that the liquidation is also governed by an ex-post constraint which bars
policies in which the regulator would liquidate a bank with greater value if it were
continued. The higher the liquidation threshold, the more this constraint becomes
difficult to satisfy. Specifically, the ex-post constraint is satisfied if and only if τ ≤
τ ≡ τ(A), where
∫ τ
0
sf(s)ds =
L
β
F (τ). (2.19)
For convenience, we assume here that E(s)β > L, which implies that τ < 1. This
has little bearing on our main insights as long as, if this condition is not satisfied, the
regulator can set the liquidation threshold at the maximal level, i.e. τ = 1.
To characterize the optimal threshold, note that Σ′(τ) < 0 is a sufficient condition
for the existence of an interior solution τ(A∗) < τ since, then, the regulator would
increase welfare by reducing the liquidation threshold. In the next proposition, we
show that this condition is necessary and sufficient, and can be expressed in terms of
a statement about the fraction of safe loans.
Proposition 10. τ(A∗) = τ if and only if
q > q¯ =
ν
(α− 1)(β − α)τ + ν
∈ (0, 1), (2.20)
where
ν = (1−βE(s))(β−α)τ− (L−τβ)(1+
LF (τ)
β
−E(s))(1−α+(β−1)(E(s)−
L
β
F (τ))).
The intuition for Proposition 10 is given in two steps, starting with a comparative
static in q in this paragraph and followed by the rationale for τ(A∗) = τ . Although
the probability of a safe loan q did not play an important role in any of the benchmark
settings, we show here that it is a key determinant of how the regulator chooses
the optimal reporting system. Specifically, when q is large, there is a greater net
benefit from increasing leverage. In the prudential benchmark, this leverage was fully
determined by the incentive condition, so that there was little the regulator could
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do to increase it further. Here, on the other hand, the regulator can increase the
inefficient liquidation of risky loans. Whether this is desirable depends on the trade-
off with the cost of excessive liquidation. But, to pin down this trade-off, recall that
the fraction of risky loans is lower so the cost of relying on inefficient liquidations is
reduced. Putting both regulatory channels together, we conclude that the regulator
will (weakly) increase the threshold τ(A∗) in response to an increase in the fraction of
safe loans q.
Continuing on this logic, this implies that expectations about failing banks increase
as a function of q, and it becomes increasingly difficult for the regulator to credibly shut
down banks. When q becomes greater than q¯, the required liquidation threshold to
implement the ideal leverage would be above τ . At this point, the ex-post liquidation
constraint E(s | s ≤ τ(A∗)) ≤ L/β becomes binding and the regulator implements the
maximal credible threshold τ . Put differently, when the loans become sufficiently safe,
the regulator implements the maximal credible level of liquidation (and would have
been better-off with a policy of commitment to liquidation and even higher leverage).
Naturally, when this point q ≥ q is reached, the credible level of liquidation no longer
depends on q since safe loans neither gain nor lose from liquidating the bank. We
summarize these comparative statics in the next corollary.
Corollary 10. A∗/E and τ(A∗) are increasing in q, strictly if and only if q ≤ q¯.
A different logic is at play for an increase in the liquidation value L but the intuition
remains entirely transparent. As for q, a greater liquidation payoff increases the total
value earned by increasing leverage, leading to a greater desirability of higher leverage
(provided it remains incentive-compatible). It also reduces the cost of liquidating risky
loans for a given state. Therefore, the comparative static is similar to that of q and
an increase in L leads to higher leverage and more liquidation for any given state. In
addition, because higher L increases the credibility of a regulatory intervention (via
its effect on L/β in the ex-post liquidation constraint), this comparative static holds
even when the maximal threshold τ is attained. We state it below.
Corollary 11. A∗/E and τ(A∗) are increasing in L.
An increase in α increases the attractiveness of safe loans to banks and reduces the
severity of agency problems while increasing the surplus generated by banks. Hence,
we argue and find that the leverage increases as a function of α. If q is high, however,
because the maximal liquidation threshold is attained and the credibility of liquidations
does not depend on α, it will no longer affect the liquidation threshold.
Corollary 12. A∗/E and τ(A∗) are increasing in α, strictly for A∗/E or if q < q.
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Finally, the effect of the risky payoff β on leverage is ambiguous because it has two
opposite effects on the liquidation threshold. On the one hand, a higher β makes it
more costly to liquidate a firm for any level of s and this tends to reduce the liquidation
threshold. On the other hand, a higher β also makes the risky loan portfolio more
attractive which requires more liquidation to meet the incentive constraint.
As it turns out, the effect of β depends on whether the ex-post liquidation constraint
τ is reached (equivalently, whether the fraction of safe loans is high enough). If τ(A∗) =
τ , the constraining factor is to make the liquidation of failing banks credible, so that
higher β, because it makes it more tempting for the regulator to continue, leads to a
reduction in the threshold and a lower leverage. If q < q, we have the only case where
the optimal leverage and the liquidation may enter in different directions, as a result
of the two trade-offs discussed earlier. We elaborate more on this in the next corollary.
Corollary 13. If q ≥ q¯, A∗/E and τ ∗ are decreasing in β. Otherwise, for any param-
eter values such that ∂τ ∗/∂β < 0 or ∂(A∗/E)/∂β > 0, τ ∗ and A∗/E vary in the same
direction as a function of β.
The main new claim is contained in the second part of Corollary 13 which reveals
that, for certain settings, the regulatory tools vary in the same direction as for the
other comparative statics.8 In particular, if the regulator raises leverage in response
to higher β, a more severe agency problem is faced for the ex-post liquidation and
liquidations must increase. Vice-versa, if the regulator reduces liquidations, then the
more severe agency problem must be solved with lower leverage.
Table 2.1 wraps up with the comparative statics of the general model, with the
main observation being that, for all variables but the payoff of the risky loan, ac-
counting and prudential regulations move in tandem. When using only accounting
regulation (third row) or only prudential regulation (fourth row), the regulations do
not depend on the fraction of good projects q and, in the case of accounting regulation,
the continuation threshold does not depend on the liquidation value. The regulations
respond to more profitable risky loans by either reducing leverage or by increasing
liquidations, and more profitable safe loans reduce the equilibrium level of inefficiency
by either increasing bank leverage or reducing inefficient liquidations.
8This claim is, unfortunately, based on endogenous objects but, conceptually, it aims at establish-
ing when we should observe the two regulatory variables co-moving and helps clarify some intuitions.
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q L α β
Joint regulation
with q > q¯
τ(A∗) 0 + 0 −
A∗/E 0 + + −
Joint regulation
with q ≤ q¯
τ(A∗) + + + ?
A∗/E + + + ?
Accounting only
benchmark
τ(A∗) 0 0 − +
Prudential only
benchmark
A∗/E 0 + + −
Table 2.1: Comparative statics
0.372 0.374 0.376 0.378 0.380
L: liquidation payoff
Σ: social surplus
 A*/E: leverage
τ(A*): threshold 1.305 1.310 1.315 1.320
α: payoff of safe loan
Σ: social surplus
 A*/E: leverage
τ(A*): threshold
0.245 0.250 0.255 0.260
q: prob. of safe loan
Σ: social surplus
 A*/E: leverage
τ(A*): threshold
Figure 2.2: Σ, A∗/E and τ(A∗)
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2.4 An Application to expected loan loss provision-
ing
2.4.1 Institutional background
A practical application of our model is to inform the debate on the optimal provi-
sioning model for loan losses that has received attention since the 2007-08 financial
crisis. Under the previous IASB (IAS 39) and FASB (FAS 114) standards, the ac-
counting model for recognizing loan losses was referred to as an incurred loss model.
It requires the recording of loan losses that have been incurred as of the balance sheet
date, rather than of probable future losses. Loss identification is based on the oc-
currence of triggering events supported by observable evidence (e.g. borrower loss of
employment, decrease in collateral values...) combined with expert judgment. This
model, it has been argued, may increase pro-cyclicality by delaying recognition of bad
debt until there is evidence of increases in default rates - which, highly correlated to
unemployment, is a lagging indicator of the cycle.
Individual countries have taken steps to overcome the limitations of the incurred
loss model of loan loss provisioning. For example, Spain adopted dynamic loan loss
provisioning in 2000 in order to reduce pro-cyclical effects. Dynamic loan loss provi-
sioning requires banks to gradually accumulate loan loss reserves prior to loss events,
with the intention of enabling banks to better weather stress events. However, dynamic
loan loss provisioning need not fully account for future expected loan losses.
The new expected loan loss standards (IFRS 9 and ASU 2016-13) have a more
forward-looking approach that emphasizes shifts to the probability of future loan losses,
even if no triggering events have yet occurred. We think about our mechanism design
as an efficient expected loss, in that banks report information about a state s before
the realization of loan payoffs. There is always a benefit to having such information
but, as our main contribution, we show that this expected measurement should not
provide all information and may, in fact, cause more liquidations of banks, some of
which are inefficient, at an interim stage of the life of a loan.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has three principles calling
for supervisors to adequately evaluate credit risk management, expected credit losses
measurement and capital adequacy. The committee supports the use of expected
credit losses approaches and encourages their application in a manner that will provide
incentives for banks to follow sound credit risk management and robust provisioning
practices.
The BCBS notes that banks may have well established regulatory capital models
82
for the measurement of expected losses. However, while these models may be used
as important starting points for estimating expected credit losses for accounting pur-
poses, regulatory capital models may not be directly usable without adjustment in the
measurement of accounting expected loan losses, given their different objectives and
inputs. In particular, the regulatory expected losses are calculated under an internal
ratings-based approach in Basel III.
2.4.2 Implications of the model
We can draw the following implications from our general model. First, an expected
loss model should not incorporate all the information about the state of the world
because it implies excessively low bank leverage (that is, prudential regulations that
are too strict). But expected loss may be problematic as well, as a reporting system
that causes too much liquidation in the interim stage if not carefully calibrated, in
particular when the proportion of risky loans is high enough and such liquidations
could be socially costly. So, expected loss may make the banking sector more fragile,
and cause episodes similar to the recent financial crisis where otherwise good loans
would be sold by banks.
Second, the comparative statics on the liquidation threshold tell us to what extent
the reporting system moves toward inducing more aggressive liquidations. As we
show under joint regulation, higher capital requirements typically come together with
reporting systems that are more tilted towards expected loss; in particular, if the safe
loans or the liquidation payoffs are higher, or the likelihood of safe loans is higher,
the regulator will tend to readjust toward an expected loss model, increasing bank
leverage in the process. We view these settings as situations when the economy as
a whole features more favorable conditions so, according to our model, an expected
loss model is more suitable to expansionary credit periods. This result also provides a
rationale for the dynamic loan loss provisioning that has been implemented in Spain
in 2000.
Third, while we solve for a full mechanism, we can examine a version of the model
where the mechanism can be interpreted as a timing choice - thus, moving the question
to the choice of when to measure the state of the loan. So far, we have assumed that
there are no frictions in how information can be controlled ex-ante. However, some
practical cases may feature constrained choices of mechanisms where certain informa-
tion may arrive over time. To set ideas, consider first a setting in which information
about the state over an horizon t ∈ [0, 1] where state 1 − s ≥ t becomes public in-
formation after state t. Naturally, in this context, we could not implement certain
reporting systems that were allowed in our baseline model. However, we can think
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about the reporting system choice as an intervention point in the timeline, with a date
t0 (committed ex-ante) where the regulator would decide to liquidate. In other words,
the regulator commits to intervention once the information has a certain precision.
Inspecting this problem further, we know that by setting t0 = 1− τ ∗, the regulator
would observe all states with 1 − s ≥ t0 (and would not liquidate as we have shown
that E(s | s ≥ τ ∗) ≥ L/β) and, for the remaining banks, observe the state 1− s < t0
which would yield the liquidation policy of the baseline model. So, we can think about
the optimal mechanism as commitment to intervene at a particular level of knowledge
about the state. We can then think about “late" intervention, similar to incurred loss,
as 1 − t∗ = τ ∗ = L/β will correspond to intervention when it is certain that the loan
is losing value while an expected loss model will correspond to intervention when the
loan starts losing value in expectation.
It is of course also possible that the arrival of information may not allow for a
solution that implements the “full-control" mechanism considered earlier and, unfor-
tunately, there are too many processes of arrival of information to consider all cases.
Instead, we analyze the opposite version of the previous example to make this point
clear and assume that it is now the low states s < t that are revealed as time pro-
gresses.9 Intervention occurs at pre-committed time t0. Setting t0 = τ ∗ will not work
here because it would imply that, at t0, the regulator would know the state for all
projects below t0 and thus would liquidate if and only s ≤ L/β and not liquidate in
the region (L/β, τ ∗] or the region above τ ∗ since we know that E(s | s ≥ τ ∗) ≥ L/β.
In this case, accounting measurements can do nothing better than revealing the state.
The intuition for this is only useful to set up the additional considerations that come
from an exogenous arrival of information and which reduce the scope for a mechanism.
When low states are revealed purely sequentially over time, then an expected loss
model is not possible since all states will be fully revealed before we get to the point
where we can induce additional liquidations.
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Costly liquidation of safe loans
Suppose that the payoff of safe loans is equal to L when liquidated. In other words,
safe loans suffer from liquidations in all states of the world. The first-best ex-post
liquidation threshold τfb is now such that qα + (1 − q)τfbβ = L, i.e. τfb = (L −
9Keep in mind that these refers to states of the world, not characteristics of individual loans so it
would not be evident that this process would be more plausible than the earlier one as this is different
from one individual loan failing a payment (further, payments occur at the end in our model).
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qα)/(1−q)β. Let us assume that qα < L in order to have an interior first-best ex-post
liquidation threshold. We can rewrite the ex post efficient continuation/liquidation
constraints as
E(s | m = 1) ≤ τfb =
L − qα
(1− q)β
≤ E(s | m = 0). (2.21)
The total surplus is now given by
Σ =
(
E(mL+ (1−m)(qα + (1− q)sβ))− 1
)
A (2.22)
and the incentive-compatibility condition that makes low risk the preferred choice is
E
[
(1−m)(αA− A+ E − s(βA− A+ E))
]
≥ 0. (2.23)
As in the baseline model, the regulator can increase the liquidation (m) or decrease
the bank leverage (A), in order to elicit a low risk portfolio choice. In this setting,
as in our baseline model, the optimal reporting system is a threshold τ ∗ above which
loan portfolios are continued. To illustrate this intuition formally, let us write the
Lagrangian of the baseline model, indicating by multiplier µ0 the incentive constraint
(2.23) (we omit the ex-post constraints for expositional purpose but they can be easily
reincorporated). Differentiating with respect to the probability m(s) of liquidating
conditional on state s,
∂L
∂m(s)
= s(µ0(Aβ − A+ E)− (1− q)β) + L − qα− µ0(αA− A+ E).
Noting that this function is linear in s, we know that m(s) = 1 if and only if s ≤ τ ,
where τ is a threshold in [0, 1]. Hence, the incentive-compatibility constraint can be
rewritten as ∫ 1
τ
(αA− A+ E − s(βA− A+ E))f(s)ds ≥ 0.
The left-hand side is negative if τ ≥ (αA − A + E)/(βA − A + E), which implies
that τ ∗ < (αA∗−A∗+E)/(βA∗−A∗+E). Moreover, the left-hand side is decreasing
in τ for τ < (αA−A+E)/(βA−A+E). Further, the objective function is increasing
in τ when τ ∈ (0, τfb), hence, it must be that, τ ∗ ≤ τfb. In contrast with our baseline
model, the optimal liquidation policy is to induce excessive continuations. Indeed, for
low realizations of s, the bank is strictly better-off with a safe rather than a risky loan
in case of continuation, whereas the bank is indifferent between a safe and a risky loan
in case of liquidation. As a result, excessive continuations are a way for the regulator
to provide incentives to the bank to choose a low risk portfolio.
85
The incentive-compatibility constraint binds in equilibrium because, otherwise, the
regulator set τ ∗ = τfb and A = Amax, a case that we rule out as in the baseline model.10
Thus, the optimal leverage is such that
A
E
=
1− F (τ)−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds(β − 1)− (α− 1)(1− F (τ))
. (2.24)
Reinjecting, the total surplus is given by
Σ = A(F (τ)L+ q(1− F (τ))α + (1− q)β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− 1)
= E
(1− F (τ)−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(F (τ)L+ q(1− F (τ))α + (1− q)β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− 1)∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds(β − 1)− (α− 1)(1− F (τ))
.
Taking the first-order condition with respect to τ yields
H(τ) = (F (τ)L+q(1−F (τ))α+(1−q)β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds−1)(β−α)(τ(1−F (τ))−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
+(1−F (τ)−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(L−qα−(1−q)τβ)((β−1)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds−(α−1)(1−F (τ))) = 0.
(2.25)
Evaluating the function H at the first-best threshold yields
H(τfb) =
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(F (τfb)L+ q(1− F (τfb))α + (1− q)β
∫ 1
τfb
sf(s)ds− 1) (β − α)
∫ 1
τfb
(τfb − s)f(s)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
The first term of this product is the social surplus of a low-risk loan portfolio using
the first-best liquidation policy and this surplus is assumed to be positive.11 The
second term is obviously negative. Hence, we can conclude that H(τfb) < 0. Thus, the
ex-post first-best threshold is always a local maximum of the total surplus Σ. This
contrasts with our main model in which the ex post first-best threshold is never a local
maximum.
10Specifically, we assume that αAmax −Amax + E − (βAmax −Amax + E)
∫
1
τfb
sf(s)ds < 0.
11This is equivalent to assume that F (τfb)L+ q(1− F (τfb))α+ (1− q)β
∫
1
τfb
sf(s)ds > 1.
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2.5.2 Residual bank equity
Suppose that the bank can liquidate the risky loan without transferring it to the
regulator. In this environment, when forced to liquidate, the bank obtains L per loan
instead of having to transfer all of its equity to the regulator. One interpretation is
that the bank can resell both risky and safe loans at the same market price L. For
high enough leverage A (to be derived later on), A(qα+ (1− q)L)− (A−E) < 0, the
bank will still have zero equity left in case of liquidation, so this case is only relevant
for environments where banks start with high levels of equity or the agency friction is
very high. Perhaps, for example, this model fits more closely the problem of certain
financial intermediaries (e.g., guaranteed funds, specialized banks) which rely more on
their own equity capital than on outside depositors. For simplicity, we assume that the
bank learns perfectly the realization of the state of the world s, but the bank cannot
credibly reveal s to the regulator.
The first-best ex-post liquidation threshold, τfb = L/β, is the same as in our
baseline model. Given that a bank never defaults, a liquidating bank receives an
expected payoff
Ul = q(αA− A+ E) + (1− q)(LA− A+ E). (2.26)
The total surplus is the same than in our baseline model. The regulator cannot
force the bank to keep a loan if the expected payoff for the bank in case of liquidation
is higher than the expected payoff in case of continuation, i.e., for all s such that
m(s) = 0, we have
q(αA−A+E)+(1−q)(LA−A+E) ≤ q(αA−A+E)+(1−q)s(βA−A+E), (2.27)
which is equivalent to LA−A+E ≤ s(βA−A+E). Further, the incentive-compatibility
condition that makes low risk the preferred choice is
E
[
αA− A+ E −m(LA− A+ E)− s(1−m)(βA− A+ E)
]
≥ 0. (2.28)
As in our baseline model, the regulator can decrease the bank leverage (A), in
order to elicit a low risk portfolio choice. The effect of liquidations on the incentives of
the bank to choose the low risk portfolio becomes ambiguous in this setting. On the
one hand, for high values of s (such that s(βA− A+ E) > LA− A+ E), liquidating
the loan decreases the payoff to the bank and increases the incentives. On the other
hand, for low values of s (such that s(βA − A + E) < LA − A + E), the expected
payoff of the bank increases in case of liquidation and the regulator would be willing to
continue. However, in those states, the bank voluntarily liquidates the loan portfolio.
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As a result, the optimal liquation policy cannot induce excessive continuations and, as
in our baseline model, induces excessive liquidations.
Formally, we can write the Lagrangian of the baseline model, indicating by multi-
plier µ0 the incentive constraint (2.28) and omitting the ex-post constraints. Differen-
tiating this Lagrangian with respect to the probability m(s) of liquidating conditional
on state s,
∂L
∂m(s)
= s(µ0(Aβ − A+ E)− (1− q)β) + (1− q)L − µ0(LA− A+ E).
Noting that this function is linear in s, we know there exists τ in [0, 1] such that
m(s) = 1 for s < τ , and m(s) = 0 for s > τ . Then, we can rewrite the incentive-
compatibility constraint as
αA− A+ E − (LA− A+ E)F (τ)− (βA− A+ E)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds) ≥ 0. (2.29)
The left-hand side increases in τ for τ > (LA − A + E)/(βA − A + E). Moreover,
we know that condition (2.27) requires that τ ∗ ≥ (LA − A + E)/(βA − A + E) and
τfb = L/β ≥ (LA − A + E)/(βA − A + E). Hence, the optimal liquidation policy
induces excessive liquidations, i.e. τ ∗ ≥ τfb. As previously, we rule out the solution
with τfb and Amax, which implies that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding
in equilibrium.12 The optimal leverage is such that
A
E
=
1− F (τ)−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds(β − 1)− F (τ)(1− L)− (α− 1)
. (2.30)
After deriving the optimal leverage, the condition that makes sure that the bank
with a risky loan does not default in case of liquidation is given by A∗/E ≤ L + 1.
This condition is satisfied if we assume that the parameters (α, β,L, q) are such that
1− F (τ¯)−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds(β − 1)− F (τ¯)(1− L)− (α− 1)
≤ L+ 1. (2.31)
To summarize, when the bank does not default in case of liquidation and the bank
can take the liquidation decision, the optimal accounting policy also induces excessive
continuations.
12We assume that αAmax − Amax + E − (LAmax − Amax + E)F (τfb) − (βAmax − Amax +
E)
∫
1
τfb
sf(s)ds) < 0.
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2.6 Conclusion and perspectives on integrated ac-
counting policy
Economists worry about the efficient allocation of resources. Unfortunately, trans-
parency need not always serve this objective and the FASB’s position on increasing
access will lead to recurrent conflicts between accounting and economic policy. This
paper, as part of many others in this stream of literature, offers an alternative per-
spective on accounting as integrated to economic policy sharing common objectives,
and where dissemination information is a means-to-an-end. To do this, accounting
standard setters need to be equipped to think about economic consequences and place
these consequences in their primary goal.
We have approached this research problem in the context of a setting that is cur-
rently affected by both accounting and prudential regulators. The current institutional
arrangement is odd, as prudential regulators use accounting information as input, but
then transform some elements of these accounting numbers or entirely ignore informa-
tion that the FASB views as important. Occasionally, various bodies have noted that
the actions of accounting standard setters have gone against efforts to stabilize credit
markets by other bodies. The position, stated repeatedly, that accountants should give
public access to as much information as possible while letting other regulatory bodies
deal with consequences using other levers is difficult to justify. In fact, we show here
that accounting choices can only be partially addressed using a capital requirement,
often leading to prudential choices that are too strict. Put differently, if accounting
choices yield outcomes that are detrimental to investors, other policy tools are only
partial substitutes.
More work is needed to address various difficult problems that may rise when us-
ing economic objectives. First, we do not know yet how accounting regulators would
effectively implement provisioning rules that are time-varying, thus creating informa-
tional levers that activate or deactivate as conditions in the capital market change. A
threshold in a simple model offers a high-level perspective but does not speak much of
its implementation at a micro-level in terms of the measurements of particular transac-
tions. Should regulators control impairment ceilings, in terms of varying percentages
of loss of value causing an impairment? Should accounting numbers be indexed on
distance from a capital ratio if banks access different profiles of risky loans?
Second, we have still almost no research about other regulatory levers that interact
with accounting policy. From a macroeconomic perspective, regulators control access
to credit via interest rate policy, budgetary choices or tax policy, all of which are
based on accounting information but do not seem coordinated with accounting. It
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seems an underlying belief in the accounting profession that such choices are purely
politically-minded and would damage accounting regulation. There is confusion here
as to economic definition of political as “what affects welfare in society" to the accoun-
tants’ definition as “what affects special interests at the expense of others" and we
hope that, taking the first, the profession can see the benefit of justifying the political
economy of such choices.
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Appendix
Appendix A.1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 7: We can rewrite the (IC) constraint as∫ L/β
0
(Aα−A+ E)f(s)ds+
∫ 1
L/β
(Aα−A+ E − s(Aβ −A+ E))f(s)ds ≥ 0. (2.32)
By contradiction, if the (IC) is not binding, the regulator will choose A = Amax
large, which contradicts A0. Hence, binding the (IC), the optimal size A∗ is given by
equation (2.5) in text. Further A∗/E is greater than 1, implying that there is always
a loan portfolio size such that the (IC) constraint is satisfied, i.e. low risk can be
induced.
Proof of Proposition 8: It is convenient to state the optimal reporting problem
for each unit of loan as a program linear in the reporting policy where, with a slight
abuse in notation, we write the control as a function m(s) ∈ [0, 1] indicating the
probability that a firm is liquidated.
(P ) max
m(s),A
A
∫
(qα + (1− q)(m(s)L+ (1−m(s))sβ − 1)f(s)ds
s.t.
α− 1− (β − 1)
∫
s(1−m(s))f(s)ds ≥ 0 (µ0)∫
(1−m(s))sf(s)ds ≥ L
β
∫
(1−m(s))f(s)ds (µa)
L
β
∫
m(s)f(s)ds ≥
∫
sm(s)f(s)ds (µb)
Differentiating the lagrangian L in m(s), we obtain
∂L
∂m(s)
= (1− q)(L − sβ) + µ0s(β − 1) + (µa + µb)(
L
β
− s)
= s(µ0(β − 1)− (1− q)β − µa − µb) + (1− q +
µa + µb
β
)L.
In turn, noting that this function is linear in s and positive at s = 0, we know that
m(s) = 1 if and only if s ≤ τ , where τ is a threshold in [0, 1].
Case 1. Suppose that µ0 = 0. Then, the solution µa = µb = 0 and τne = L/β
maximizes the Lagrangian and satisfies the constraints associated to multipliers µa
and µb. Reinjecting in the incentive-compatibility condition,
α− 1− (β − 1)
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds ≥ 0, (2.33)
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which contradicts A0.
Case 2. Suppose that µ0 > 0, in which case the complementary slackness condition
implies α− 1− (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds = 0, which is equivalent to∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds =
α− 1
β − 1
. (2.34)
Therefore, τ ∈ (L
β
, 1), where the lower bound is from A1.
Next, note that τ > L/β implies that the constraint associated to µa is not binding.
The constraint associated to µb requires the following inequality:
LF (τ) ≥ β
∫ τ
0
sf(s)ds, (2.35)
which is equivalent to
L ≥
β
∫ τ
0
sf(s)ds
F (τ)
, (2.36)
To conclude the proof, note that if (2.36) is not satisfied, then inducing low risk
is not feasible and, therefore, the optimal choice is A∗ = 0. Otherwise, the optimal
choice is A∗ = Amax.
Proof of Corollary 8: Suppose that we are in the case with A∗ = Amax. The
optimal threshold κ is defined such that
∫ 1
κ
sf(s)ds = (α − 1)/(β − 1). Therefore,
as α increases,
∫ 1
κ
sf(s)ds increases, which implies that κ decreases. Similarly, as β
increases,
∫ 1
κ
sf(s)ds decreases, which implies that κ increases.
Proof of Lemma 13: We define the Lagrangian similarly with the lagrange mul-
tipliers µ0, µa and µb, associated to constraints (2.12), (2.10) and (2.11) respectively.
Differentiating with respect to m(s),
∂L
∂m(s)
= s(µ0(Aβ − A+ E)− (1− q)β − µa − µb) + (1− q +
µa + µb
β
)L.
Noting that this function is linear in s and positive at s = 0, we know that m(s) = 1
if and only if s ≤ τ , where τ is a threshold in [0, 1].
Case 1. Suppose that µ0 = 0. Then, the solution µa = µb = 0 and τ = L/β
maximizes the Lagrangian and satisfies the constraints associated to multipliers µa
and µb. But, then, it is desirable to set A = Amax, which contradicts A0.
Case 2. Suppose that µ0 > 0. Writing the incentive-compatibility explicitly after
reinjecting m(s) = 1 if and only if s < τ ,
∆IC = αA− A+ E − (βA− A+ E)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds ≥ 0 (2.37)
The left-hand side is increasing in τ and the objective function is increasing in τ when
τ ∈ (0,L/β), hence, it must be that, if the (IC) is binding, τ ≥ L/β.
Proof of Lemma 14: Suppose that the efficient continuation threshold is such
that the incentive-compatibility constraint does not bind . Then, it is optimal for the
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regulator to set the threshold τ = L/β. This first-best ex post threshold satisfies the
constraints (2.10) and (2.11).
The expected utility of the regulator is
(qα + (1− q)F (
L
β
)L+ (1− q)
∫ 1
L
β
sβf(s)ds− 1)A.
This last expression is positive from A0. But then, it is desirable to set A = Amax.
This is a contradiction with A0. Hence, the incentive-compatibility condition binds in
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 9: Let us denote
H(τ) = Σ′(τ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds))2/E (2.38)
Taking the first order condition of the optimization problem,
H(τ) = (qα + (1− q)(LF (τ) + β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)− 1)(β − α)τ
+ (1− q)(L − τβ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)) = 0.
(2.39)
Evaluating this expression at τ = L/β,
H(
L
β
) = (qα + (1− q)(LF (
L
β
) + β
∫ 1
L
β
sf(s)ds)− 1)(β − α)
L
β
> 0,
so that the first-best ex post threshold L/β is never the ex ante optimal choice for the
regulator. Further, we know from Lemma 13 that τ(A∗) ≥ L/β which implies that
the liquidation threshold must be in the set (L/β, τ(A)].
Proof of Proposition 10: Since the ’if’ part is immediate, we prove here the
‘only if’ part. Differentiating H in τ ,
H ′(τ) = (qα + (1− q)(LF (τ) + β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)− 1)(β − α)
+τ(β−α)(1−q)f(τ)(L−τβ)−(1−q)β(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds−(α−β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds))
+(1−q)(L−τβ)
(
τf(τ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds−(α−β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds))+τf(τ)(1−β)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
)
.
(2.40)
To simplify the above equation, let us rewrite equation (2.39) at the optimal threshold
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τ ∗ ≡ τ(A∗) as
(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ ∗) + β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)− 1)(β − α)τ ∗
= −(1− q)(L − τ ∗β)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))
(2.41)
Reinjecting this last equality into (2.40) evaluated at τ ∗ yields
H ′(τ ∗) = τ ∗(β − α)(1− q)f(τ ∗)(L − τ ∗β)
− (1− q)
L
τ ∗
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))
+(1−q)(L−τ ∗β)
(
τ ∗f(τ ∗)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds−(α−β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))+τ ∗f(τ ∗)(1−β)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)
)
.
= −(2τ ∗(1− q)f(τ ∗)(τ ∗β − L) + (1− q)
L
τ ∗
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))︸ ︷︷ ︸
H1
× (β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds+ 1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H2
. (2.42)
It is immediate to verify that H1 < 0. Next, H2 > 0 can be written as
β − 1
α− 1
>
1∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds
. (2.43)
This last inequality is an implication from the incentive-compatibility condition,
since we know from the incentive-compatibility condition that
1∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds
=
βA− A+ E
αA− A+ E
<
β − 1
α− 1
. (2.44)
Therefore, we have shown that Σ′(τ ∗) < 0. Note that this holds at τ ∗ as well as at
any root of Σ′(.), implying that Σ′(.) can cross zero at most once and from below so
that Σ has a single peak. Evaluating Σ′(.) at τ , we know that the the peak is located
below τ if Σ′(τ) ≤ 0 and above τ if Σ′(τ) > 0.
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We can further rewrite
H(τ) = (qα + (1− q)(LF (τ¯) + β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− 1)(β − α)τ (2.45)
+(1− q)(L − τβ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds))
= (qα + (1− q)βE(s)− 1)(β − α)τ (2.46)
+(1− q)(L − τβ)(1 +
LF (τ)
β
− E(s))(1− α + (β − 1)(E(s)−
L
β
F (τ))),
(2.47)
where the last equality is obtained from the definition of τ . Thus, Σ′(τ) > 0 is
equivalent to
q >
(1− βE(s))(β − α)τ − (L − τβ)(1 + LF (τ)
β
− E(s))(1− α + (β − 1)(E(s)− L
β
F (τ)))
(α− βE(s))(β − α)τ − (L − τβ)(1 + LF (τ)
β
− E(s))(1− α + (β − 1)(E(s)− L
β
F (τ)))
.
(2.48)
Therefore, we get condition (2.20) in text.
Proof of Corollaries 10, 11 and 12 : Let us start by deriving the comparative
statics in the case q > q¯. The threshold τ¯ is defined by (2.19), which is equivalent to
E(s | s ≤ τ¯) = L/β. Obviously, τ¯ does not depend on α. Further, as L increases,
E(s | s ≤ τ¯) increases, which implies that τ¯ increases. Similarly, as β increases,
E(s | s ≤ τ¯) decreases, which implies that τ¯ decreases.
The optimal leverage is given by
A∗
E
=
1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds
1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds)
. (2.49)
Therefore,
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂τ¯
=
τ¯ f(τ¯)(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds)) + (1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds)(β − 1)τ¯ f(τ¯)
(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))2
> 0.
(2.50)
As a result,
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂L
=
∂τ¯
∂L
τ¯ f(τ¯)(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds)) + (1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds)(β − 1)τ¯ f(τ¯)
(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))2
> 0
(2.51)
and
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂α
=
1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds
(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))2
> 0. (2.52)
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Finally, τ¯ decreases in β. Hence,
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂β
=
∂τ¯
∂β
τ¯ f(τ¯)(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))
(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))2
+
(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds)((β − 1)τ¯ f(τ¯) ∂τ¯
∂β
−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))
(1−
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ¯
sf(s)ds))2
< 0. (2.53)
which implies that A
∗
E
decreases in β.
Then, we can derive the comparative statics in the case q ≤ q¯. Let H(τ) = Σ′(τ)
be defined as the derivative of the social surplus in τ . We know from Proposition 10
that τ ∗ < τ and, given that it is a local maximum of Σ, H ′(τ ∗) ≤ 0. We will assume
here that it is regular maximum, H ′(τ ∗) < 0 so that the comparative statics are always
well-defined. It then follows that the comparative static of τ ∗ in a variable X has the
sign of ∂H/∂X, which we conduct next:
∂H
∂α
= q(β − α)τ − τ(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ) + β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)− 1)
−(1− q)(L − τβ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds);
∂H
∂β
= (1− q)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds(β − α)τ + τ(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ) + β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)− 1)
+(1− q)(L − τβ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds
−(1− q)τ(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds);
∂H
∂L
= (1− q)F (τ)(β − α)τ
+(1− q)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds) > 0;
∂H
∂q
= (α− LF (τ)− β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(β − α)τ
−(L − τβ)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds).
We know that H(τ(A∗)) = 0. Therefore
− τ ∗(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ ∗) + β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)− 1)
=
1− q
β − α
(L − τ ∗β)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds), (2.54)
which implies that ∂H
∂q τ=τ(A∗)
= (α + 1
1−q
(qα − 1))(β − α)τ(A∗) > 0. Similarly,
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H(τ(A∗)) = 0, is equivalent to
− τ ∗(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ ∗) + β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)− 1)
=
1− q
β − α
(L − τ ∗β)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds), (2.55)
which implies that
∂H
∂α
(τ(A∗)) = q(β−α)τ ∗+(1−q)(τ ∗β−L)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(1−
1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds
β − α
)
= q(β − α)τ ∗ +
1− q
β − α
(τ ∗β −L)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(β − 1− (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)) > 0.
(2.56)
We can conclude that the optimal threshold τ ∗ increases in α, in q and in L.
From (2.16), we can also conclude that the optimal leverage moves in the same
direction than the optimal threshold with respect to q, α and L. More precisely, we
know that
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂L
=
∂τ ∗
∂L
τ ∗f(τ ∗)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)) + (1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(β − 1)τ ∗f(τ ∗)
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))2
> 0,
(2.57)
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂q
=
∂τ ∗
∂q
τ ∗f(τ ∗)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)) + (1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(β − 1)τ ∗f(τ ∗)
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))2
> 0,
(2.58)
and
∂(A
∗
E
)
∂α
=
∂τ∗
∂α
τ ∗f(τ ∗)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)) + (1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)((β − 1)τ ∗f(τ ∗)∂τ
∗
∂α
+ 1)
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))2
> 0.
(2.59)
Therefore, the optimal leverage A
∗
E
also increases in α, q and L.
The comparative statics with respect to β is slightly more complicated. Indeed, we
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know that
dH
dβ
= (1− q)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds(β − α)τ + τ(qα + (1− q)(LF (τ) + β
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)− 1)
− (1− q)(τβ − L)(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds
− (1− q)τ(1−
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds)(1− α + (β − 1)
∫ 1
τ
sf(s)ds). (2.60)
The first two terms are positive whereas the last two terms are negative. There is an
ambiguity for the following reason. As β increases, the risk-shifting problem becomes
more severe (first two terms) and the regulator should provide more incentives to the
banker to choose the low risk portfolio by increasing the liquidation threshold. On the
other hand, as β increases, the payoff in case of continuation is increasing (last two
terms) and hence, the regulator is willing to reduce the liquidation threshold.
Proof of Corollary 13: Taking the derivative of (2.16) with respect to β yields
∂A∗/E
∂β
=
∂τ∗
∂β
τ ∗f(τ ∗)(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))2
−
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)(−(β − 1)∂τ
∗
∂β
τ ∗f(τ ∗) +
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds)
(1−
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds− (α− β
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds))2
.
Hence, ∂τ
∗
∂β
< 0 implies that ∂A
∗/E
∂β
< 0.
Further, we know that the leverage is given by∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds =
αA∗ − A∗ + E
βA∗ − A∗ + E
. (2.61)
Taking the derivative of the right hand side with respect to beta yields
(α− 1)∂A
∗
∂β
(βA∗ − A∗ + E)− (αA∗ − A∗ + E)((β − 1)∂A
∗
∂β
+ A∗)
(βA∗ − A∗ + E)2
=
E(α− β)∂A
∗
∂β
− (αA∗ − A∗ + E)A∗
(βA∗ − A∗ + E)2
(2.62)
Hence, ∂A
∗
∂β
> 0 implies that the right-hand side of (2.61) decreases in β, which in turn
implies that
∫ 1
τ∗
sf(s)ds decreases in β, i.e. τ ∗ increases in β. 
Appendix A.2: uniform states
In this appendix, we develop the main results in the context of the uniform distribu-
tion where the main tradeoffs can sometimes be expressed in closed-form. Specifically,
we assume that s is uniformly distributed with support on [0, 1]. A point of interest of
this uniform choice is that it can be viewed as a principle of maximal ignorance (absent
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any well-formed prior) or as a linear approximation for low levels of uncertainty as,
for example, in Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2008b). Our assumption that E(s)β > L is
equivalent to 2L/β < 1 and implies that the liquidation threshold τ¯ is interior.
Solving explicitly for κ in Proposition 8,
κ =
√
1 + β − 2α
β − 1
. (2.63)
With uniform states, the continuation threshold κ is also the probability of liqui-
dation. This probability is decreasing and concave in α, which is intuitive because the
value of liquidating loans becomes increasingly attractive when most loans are safe and
there is very little opportunity cost from excess liquidation of risky loans. Further, it
is increasing and convex in β if and only if 3α−1−2β > 0, which reflects a situation in
which safe loans are sufficiently common that increasing the probability of liquidation
(as β increases) benefits incentives more than they reduce total surplus.
Specifically, total surplus is given by
Σ = Amax(qα + (1− q)(L
√
1 + β − 2α
β − 1
+ β
α− 1
β − 1
)− 1). (2.64)
The surplus is increasing in β if and only if L ≥
√
1+β−2α
β−1
. In particular, the payoff
of the risky loan that maximizes total surplus can be derived explicitly as
β − 1 =
2(α− 1)
1− L2
, (2.65)
which represents the ideal loan risk profile for a bank with no equity.
Similarly, we derive total surplus under the maximum liquidation threshold τ¯ =
2L/β. This implies a surplus equal to
Σ = Amax(qα + (1− q)(LF (2
L
β
) + β
∫ 1
2L
β
sds)− 1)
= Amax(qα + (1− q)
β
2
− 1)
and this measurement system yields positive surplus if and only if q >
1− β/2
α− β/2
.
Under the pure prudential regulation benchmark, equation (2.5) implies a bank
leverage
A∗
E
=
β2 + L2
β2(1 + β − 2α)− L2(β − 1)
, (2.66)
which reveals how the bank becomes smaller in response to a more severe agency
problem. Plugging this expression into the total surplus,
Σ = E
β2 + L2
β2(1 + β − 2α)− L2(β − 1)
(qα + (1− q)(L2/β +
β
2
(1−
L2
β2
))− 1), (2.67)
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which is, as expected, increasing in the liquidation payoff since this helps sustain
a greater bank size and higher payoffs conditional on liquidation. It is also increasing
in fraction of sale loans q because α > L2/β + β
2
(1− L
2
β2
)) and ambiguous in β.
We solve next for the general case with an endogenous continuation threshold and
an optimally set capital requirement.
Proposition 11. Let
q¯ =
1 +Q
α +Q
. (2.68)
where Q > 0 (see proof below). If q > q¯, the reporting system issues a liquidation
signal m(s) if and only if s < τ(A∗) = 2L/β.
Proof of Proposition 11: With a uniform distribution, the incentive-compatibility
condition is now given by
∆IC =
∫ (
Aα− A+ E − s(1−m(s))(Aβ − A+ E)
)
ds ≥ 0. (2.69)
We define the Lagrangian similarly with associated multipliers µ0, µa and µb. Dif-
ferentiating with respect to m(s),
∂L
∂m(s)
= s(µ0(Aβ − A+ E)− (1− q)β − µa − µb) + (1− q +
µa + µb
β
)L.
Noting that this function is linear in s and positive at s = 0, we know that m(s) = 1
if and only if s ≤ τ , where τ is a threshold in [0, 1].
Case 1. Suppose that µ0 = 0. Then, the solution µa = µb = 0 and τ = L/β
maximizes the Lagrangian and satisfies the constraints associated to multipliers µa
and µb. But, then, it is desirable to set A = Amax, which contradicts A0.
Case 2. Suppose that µ0 > 0. Writing the incentive-compatibility explicitly after
reinjecting m(s) = 1 if and only if s < τ ,
∆IC = τ
2(A(β − 1) + E) + E − A(β + 1− 2α) ≥ 0 (2.70)
The left-hand side is increasing in τ and the objective function is increasing in τ when
τ ∈ (0,L/β), hence, it must be that, if the (IC) is binding, τ ≥ L/β. In addition, the
optimality of ex-post liquidations requires L ≥ βτ/2, that is, τ ≤ 2L/β.
Solving for the optimal leverage,
A
E
=
1 + τ 2
1 + β − 2α− (β − 1)τ 2
(2.71)
and reinjecting into the social surplus
Σ = A
∫
(qα + (1− q)(m(s)L+ (1−m(s))sβ − 1)ds
= E(1 + τ 2)
(qα + (1− q)(Lτ + 1
2
β(1− τ 2))− 1)
1 + β − 2α− (β − 1)τ 2
. (2.72)
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Differentiating this expression with respect to τ ,
H(τ) = k0
5∑
i=0
νiτ
i,
where k0 > 0 and
ν0 = (β + 1− 2α)(1− q)L > 0
ν1 = β(β + q − βq − 5) + 4α(1 + βq)− 4α
2q
ν2 = 2L(1− q)(1 + 2β − 3α) > 0
ν3 = −2β(1− q)(1 + β − 2α) < 0
ν4 = −(β − 1)(1− q)L < 0
ν5 = β(1− q)(β − 1) > 0.
It is readily verified that this polynomial is positive at τ = L/β:
H(
L
β
) = 2(1− q)(β − α)
L3
β2
+ 4(β − α)(qα− 1)
L
β
+ 2(1− q)(β − α)L (2.73)
= 4(β − α)
L
β
(qα + (1− q)(L
L
β
+ β
∫ 1
L
β
sds)− 1) > 0. (2.74)
Therefore, the solution implies excess liquidations, i.e., τ > L/β, and full-information
is not optimal.
Further, we have
H(2L/β) = 16(1− q)(β − 1)
L5
β4
+ 8(1− q)(α− 1)
L3
β2
+ 8α
L
β
(1 + βq − αq)
+ L(2(q − 5) + (1− q)(3β + 1− 2α)). (2.75)
The condition q ≥ q¯ is equivalent toH(2L/β) > 0. From our analysis of the model with
a general distribution, the optimal solution is the corner solution τ(A∗) = τ¯ = 2L/β.
Otherwise, if q < q¯, the solution is interior. 
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Chapter 3
Non-Audit Services, Incentives and
Audit Quality
3.1 Introduction
What are the incentive effects of the provision of non-audit services (NAS) on audi-
tors? This is an important policy question of concern to regulators given the debate
that has been raging for years on whether an audit company should provide NAS to
its audit clients. This debate is often reduced to a simple cost and benefit tradeoff.
On the one side, joint NAS and audit services provision is likely to be more efficient
in terms of production costs because of knowledge spillovers (Simunic, 1984). On the
other side, NAS may threaten the auditor’s independence because it creates an eco-
nomic bond between the auditor and the client (DeAngelo, 1981a). In the absence of a
clear sense of the incentive effects, the conventional wisdom that “providing both NAS
and audit services to the same client threatens auditor independence and may affect
audit quality” seems to prevail (Causholli et al., 2014). For instance, this conventional
wisdom led US policymakers to prohibit auditors from providing many non-audit ser-
vices with the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Nevertheless, as underscored by
Ewert (2004), “the incentive problems of combining NAS and auditing are still an open
issue.” I believe that a proper understanding of the incentive effects of NAS would
guide regulators in designing new regulatory actions.
In this paper, I depart from the conventional wisdom and emphasize a novel rea-
son in favor of the provision of NAS by auditors. Specifically, I build a framework to
study a positive incentive externality of NAS: the possibility of providing NAS contin-
gent on detecting financial misstatements may increase the auditor’s effort to detect
those misstatements. This represents a benefit of the provision of NAS by auditors.
Nonetheless, my analysis also underlines that the provision of NAS may create conflicts
of interest and decrease perceived audit quality. I highlight a negative impact of this
decrease in audit quality when two firms in the same industry rely on peers’ financial
statements. Restricting auditors from providing NAS may in turn be desirable. Thus,
regulators face a tradeoff between the ex ante positive incentive effect and the ex post
decrease in audit quality. Removing the current restrictions on contingent audit fees
on unfavorable audit opinions may offset the ex post decrease in audit quality while
preserving the ex ante incentives.
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My theory starts with a classic conflict of interests between an empire building
manager and the investors of a firm as in Baldenius (2003). The manager enjoys some
private benefits from running the firm and wants to hide a poor financial situation from
the investors, so that the latter do not intervene and liquidate the firm, which would
be optimal for them. The auditor must exert a costly audit effort to detect financial
misstatements by the manager. After the publication of the financial statements, if
the firm is not liquidated, the manager hires a consultant to increase the firm’s value.
The consultant, who can be either the auditor or an outsider, earns an economic rent
from the NAS contract.1
The optimal mechanism for the investors is such that the auditor is rewarded in
case of misstatements detection. This reward can either be contingent audit fees or
the economic rent attached to the NAS contract. In that latter case, the auditor has
then incentives ex ante to detect misstatements in order to obtain the lucrative NAS
contract. If the value added of NAS is high, my analysis shows that the investors
optimally commit with some probability not to liquidate the firm and to have the
auditor provide NAS if the auditor detects misstatements. This optimal mechanism
admits a simple implementation whereby the provision of NAS might create conflicts of
interest and reduce auditor independence. Specifically, the manager is willing to give
the NAS contract to the auditor so that the latter gives a favorable audit opinion and
the firm is not liquidated, as in Lu and Sapra (2009) and Kornish and Levine (2004).
This NAS contract yields a positive rent that provides incentives to the auditor to
exert audit effort. Thus, based on my previous analysis, I underscore that it is optimal
for the investors to commit ex ante to let the manager hire the auditor as consultant
with some probability. In light of this incentive effect, banning auditors from providing
NAS to audit clients in order to increase auditors’ independence may harm investors.
However, in this setup, the impact of the provision of NAS on audit quality, which
I define as the probability that the auditor gives an unfavorable audit opinion to
manipulated financial statements, is unclear. On the one hand, allowing the auditor
to provide both NAS and auditing services may increase ex ante audit effort. On the
other hand, if the auditor is banned from providing NAS to audit clients, the auditor
is fully independent because the manager is not able ex post to exert pressure on
the former with a NAS contract. Therefore, I investigate the impact of the optimal
mechanism and I show that audit quality is higher when the auditor can provide NAS
if the economic rent from NAS is sufficiently high. Conversely, if the rent from NAS is
low, audit quality is higher when the provision of NAS by the auditor is banned and
audit fees contingent on a negative audit opinion are allowed. Audit fees contingent
on unfavorable audit opinions preserve the ex ante incentive effect while preventing ex
post conflict of interests.
The series of financial reporting scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s at
companies such as Enron or Worldcom are relevant examples in which the traditional
market-based incentive forces for auditors, i.e. litigation and reputation costs, were not
effective enough to prevent audit firms from giving clean audit opinions to fraudulent
financial statements. Similar to the case of the credit rating agencies during the
financial crisis of 2007-08, reputation risks do not seem to play an important enough
1The economic rent from the NAS contract admits several interpretations: private benefit, effi-
ciency wage, rent from imperfect competition...
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role to prevent certification intermediaries from providing false information to the
investors. Moreover, despite the recent increase in litigation costs, it is not possible for
regulators to impose very high litigation costs.2 Hence, this paper highlights how an
incentive effect of NAS, above and beyond litigation and reputation costs, can affect
audit effort.
I highlight a potential role for the regulation of NAS using a sequential equilibrium
model with two firms in the same industry. The investors of the first-moving firm face
the same situation as in the baseline setup described above whereas the investors of
the second-moving firm also observe the liquidation decision of the investors of the
first firm. There is an informational externality resulting from the decrease in audit
quality caused by the provision of NAS by the auditor of the first-moving firm. Indeed,
the investors of the second firm may rely on the first firm decision to make their own
liquidation decision. Hence, the decrease in audit quality resulting from the provision
of NAS by the auditor of the first firm may induce an inefficient herding behavior in
case of bad firms. I underline that investors can recover truth-telling if the provision
of NAS by auditors is banned and contingent audit fees on unfavorable audit opinions
are allowed as in Kornish and Levine (2004). This latter policy would increase audit
quality and reduce the negative informational externality.
The results of the paper contribute to both the regulatory and academic commu-
nities. Regulators and practitioners fear that auditors would be unwilling to challenge
a client if a negative audit opinion would mean losing future NAS contracts (e.g. Bell
et al., 2015; The Guardian, 2010; SEC, 2001).3 As underlined by DeFond et al. (2002),
there is an important tradeoff for auditors. Auditors are willing to sacrifice their in-
dependence if reputation and litigation costs associated with audit failures are smaller
than the economic rents from NAS contracts. The corporate accounting scandals are
examples of ex post conflicts of interest. However, my findings shed some light on
the desirability of the provision of NAS by auditors and suggest that regulators may
need to investigate more carefully the tradeoff between ex ante incentives and ex post
conflicts on interest.
Lastly, my model generates empirical predictions about the effects of the provision
of NAS on audit effort and audit quality. The main empirical takeaway is that finding
a negative relationship between the provision of NAS and financial misstatements
does not imply that NAS negatively affect audit quality. On the contrary, a negative
relationship may indicate that incentives are provided to auditors using NAS and this
mechanism improves ex ante audit quality.
3.2 Background and literature review
3.2.1 Institutional setting
The corporate scandals of the early 2000s reignited the debate on auditors providing
NAS. Indeed, those accounting scandals are relevant cases of conflicts of interest re-
2I discuss some reasons why it is indeed the case on page 116.
3Another concern is that auditors may audit their own work after providing NAS to an audit
client. I discuss this point in section 3.6.1.
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sulting from the provision of NAS by auditors. For instance, Arthur Andersen, the
auditor of Enron and Worldcom, was criticized for approving the accounting treatment
of many suspect transactions. Andersen, which was a member of the Big Five, went
bankrupt just a few months after Enron. One potential explanation of the audit fail-
ures is the provision of lucrative NAS services by Andersen to the top managements
of Enron and Worldcom. Nonetheless, the impact of those contracts on Andersen’s
incentives to provide high audit effort is still unclear.
The regulatory response to those corporate scandals has been to increase auditors’
independence as much as possible. Regulators have put restrictions on the provision
of NAS by auditors in order to increase audit quality. In the US, Section 201 of SOX
restricts auditors from providing some NAS such as internal audit outsourcing to audit
clients. In the European Union, legislation approved in 2014 puts a cap on the level of
non-audit fees that auditors can earn from audit clients (70% of audit fees) and also
prohibits a set of NAS.
After the passage of SOX, the Big Four audit firms (Deloitte, EY, KPMG and
PwC) stopped most of their non-audit activities and signed non-compete agreements
with their former consulting divisions. Those agreements expired in the mid-2000s and
the Big Four firms again provide NAS to audit clients outside the US, where SOX does
not apply, and also in the US for NAS unaffected by SOX.4 From 2011 to 2016, they
acquired over 160 consulting entities, according to the PCAOB. The Big Four’s total
global revenues from consulting services provided to both audit and non-audit clients
exceeded their audit revenues in the last few years. Further, in recent studies, Carcello
et al. (2017) and Whalen et al. (2015) find that NAS still make up a sizeable portion of
the fees that auditors collect from their audit clients (around 20 percent). For example,
in 2014, at least 300 companies in the U.S. and Europe paid their auditors as much
for add-on services as they did for audit work (Wall Street Journal , 2014).
Gven those facts, the provision of NAS by auditors to audit clients is still a major
issue for regulators (Causholli et al., 2014; Beardsley et al., 2017). I briefly highlight the
main reasons of this concern, based on the more exhaustive discussion of Kowaleski
et al. (2016). Although in many cases Big 4 personnel work only as auditor or as
consultant, the Big 4 firms have some employees that make both audit and consulting
decisions. First, Big 4 firms provide opportunities for their employees to rotate or
to participate in transfers between different service lines. Second, recent graduates
acknowledge the opportunities to rotate in auditing and in consulting within the same
year. Third, some consultants also participate as specialists for certain audits. Finally,
when the audit firm provides both auditing and consulting services to the same client,
one partner is generally in charge of the entire client relationship.
As a result of those practices, regulators continue to see auditor independence
violations (Harris, 2016). A recent example comes from an investigation of KPMG
in 2016 for possible independence violations related to non-audit services provided to
Ted Baker, an audit client (Financial Times, 2016). Regulators closely monitor the
Big Four in order to avoid a new accounting scandal like Enron. Nonetheless, they are
focused on the ex post problems linked to a lack of auditor’s independence and they
4In the US, an extensive list of permissible non-audit services remains: benefit plan audits, assis-
tance related to mergers and acquisitions, attestation services, accounting consultations, tax compli-
ance, tax planning, tax advice and operational audits...
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seem not to have considered the ex ante incentive externalities. This paper offers a
framework to investigate both the ex post problems and the ex ante externalities of
the provision of NAS by auditors and might help to design better regulations.
3.2.2 Related literature
First, there is a large strand of the auditing literature studying the behavior of audit
companies providing NAS to audit clients. In a seminal paper, Simunic (1984) argues
that auditors should provide NAS to audit clients because of potential knowledge
spillovers between the two types of services. Since then, many empirical studies have
been conducted to study the link between NAS and audit quality and the evidence is
mixed.5 Studies using output-based proxies find that NAS do not impair audit quality
(e.g. DeFond et al., 2002; Krishnan et al., 2005; Schmidt, 2012), and some NAS may
even improve it (e.g. Kinney et al., 2004); while studies using perception-based proxies
find that investors penalize companies purchasing NAS (e.g. Frankel et al., 2002; Higgs
and Skantz, 2006; Khurana and Raman, 2006). The main difficulty in this area is to find
a good proxy to measure audit quality and to identify the counterfactual observations
(Carcello et al., 2017). My model predicts a positive relationship between NAS and
audit effort. More importantly, it also predicts that a ban of the provision of NAS by
auditors would increase auditor independence but decrease audit quality.
The most related papers to mine are Kornish and Levine (2004) and Lu and Sapra
(2009), who also investigate the impact of NAS on audit quality. Lu and Sapra (2009)
find that a mandatory restriction on NAS decreases a conservative auditor’s audit
quality and increases an aggressive auditor’s audit quality. Kornish and Levine (2004)
also use a contractual setting to investigate the impact of NAS on auditors’ behaviors.
Their conclusions are similar to mine: managers can influence auditors with NAS
to issue favorable audit opinions while contingent audit fees can induce an unbiased
audited accounting report. Nevertheless, they do not analyze the potential impact
of NAS and contingent audit fees on audit effort and focus instead on their ex post
effects. I study the impact of NAS on both the ex ante audit effort and on the ex post
audit quality.
This paper intends to contribute more broadly to the literature studying auditors’
incentives to provide high audit quality. An important number of papers study the
impact of legal liability on audit quality. Dye (1993) studies the impact of an increase in
auditor’s liability and in auditing and accounting standards. Laux and Newman (2010)
and Schwartz (1997) also analyze the impact of legal liability on auditor’s incentives.
Magee and Tseng (1990) study the pricing of audit services and the potential threats
for the auditor’s independence. Analyzing the incentive effects of NAS, this paper
provides a new argument in favor of the provision of NAS by auditors to audit clients.6
Lastly, following the seminal work of Tirole (1986), an extensive literature has been
devoted to the analysis of collusion in a principal-supervisor-agent setting.7 Baiman
5For a recent survey of the archival auditing literature, see DeFond and Zhang (2014).
6The conflict of interest stemming from the provision of NAS by auditors is similar to the one
faced by credit ratings agencies that offer non-ratings services (Baghai and Becker, 2018). A similar
conflict also arises in sell-side research.
7For a more exhaustive survey and discussion of this literature, see Laffont and Rochet (1997). For
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et al. (1991) study the ex ante collusion between a manager and an auditor and char-
acterize the resulting optimal owner-manager contract. In the same vein, Friedman
(2014) studies a CEO pressuring a CFO to bias financial reports. In this paper, allow-
ing ex post collusion between the manager and the auditor is a way to implement the
optimal mechanism for the investors.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3 describes the setup of the
model, discusses the assumptions, and solves the static model with binary audit effort.
Section 4 examines the case of a continuum of possible audit effort levels and studies
the impact of the optimal mechanism on audit quality. Section 5 investigates a negative
informational externality of NAS in a sequential equilibrium with two firms. Finally, I
discuss the regulatory and empirical implications in section 6 and section 7 concludes.
3.3 The model
3.3.1 The setup
There are three stages, t = 0, 1 and 2. The timing of the model is summarized in
Figure 3.1. There are four types of risk-neutral players involved in a firm: investors,
the auditor, consultants and the manager. The investors own the firm from t = 0
until t = 2. The manager runs it with private information about its efficiency and the
auditor collects information for the investors at t = 1. One of the consultants might
be hired to provide consulting services and increase the firm’s value at t = 1.8 The
manager is an empire builder and gets a private benefit b (perks, human capital...) of
running the firm until t = 2. The firm can be of two types: good (G) with probability
p and bad (B) with probability 1− p. Consistent with Lu and Sapra (2009), I refer to
the parameter 1− p as “client business risk.” At t = 2, a good firm yields a cash flow
R with probability q and a zero cash flow with probability 1− q, whereas a bad firm
always yields a zero cash flow. Any firm can be liquidated at the intermediate stage
t = 1 to get the liquidation payoff L such that qR > L > 0. The liquidation decision is
made by the investors and admits several interpretations: a reorganization of the firm,
a partial asset sale, a reduction in the scope of the firm, layoffs and firings... Those
decisions are typically made by the board of directors, who acts in the best interests
of the investors.
The manager’s liquidation aversion is strong enough such that the investors do
not find optimal to induce the manager to liquidate the firm or reveal his private
information about the firm’s viability. This implies that there is a conflict of interests
between the manager and the investors in case of a bad firm.9 The manager always
certifies to the investors that the firm is good so that continuation is chosen by the
example, Che (1995) studies the optimality of allowing collusion for incentives reasons in a different
setup.
8I use the terms NAS and consulting services interchangeably in the rest of the paper. They refer
to all the types of NAS provided by the Big Four firms (tax services, compensation services,...).
9Like Dye (1993) and Lu and Sapra (2009), my model does not include manager’s legal liability
in order to focus on the role of auditing. If such a liability were effective so that a manager with a
bad firm would indeed report it, the auditor would be useless.
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investors.10 Namely, in case of a bad firm, the manager manipulates the financial
statements. I assume that the investors lack either the time or the knowledge required
to supervise the manager, and that the auditor lacks either the time or the resources
required to run the firm.
The key friction is a moral hazard problem. The auditor must exert an unobservable
audit effort e ∈ {eL, eH} to verify the accuracy of the financial statements.11 At t = 1,
after exerting effort, the auditor receives a signal s ∈ {∅, sB} according to the following
probabilities:12
P (s = ∅ | G) = 1 and P (s = sB | B) = 1− P (s = ∅ | B) = e.
The essence of this audit technology is that more audit effort increases the prob-
ability that the auditor detects financial misstatements.13 If the firm is good, the
auditor receives no evidence of misstatements (s = ∅) because the manager is right to
report that the firm is good. If the firm is bad, the manager lies and manipulates the
financial statements. The auditor collects evidence of financial misstatements (s = sB)
with probability e and receives no evidence of misstatements (s = ∅) with the com-
plementary probability 1 − e. The auditor incurs a private cost c from exerting high
audit effort (e = eH) whereas the cost of exerting low audit effort (e = eL) is nor-
malized to 0. After receiving the signal s, the auditor makes a report r ∈ {∅, sB} to
the investors. The auditor cannot claim to possess evidence of financial misstatements
(r = sB) when he has no evidence because sB is hard information. The auditor can
only lie by omission and hide evidence of misstatements.
After the audit report, the investors decide whether to continue or liquidate the
firm. If the investors choose continuation, the manager hires a consultant, who in-
creases the probability of success of the firm by τ ∈ [0, 1 − q]. There is a pool of
consultants including the auditor. If a consultant is hired, a bad firm yields a cash
flow R with probability τ and a zero cash flow with probability 1 − τ . Similarly, a
good firm with a consultant yields a cash flow R with probability q+ τ ≤ 1 and a zero
cash flow with probability 1 − q − τ . The consultant earns an economic rent β from
providing consulting services. This economic rent admits several interpretations.
(i) First, it can be a private benefit that may accrue for a variety of reasons: human
10Over-reporting is the more fequent source of financial misrepresentation at the firm level. For
empirical evidence using SEC enforcement actions aimed at violations of US Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), see e.g. (e.g. Beneish, 1999; Feroz et al., 1991; Karpoff et al., 2008).
This assumption is commonly made in the literature to simplify the firm’s reporting system and
focuses the model on the auditing issue (e.g. Dye, 1993; Laux and Newman, 2010; Lu and Sapra,
2009).
11In practice, the role of the auditor is also to monitor ex post the cash flows of the firm, like in the
costly state verification model of Townsend (1979). I focus on the forward-looking role of the auditor.
12I assume that the auditor receives a signal imperfectly correlated with the true type of the firm.
In practice, auditors do not have all the possibilities to examine all the firm’s records; they make
inferences with a sample of them. This inference is subject to errors.
13This audit technology assumes away false positives, i.e. when the auditor discovers misstatements
in case of a good firm. This is innocuous and reflects that Type I errors are rare and unimportant in
audit practice. See, among others, Ewert (1999), Newman et al. (2005) and Simunic et al. (2017) for
a similar assumption.
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capital accumulation, perks, ego, social status...14
(ii) The economic rent β can be an efficiency wage that the investors need to pay to
the consultant in order to get the expected monetary gain τR.15
(iii) Lastly, β can be a rent from imperfect competition on the consulting market: col-
lusion between consultants, competition on quantities instead of prices, product
differentiation...
In the first two interpretations (i) and (ii), the rent β survives even in case of
perfect competition on the consulting market as long as the consultants are financially
constrained.16 Indeed, it is not possible for the investors to auction the consulting con-
tract and get the monetary gain β because the consultants are financially constrained.
I stick to the first interpretation in the rest of the paper but the results are exactly
the same under the two other interpretations. Perfect competition on the consultant
market implies that the reservation utility of a consultant is zero. Hence, a consultant
earns a private benefit β > 0 from the consulting contract but there is no NAS fees.17
It is ex post optimal for the investors to liquidate a bad firm even if the consultant
creates some value, i.e. L > τR > 0. The total expected value added of consulting
services is τR + β, the sum of the monetary gain and of the private benefit. The
consultant learns the type of the firm after the liquidation decision has been made by
the investors.
The auditor is protected by limited liability. In the baseline model, in case of
continuation, the manager is indifferent between signing the consulting contract with
the auditor or with an outside consultant; I assume that the manager makes the
preferred choice of the investors. Finally, the investors have deep pockets and, without
loss of generality, the reservation utility of the manager and the auditor are equal to
zero.18
14This private benefit could also capture indirect benefits including the possibility of signalling
ability, developing a personal relationship with the firm’s senior management, a greater likelihood of
retaining the client, enhancing the chances of gaining other rewarding assignments, receiving positive
spillovers on other non-audit activities and increasing the likelihood of obtaining a top management
position in the firm.
15In the Appendix 3, I provide one way of endogenizing β.
16One explanation of the financial constraint could be the intangibility of consulting firms assets,
which implies that those firms have no debt capacity.
17I could add non-audit fees in that case by supposing that a consultant should be paid a minimum
wage w0. For example I could assume that the utility function of a consultant with respect to money
is
Uconsultant(w) =
{
w for w ≥ w0
−∞ for w < w0.
This would not change the results.
18I assume that there is perfect competition on the audit market to focus on the incentive effects
of NAS.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of the model
✲
Stage t = 0 Stage t = 1 Stage t = 2
r r r
The investors set
the optimal mechanism
and the manager learns
the type of the firm.
The auditor exerts effort e ∈ {eL, eH} and
receives a signal s = sB with proba. e(1− p)
and s = ∅ otherwise. The auditor makes
a report r ∈ {∅, sB} to the investors.
Decision to continue or liquidate by the investors.
If continuation, the manager hires a consultant.
Firm’s cash flow realized
3.3.2 Discussion of the main assumptions
Contingent audit fees As emphasized by Wagenhofer (2004), the current restriction
on contingent audit fees (i.e. fees based on the outcome of the audit) is “clearly a
questionable exogenous restriction on feasible contracts with the auditor.” I start
from a general mechanism without restrictions on the contingency of audit fees. In
equilibrium, I will show that only audit fees contingent on a report of evidence of
financial misstatements by the auditor might be optimal. In practice, regulators fear
a compensation contingent on favorable audit opinions. For instance, the SEC (2000)
states that “contingent fees result in the auditor having a mutual interest with the
audit client in the outcome of the work performed.” Hence, the regulators’ concern
does not relate to audit fees contingent on misstatements detection. In section 3.4.2,
I add a restriction on the contingency of audit fees to be consistent with practice and
provide some empirical implications.
Empire builder The manager’s private benefit of continuation is sufficiently high
so that the agency conflict cannot be eliminated through compensation contracts.19 As
in Acemoglu and Gietzmann (1998), this assumption is not crucial and other conflicts of
interest between the manager and the investors would work as well. Given this conflict
of interests, hiring an external auditor is optimal for the investors rather transferring b
to the manager so that the latter reveals the firm type.20 The manager plays no other
role in the baseline model and the problem would be similar with an owner-manager
hiring an auditor to discover the type of the firm. Nonetheless, I discuss later in section
3.3.4 an implementation of the optimal mechanism in a more realistic setup in which
the manager may exert pressure on the auditor with the consulting contract.
Liquidation when report of misstatements only Continuation is the optimal
decision for the investors when receiving no evidence of financial misstatements from
the auditor at t = 1. The auditor reports no misstatements either because the firm is
good or because the firm is bad and the auditor has not detected financial misstate-
19In the model, there is no contract between the manager and the investors. Assuming that the
conflict of interests manager/investors may be partially resolved with compensation contract would
not change the results as long as the incentives of the manager and the investors cannot be fully
aligned.
As discussed by Baldenius (2003), The Economist lists empire benefits as the main example for
agency problems in its online “Economics A-Z.” Further, Hennessy and Levy (2002) find strong
empirical evidence for empire benefits to affect investment decisions.
20See Appendix 2 for a formal statement of this assumption.
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ments. Hence, I assume that the probability of having a good firm conditional on no
report of misstatements from the auditor is large enough.
Consulting services The value-added of consulting services is the same both for
a good and a bad firm. This is not crucial to my results as long as there is some
value-added for a bad firm. Many consulting firms provide, in effect, special services
for distressed firms. Furthermore, the consultant is usually chosen after the manager
learns the type of the firm. Indeed, in effect, the provision of consulting services is
often contingent on the type of the firm. Note that in the model, the auditor can
provide consulting services both for good and bad firms.
The consultant earns an economic rent β from providing consulting services that
admits three interpretations. The interpretations (ii) and (iii) are consistent with Lu
and Sapra (2009) and Simunic et al. (2017), who assume that the present value of the
expected monetary rents from future engagements from NAS is non-zero and exoge-
nously given. In those two interpretations, β is a monetary transfer and the expected
investors’ surplus from consulting is τR − β instead of τR under the interpretation
(i). As discussed in the introduction, a major fear of regulators and practitioners is
that the auditors’ independence is at risk due to “lucrative consulting contracts” (e.g.
Financial Times, 2015; The Guardian, 2010). In the context of my model, the eco-
nomic rents from those “lucrative contracts” can be both monetary and non-monetary
benefits.
3.3.3 The optimal mechanism
I focus my analysis on the mechanism that maximizes the investors’ surplus, which
is in line with regulators’ objectives. For instance, SOX states that “the PCAOB
is a nonprofit corporation established by Congress to oversee the audits of public
companies in order to protect investors (...).” The investors may decide to continue
a bad firm and to have the manager hire the auditor as consultant. Indeed, this
provides ex ante incentives to the auditor to exert audit effort and to detect financial
misstatements. Let l be the probability for the investors to choose continuation and to
get the manager to hire the auditor as consultant when the auditor reports evidence
of financial misstatements. I denote by wL the audit fees contingent on a report of
financial misstatements and a liquidation decision by the investors.
If the auditor provides evidence of misstatements, the utility of the investors (resp.
the auditor) is L − wL (resp. wL) in case of liquidation and τR < L (resp. β) in
case of continuation. I denote by WA the sum of the utilities of the auditor and the
investors when the latter take action A ∈ {liquidation, continuation}. This surplus is
Wcontinuation = τR + β in case of continuation and Wliquidation = L + wL − wL = L in
case of liquidation.21 The following proposition is the core result of the paper.
Proposition 12. The optimal mechanism for the investors is as follows.
• If the auditor does not report financial misstatements, continuation is chosen by
the investors, the manager hires an outside consultant and there is no audit fee;
21If the economic rent β represent consulting fees as in interpretations (ii) and (iii), the surpluses
are given by Wcontinuation = (τR− β) + β = τR and Wliquidation = L.
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• otherwise, if the auditor reports financial misstatements:
– if the surplus from continuation is larger than the surplus from liquidation
(Wcontinuation > Wliquidation), continuations that are costly to investors oc-
cur with a positive probability (l∗ = (c/∆e)/((1− p)β)) in which case the
manager hires the auditor as consultant and there is no audit fee (w∗L = 0);
– if the surplus from continuation is smaller than the surplus from liquidation
(Wcontinuation < Wliquidation), the firm is liquidated, the auditor provides no
consulting services (l∗ = 0) and there are positive contingent audit fees
(w∗L = (c/∆e)/(1− p)).
Proof. See the appendix.
In words, the optimal mechanism rewards the auditor for detecting financial mis-
statements. If the total value added of consulting services is larger than the liquidation
surplus (Wcontinuation > Wliquidation), the investors optimally commit to costly contin-
uations with some positive probability (l∗ > 0) and to get the manager to hire the
auditor as consultant. The investors use the economic rent attached to the consult-
ing contract to reward the auditor. Otherwise, if the total value added of consulting
services is smaller than the liquidation surplus (Wcontinuation < Wliquidation), there is no
costly continuation (l∗ = 0) and the investors provide incentives to the auditor with
contingent audit fees.
This latter case of the optimal mechanism is counterfactual because contingent
audit fees are not allowed in practice. However, as discussed on page 110, regulators
are more afraid of fees contingent on favorable audit opinions because such fees put
the audit firm in the position of wanting the same outcome as the manager, creating a
self-interest threat. In my setting, only fees contingent on unfavorable (e.g., qualified
or adverse) audit opinions might be optimal.
Otherwise, the first case (Wcontinuation > Wliquidation) is in line with reality. Indeed
there is no contingent audit fee and the investors provide incentives to the auditor via
the consulting contract.
Under the optimal mechanism (l∗, w∗L), the expected utility of the investors is
Uinvestors = p(q + τ)R+ (1− p)
[
(1− eH)τR+ eH
(
(1− l∗)(L− w∗L) + l
∗τR
)]
. (3.1)
If the firm is good, with probability p, the auditor never reports evidence of financial
misstatements. Therefore, the investors continue the firm, the manager hires an outside
consultant and the expected final cash flow is (q+τ)R. Similarly, if the firm is bad and
the auditor gets no evidence of financial misstatements, which happens with probability
(1 − p)(1 − eH), the expected final cash flow is τR. Finally, if the firm is bad and
the auditor gets evidence of financial misstatements, which happens with probability
(1−p)eH , the investors choose continuation and the auditor is hired as consultant with
probability l∗. With the complementary probability 1− l∗, the investors liquidate the
firm and pay contingent audit fees w∗L to the auditor.
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Given the optimal mechanism (l∗, w∗L), the expected utility of the auditor is
Uauditor = (1− p)eH(l
∗β + (1− l∗)w∗L)− c = eL
c
∆e
.
The investors reward the auditor when the latter provides evidence of financial mis-
statements. If the firm is bad, the auditor receives evidence of financial misstatements
and reports it to the investors with probability eH . The latter choose continuation with
probability l∗ and the manager hires the auditor as consultant, who gets the economic
rent β. Otherwise, with probability 1 − l∗, the investors choose to liquidate the firm
and pay the audit fees w∗L to the auditor. Finally, the auditor incurs the private cost
c when exerting high audit effort. The auditor earns a positive rent eLc/(∆e) because
of the moral hazard problem.22
The main insight of this simple model is that eliciting high audit effort using a
lucrative consulting contract with a positive probability is cheaper than using contin-
gent audit fees if the value added of NAS is large enough.23 This is true even if the
investors would be better-off liquidating a bad firm ex post. A direct implication is
that, in equilibrium, the auditor provides consulting services only to firms with bad
projects. From conversations with former auditors, this prediction seems in line with
the real world in which auditors are often hired to help solve a problem after detecting
a breach in the accounts. For example, corporate finance services are a type of NAS
often provided to distressed firms.
3.3.4 Implementation
After describing the optimal mechanism for the investors, I analyze an implementation
of this mechanism in a more realistic setting with potential conflicts of interest resulting
from the provision of both auditing and consulting services by the auditor. I assume
that the choice of the consultant is non-contractible and is made by the manager
because investors often lack either the time or the knowledge to choose the consultant.
In practice, the audit committee is supposed to play a key role in generating the
financial statements. According to Section 301 of SOX, it is in charge of hiring an
external auditor, other advisors as needed, and collecting information through different
sources. As noted by Caskey et al. (2010), the audit committee plays an important
role in monitoring potential conflicts of interest between the auditor and the manager.
The manager should also get the approval of the audit committee if the former chooses
to hire the external auditor as consultant. Nevertheless, it is still challenging for audit
committees to provide effective oversight, especially in large, complex organizations.
For instance, Cohen et al. (2010) show that, even after SOX, some audit committees
still play a passive role in helping resolve disagreements between the external auditor
and the management. In the same vein, Beasley et al. (2009) quote a statement from
a NYSE audit committee chair: “No one really understands how limited an audit
22Assuming imperfect competition on the audit market would not change the result. If the reser-
vation utility of the auditor were U¯ > eLc/(∆e), the investors would pay noncontingent audit fees
F ∗ = U¯ − eLc/(∆e).
23If Wcontinuation = Wliquidation, there is an infinity of optimal mechanisms. The investors are
indifferent between providing incentives to the auditor via contingent audit fees or via a consulting
contract.
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Figure 3.2: Reporting process
✲r r r r
The auditor gets a signal
s ∈ {∅, sB} and the
manager observes s.
The audit committee observes
s with proba 1− l∗ and
receives no signal with proba l∗.
If s = sB and the audit committee
does not observe s, the manager
exerts pressure on the auditor with
a NAS contract.
The auditor gives a favorable
or unfavorable audit opinion:
r ∈ {∅, sB}.
committee is in its work. In big companies, it is virtually impossible to know what is
going on without relying on management (...) and the external auditor.”
The reporting process in the presence of the audit committee is summarized in
Figure 3.2 and is as follows.24 After exerting audit effort, the auditor gets a signal
s ∈ {∅, sB} and the manager also observes the auditor’s signal.25 The audit committee
observes the auditor’s signal s only with probability 1− l. If the audit committee does
not observe s, there is a bargaining process between the manager and the auditor to
decide on the report r ∈ {∅, sB} to make to the investors. Finally, the auditor gives
a public favorable audit opinion (r = ∅) or an unfavorable audit opinion (r = sB).
The investors always liquidate the firm after an unfavorable audit opinion26 Hence,
the manager should induce a positive audit report to continue running the firm. If
the audit committee observes s, the auditor is forced to report r = s. Otherwise, the
auditor may lie and agree on a positive report to a bad firm even if he has hard evidence
of financial misstatements. Indeed, the manager is an empire builder and always wants
to continue running the firm. Therefore, during the bargaining process, the manager
lures the auditor with future consulting services to get a favorable opinion.
The investors set the probability l at t = 0. There are several ways for the investors
to influence l. It could be by increasing or decreasing the number of internal controls.
The probability l also captures the skills of the audit committee and decreases with
the experience of the audit committee’s members. More generally, the value 1− l is a
measure of corporate governance of the firm.27
According to Proposition 1, the investors optimally have the manager hire an out-
side consultant if the auditor does not collect evidence of financial misstatements. In
that case, the auditor does not have hard evidence of financial misstatements and
poses no threat to the manager. As a result, the auditor never provides consulting
24See Beasley et al. (2009) for a detailed discussion on the role of the audit committee and on the
oversight process.
25The manager usually knows what records were examined by the auditor and can deduce the
inferences they support.
26An unfavorable opinion, particularly a modified unqualified opinion (i.e. a going concern disclo-
sure), is sometimes considered as a “self-fulfilling prophecy”(Dopuch et al., 1986) because it could,
for instance, increase regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, the audit committee and the board would not
allow continuation if the auditor were to release an unfavorable opinion.
27I have assumed that there is no cost of decreasing l for the investors. In practice, there could be
substantial costs to improve the corporate governance. Adding such costs would reinforce my result
on the optimality to have l∗ > 0.
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services when he does not have evidence of financial misstatements. In case the audi-
tor detects financial misstatements and the audit committee does not observe s, the
manager can effectively exert pressure on the auditor for a favorable audit opinion with
the consulting contract. The investors let the manager hire the auditor as a consultant
with probability l. As in Lu and Sapra (2009) and Kornish and Levine (2004), the
consulting contract can effectively be contingent on the audit opinion, representing
client pressure on auditors.
I rule out direct monetary bribes by the manager to the auditor even when disguised
as audit fees in excess of the competitive level, on the ground that such openly illegal
bribes would be easily detectable via “whistle-blowing”, and therefore punishable by
law enforcers.28 I also do not allow the manager to exert pressure on the auditor by
committing to keep him as auditor in the future. Indeed, it is much more complicated
and costly to fire an auditor than to fire a consultant (e.g. Coffee, 2002).29 Hence,
the threat of firing the auditor in the future may not be credible. The following
corollary restates the main result of the paper when the choice of the consultant is
non-contractible for the investors.
Corollary 14. If Wcontinuation > Wliquidation and the auditor detects financial misstate-
ments:
• with probability l∗, the auditor gives a favorable audit opinion, the investors
choose continuation and the auditor is hired as consultant;
• with probability 1 − l∗, the auditor gives an unfavorable audit opinion and the
investors choose liquidation.
Proof. Direct consequence of Proposition 1.
The ex post collusion between the manager and the auditor is a way to implement
the optimal mechanism for the investors. This implicit contract using conflicts of
interest is a commitment device for the investors to commit not to liquidate a bad
firm at t = 1 after the auditor has detected financial misstatements. Indeed, the
investors do not learn that the auditor has detected misstatements when the manager
and the auditor collude and agree on a good report.
Previous empirical studies provide evidence that investors perceive negatively the
provision of NAS by auditors (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). The main prediction of my
baseline model is in line with this empirical evidence because the model predicts that,
in equilibrium, auditors provide NAS only after detecting financial misstatements.
The outside investors can deduce that the auditor hid misstatements when the latter
provides NAS.
28If monetary bribes were allowed, conflicts of interest would arise even if the auditor were banned
from providing NAS. However, practitioners consider the joint provision of auditing services and NAS
as the main source of the auditors’ involvement in corporate scandals (Crockett et al., 2003)
29Regulation S-K imposes some specific disclosures in that case. Namely, a reporting company
needs to file a Form 8-K after the resignation or dismissal of the independent auditor. Further, the
choice to change auditors is often perceived as a way to shop for more favorable audit opinions. This
a major concern for regulators and the empirical evidence underscores that investors perceive an
auditor change negatively (e.g. Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Fried and Schiff, 1981; Shu, 2000).
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3.4 Equilibrium level of effort and audit quality
3.4.1 Continuous audit effort
Up to this point, the audit effort has been a binary variable, either high or low. I have
explained my main result by the fact that inducing audit effort without consulting
services is sometimes more expensive. If this is the case, in a model with many levels
of effort, the equilibrium level of audit effort should be sometimes smaller without
consulting services. This section tests this hypothesis. The auditor generates a proba-
bility e ∈ [0, 1] of detection by expanding an effort at a cost C(e) = ke2/2, with k > 0
sufficiently large so that the equilibrium level of audit effort is interior. The utility of
the investors is similar to that of the binary effort case and is given by (3.1).
Further, I introduce a litigation/reputation cost ρ > 0 for the auditor for giving
a favorable opinion and the final cash flow is zero. Litigation and reputation costs
are considered as the main market-based incentive forces that drive audit quality (e.g.
Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012; Venkataraman et al., 2008). Hence, I analyze the impact
of those costs on the auditor’s incentives in my model. An “error” of the auditor is
either due to a lack of effort or to a voluntary lie. In practice it is difficult to determine
whether an auditor misled investors ex post. Thus, I assume that the auditor bears
litigation and reputation costs for both a lack of audit effort or a voluntary lie.
The expected cost for the auditor of giving an unmodified opinion when receiving
evidence of financial misstatements is the product of the litigation and reputation
costs ρ and of the probability of failure of a bad firm (1 − τ). Therefore, the auditor
is willing to lie to get the consulting contract only if the expected benefit of receiving
this contract is larger than the expected litigation and reputation costs.
Lemma 15. The auditor’s reporting strategy after receiving evidence of financial mis-
statements is the following.
• If (1−τ)ρ > β, then the auditor never lies and gives an unfavorable audit opinion;
• otherwise, if (1 − τ)ρ < β, then the auditor gives a favorable audit opinion and
is hired as consultant with probability l.
When detecting financial misstatements and facing potential litigation and repu-
tation risks, the auditor balances the benefit of giving a clean audit opinion to get
the consulting contract and the threat of being fined and/or the reputation loss if the
firm ultimately fails. As discussed in the introduction, the main fear of regulators is
precisely that auditors would be willing to sacrify their independence if litigation and
reputation costs are smaller than the economic rents from NAS contracts. Lu and
Sapra (2009) notice that what is crucial for the auditor is this tension rent-liability
captured by the ratio β/((1−τ)ρ). If this ratio is larger than one, the auditor is willing
to sacrifice his independence.
The numerous corporate and audit scandals that arose during the last twenty years
raise the question why regulators do not increase legal liabilities for auditors such that
there is always truthtelling in equilibrium. There are several theoretical explanations:
increasing the penalty on one crime might induce criminals to shift towards other
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crimes (Stigler, 1970) or increasing the penalty might result in a lower conviction rate
because jurors will be less willing to convict (Andreoni, 1991). In the specific context
of auditing, Laux and Newman (2010) underline that excessive litigation costs could
imply that auditors would be unwilling to provide audit services to risky clients, lim-
iting the access to external capital for those potential clients. Further, as discussed
in the introduction, the repeated corporate and audit scandals suggest that the ex-
pected reputation costs are not large enough to prevent certification intermediaries
from providing false information to the investors.
As a result, I assume that litigation and reputation costs are not too high compared
to the economic rent of the consulting contract, i.e. β is larger than (1 − τ)ρ, such
that the audit effort problem becomes
e ∈ argmax
eˆ
eˆ
(
(1−p)(1− l)wL+ l(1−p)(β− (1−τ)ρ)
)
− (1− eˆ)(1−p)(1−τ)ρ−C(eˆ).
(3.2)
From (3.2), one can conclude that the litigation and reputation costs ρ provide
incentives to the auditor to exert audit effort. As a result, the investors need to
provide less incentives using contingent audit fees or consulting services. If the firm is
good, the litigation and reputation costs do not influence the auditor’s choice of effort.
Indeed, in that case, the auditor never detects financial misstatements and the auditor
has no influence on the final cash flow of the firm.
If the auditor detects financial misstatements, the utility of the investors (resp.
auditor) is L− wL (resp. wL) in case of liquidation and τR < L (resp. β − (1− τ)ρ)
in case of continuation. The surplus of the investors and the auditor is Wcontinuation =
τR + β − (1− τ)ρ in case of continuation and Wliquidation = L+ wL − wL = L in case
of liquidation. The following proposition gives the optimal mechanism in the presence
of litigation and reputation costs.
Proposition 13. The optimal mechanism for the investors is as follows.
(i) If the continuation surplus is larger than the liquidation surplus (Wcontinuation >
Wliquidation), then, in equilibrium, the auditor provides consulting services to the man-
ager with some strictly positive probability,
l∗ =
C ′(e∗)− (1− p)(1− τ)ρ
(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ)
,
and there is no contingent audit fee (w∗L = 0). The equilibrium level of audit effort is
given by e∗ = (1− p)β/2k;
(ii) otherwise, if the liquidation surplus is larger than the continuation surplus
(Wliquidation > Wcontinuation), then, in equilibrium, the auditor provides no consulting
services to the manager (l∗ = 0) and there are positive contingent audit fees (w∗L =
C ′(e∗)/(1 − p) − (1 − τ)ρ). The equilibrium level of audit effort is given by e∗ =
(1− p)(L− τR + (1− τ)ρ)/2k.
Proof. See the appendix.
As long as the liability and reputation costs are not too high, the positive incentive
effect described in the baseline model still holds and the optimal mechanism has similar
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features to the one in the binary audit effort case. The investors are better off in the
presence of liability and reputation costs because it is then cheaper to give incentives
to elicit high audit effort.
The continuous effort model is useful to compare the equilibrium levels of audit
effort. I focus on the most interesting case (i), Wcontinuation > Wliquidation, in which
the provision of consulting services is optimal for the rest of the paper and I analyze
the impact of a regulatory intervention on audit effort. If the auditor cannot provide
consulting services due to a regulatory ban, the equilibrium level of audit effort is given
by e∗NC = (1 − p)(L − τR + (1 − τ)ρ)/2k. This is smaller than the equilibrium audit
effort when the auditor can provide consulting services, e∗C = (1− p)β/2k > e
∗
NC . The
following corollary sums up this result.
Corollary 15. The audit effort is smaller if the regulator bans the provision of con-
sulting services by the auditor (e∗C > e
∗
NC).
Therefore, if the regulator bans the provision of consulting services by the auditor,
this decreases the auditor’s incentives to exert audit effort. This is true even if contin-
gent audit fees are allowed. If contingent audit fees are banned, the audit effort is even
smaller after a regulatory ban on consulting services. In that latter case, the litigation
and reputation risks are the only incentives for the auditor to exert audit effort.
3.4.2 Audit quality
In this section, I define audit quality within my setup and analyze the impact of
the optimal mechanism on audit quality. First, I derive some comparative statics on
the equilibrium level of audit effort e∗ and on the equilibrium probability l∗ that the
auditor provides consulting services contingent on detecting financial misstatements.
Corollary 16. The equilibrium level of audit effort e∗
• increases with the client business risk 1− p;
• decreases with the cost of audit effort k;
• increases with the rent β of the consulting contract.
First, the level of audit effort increases in the client business risk, 1−p, because the
auditor is rewarded only if he detects financial misstatements and the manager manip-
ulates the financial statements only in case of a bad firm. Obviously, the equilibrium
level of audit effort decreases with the cost of effort. Finally, the level of audit effort
increases in the economic rent from the consulting contract because the investors use
NAS to provide incentives to the auditor.
Corollary 17. The equilibrium probability l∗ that the auditor provides consulting ser-
vices contingent on detecting financial misstatements
• increases with the rent β of the consulting contract;
• decreases with the expected litigation and reputation costs ρ.
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The marginal benefit of audit effort, which is equal to the marginal cost in equilib-
rium, increases with the rent β. As a result, the probability l∗ increases to compensate
the increase in the cost of audit effort. Further, the larger the litigation and reputation
costs, the less incentives the investors need to provide to the auditor to exert audit
effort. Hence, the auditor provides less often NAS in equilibrium.
Next, I analyze the impact of the provision of consulting services by the auditor
on audit quality. First, I define the concept of audit quality within the context of this
paper. Most studies define audit quality as some variation of “the market-assessed joint
probability that a given auditor will both detect a breach in the client’s accounting
system and report the breach” (e.g. DeAngelo, 1981b). I apply this definition to my
specific setup.
Definition The audit quality (AQ) is the probability that the auditor gives an unfa-
vorable audit opinion to a bad firm.
Notice that this definition is a measure of ex ante audit quality. Interestingly, audit
quality in this setup may be different from audit effort. This contrasts with a large
strand of the literature that does not study ex post conflicts and therefore, assume
that the ex ante choice of audit effort is the audit quality. In my setup, when conflicts
of interest happen, the auditor gives a clean audit opinion to manipulated financial
statements while audit effort provided ex ante is independent of the final audit opinion.
Therefore, ex ante audit quality is the product of the audit effort and of the probability
of having no conflict of interest ex post, i.e. AQ∗ = e∗(1− l∗).
Corollary 18. In equilibrium, audit quality AQ∗
• increases with the expected litigation and reputation costs ρ;
• increases with the client business risk 1− p;
• increases with the rent β of the consulting contract.
This result is a direct consequence of Corollaries 16 and 17. First, if the expected
litigation and reputation costs increase, the probability l∗ decreases and therefore,
audit quality increases. Second audit effort increases with the client business risk and
l∗ does not depend on the client business risk. I investigate now the impact of a ban
of the provision of consulting services by the auditor in two regimes: contingent audit
fees allowed and contingent audit fees banned.
Contingent audit fees allowed
The impact of a ban on the provision of NAS by the auditor to its audit clients
on audit quality is unclear. On the one hand, audit quality is negatively affected by
the provision of consulting services because of the conflicts of interest which happen
with probability l when the auditor can provide consulting services. When conflicts of
interest happen, the auditor gives a favorable audit opinion to a bad firm. Therefore,
a ban of NAS would increase auditor independence. On the other hand, such a ban
may decrease audit effort because the incentive effect of the consulting contract would
disappear. The following corollary studies this tradeoff as a function of the economic
rent β of the consulting contract.
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Corollary 19. Suppose contingent audit fees are allowed. There exists a cutoff value β¯
such that, if β < β¯, audit quality is higher when the auditor cannot provide consulting
services. Otherwise, if β > β¯, audit quality is higher when the auditor can provide
consulting services.
Proof. See the appendix.
If the economic rent from the consulting contract is low, β < β¯, audit quality is
lower when the auditor optimally provides consulting services despite the fact that
audit effort is larger. A ban of consulting services would force the investors to use
contingent audit fees to provide incentives to the auditor and this would increase
audit quality. Empirically, we may not see this effect because contingent audit fees are
banned.
From a regulatory point of view, it might be optimal to allow contingent fees
for unfavorable audit opinions and to ban the provision of consulting services by the
auditor. Removing the current restriction on contingent audit fees for unfavorable
opinions would increase auditor independence while preserving the ex ante incentives
to exert audit effort. The regulator may want to increase the overall quality of audit
reports because there are possible negative externalities when audit quality is low.30 I
study one of these negative externalities in section 3.5 in the context of audit reports
in the same industry.
If the economic rent from the consulting contract is high, β > β¯, then both audit
effort and audit quality are higher if the auditor can provide consulting services. In
that latter case, there is no role for regulation of NAS because both audit quality and
audit effort are higher when the auditor can provide consulting services.
Contingent audit fees disallowed
Finally, as discussed above, contingent audit fees are banned by the American In-
stitute of Certified Public Accountants’ Code of Professional Conduct (the last version
became effective in 2014). Therefore, I assume that there is no contingent audit fee
(wL = 0) until the end of the section. The only forces that remain to provide incentives
to the auditor are the market-based reputation/litigation costs ρ and the economic rent
of NAS β. In this context, I investigate the impact of a ban for auditors to provide con-
sulting services to audit clients. On the one hand, the audit effort is smaller because
I have assumed that the rent-liability ratio is larger than one, i.e. β/((1 − τ)ρ) > 1.
On the other hand, the auditor is fully independent and the manager cannot exert
pressure on the auditor with a NAS contract to bias the audit report. Nevertheless,
I show that this regulatory action unambiguously decreases audit quality because the
investors cannot provide incentives with contingent audit fees. Corollary 20 follows
from this discussion.
Corollary 20. Suppose contingent audit fees are allowed. If the regulator bans the
provision of consulting services by the auditor, there is an increase in the auditor’s
independence. Furthermore, there is also a decrease in the audit effort e∗ and a decrease
in audit quality AQ∗.
30For example, the PCAOB 2014 annual report states: “Over the last 12 years, the PCAOB has
built a robust and insightful auditor oversight program to promote high-quality, independent audits.”
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Proof. See the appendix.
This result emphasizes that even during times of corporate failures, having an
auditor who provided consulting services to its audit clients due to conflicts of interest
does not mean that the auditor did not do his audit job properly. Indeed ex ante
audit effort would have been smaller if the auditor could not have provided consulting
services. Therefore, a ban on the provision of consulting services would unambiguously
decrease audit effort and audit quality, even in the presence of litigation and reputation
costs.
As discussed in the introduction, recent regulatory actions have been taken to
ban a number of NAS that auditors can provide and cap the consulting fees auditors
can receive from audit clients. My analysis underlines that those actions might be
inefficient from the investors’ point of view and increasing auditors’ independence may
even decrease ex ante audit quality. The main reason is that regulators are focusing on
only one piece of the puzzle: the ex post conflicts of interest. However, I demonstrate
that both the ex post problems and the ex ante incentive externalities should be
considered.
3.5 Informational externalities and regulation
In the one-firm model there is little room for regulation on NAS because investors
choose the optimal amount of NAS that the auditor provides in equilibrium. The goal
of this section is to investigate a negative informational externality arising from the
provision of consulting services by the auditor to its audit clients in a two-firm setting.
It is important for regulators to take into account those types of externalities when
deciding whether or not to ban the provision of NAS by auditors.
For simplicity, I consider the binary audit effort model with eL = 0 and no litigation
and reputation cost (ρ = 0). In the binary effort model, audit quality is lower when
incentives are provided to the auditor with consulting services instead of contingent
audit fees.31 In the continuous effort model, as we have seen previously in Corollary
19, audit quality is lower when consulting services are allowed for low values of the
economic rent β (β < β¯). Hence, I conjecture that the results of this section are the
same for the continuous effort model in the case β < β¯. The results of this section are
more general than this specific case because the investors may in practice tolerate a
higher probability of collusion between the manager and the auditor if, for example,
decreasing l is costly. This would further decrease audit quality when incentives are
provided using NAS instead of contingent audit fees.
In the proof of Proposition 14, I consider first a case in which the investors have
access to an exogenous informative public signal on the firm’s type before deciding
whether to provide incentives to the auditor. In this setup, I show that the investors
make the liquidation decision solely based on the public signal without giving incentives
to the auditor when the public signal is informative enough. Otherwise, when the
31In the binary effort model, the audit quality is AQ∗NC = eH if there is no provision of NAS and
incentives are provided using contingent fees. Otherwise, AQ∗C = eH(1 − l
∗) < AQ∗NC if incentives
are provided using NAS.
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public signal is not informative enough, the investors provide incentives to the auditor
and make the liquidation decision as a function of the audit report, as in the basic
setup.
Then, I endogenize the public signal in an equilibrium model with two firms F1
and F2 in the same industry and with perfectly correlated projects.32 Each firm has
a different auditor. I consider a sequential equilibrium in which the investors of firm
F1 move first and then the investors of firm F2 make their liquidation decision. The
investors of firm F1 send a negative public signal (s = 0) when choosing liquidation
whereas they send a positive public signal (s = 1) when choosing continuation. In
the second period, the investors of firm F2 make the liquidation decision taking into
account the signal s.33
The optimal mechanism for the investors of firm F1 is such that there is no con-
tingent audit fee and there is a positive probability l∗ > 0 that the auditor gets the
NAS contract in case of misstatements detection. The investors of firm F2 receive the
signal s according to the following distributions:
P (s = 0 | B) = eH(1− l
∗) = 1− P (s = 1 | B),
and
P (s = 0 | G) = 0 = 1− P (s = 1 | G).
The investors of firm F1 liquidate their firm if and only if the auditor gives an un-
favorable audit opinion, which happens with probability eH(1 − l∗) in case of bad
firms. Otherwise the auditor gives a favorable audit opinion and the investors choose
continuation. Computing the ratios of probabilities for the two values of the signal
yields
P (s = 1 | G)
P (s = 1 | B)
=
1
1− eH(1− l∗)
and
P (s = 0 | G)
P (s = 0 | B)
= 0.
This ratio of conditional probabilities increases in the value of the signal s and, thus,
a signal s = 1 from firm F1 is good news for firm F2.
Proposition 14. For some parameter values, the investors of firm F2 make the same
liquidation decision as the investors of firm F1. In particular, in case of bad firms, if
there are conflicts of interest and the auditor of firm F1 gives a favorable audit opinion,
both the investors of firm F1 and of firm F2 choose continuation.
Proof. See the appendix.
If the signal s sent by firm F1 is sufficiently informative, there is herding because
the investors of firm F2 make the same liquidation decision as the investors of firm F1.
As a result, in case of bad firms, when the auditor can provide consulting services, the
investors of firm F1 let the auditor provide such services in some states of the world.
32Foster (1981) provides empirical evidence on the importance of peers’ financial statements. Fur-
thermore, De Franco et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2016) provide evidence on the importance of
financial statements’ comparability.
33There is a one to one mapping between the liquidation decision and the audit opinion. Therefore,
it is equivalent to say that the investors of firm F2 observe the financial statements or the liquidation
decision of the investors of firm F1.
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In those states of the world, there is continuation of the two firms. This is a negative
externality due to the provision of consulting services by the auditor of firm F1. If this
negative informational externality dominates the incentive externality of consulting
services, there is a role for regulating the provision by auditors of consulting services
to audit clients. Indeed, it is optimal for the investors of firm F1 to get the manager
to hire an auditor who provides consulting services but they failed to internalize the
negative informational externality that they impose on the investors of firm F2.
The main takeaway of this extension is that, if the negative informational external-
ity of consulting services dominates the positive incentive externality, then maximizing
audit quality increases investors’ surplus and audit fees contingent on an unfavorable
audit opinion might be optimal. Indeed, the investors can recover truthtelling if the
provision of consulting services by the auditor is banned and contingent audit fees on
unfavorable audit opinions are allowed as in Kornish and Levine (2004). Removing
the current restrictions on contingent audit fees for unfavorable audit opinions would
increase audit quality and eliminate this negative informational externality.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Regulating the audit industry
As underlined in the introduction, the numerous corporate scandals have brought to
line the challenges that the audit industry is facing. I discuss in this section some of the
most important regulatory issues in the context of my model. First, in the baseline one-
firm model, it is always optimal to let audit firms provide NAS to audit clients. Indeed,
the optimal probability that the auditor provides NAS is fixed by the investors. This
result heavily depends on the possibility for the investors to choose the right amount of
conflicts of interest. Thus, assuming that there is a cost of decreasing the probability of
conflicts of interest between the auditor and the manager (e.g. improving the corporate
governance), restricting the provision of NAS by the external auditor may be optimal.
To the extent that the cost of improving the corporate governance is larger than the
benefit of having an audit firm providing NAS, the investors would prevent the auditor
from providing NAS to the manager. Empirically, there is evidence that firms with
high agency costs do have auditors who provide less NAS.34 If the investors are able
to prevent the auditor from providing NAS when it is needed, there is little room for
regulatory intervention. Furthermore, if auditors benefit from knowledge spillovers,
regulations implemented in the US and the EU may be questionable. For instance,
Romano (2005), in an influential critique of SOX, states that “the best inference to
draw for policy-making from the extensive literature is that SOX’s prohibition of NAS
by auditors is a policy that makes little sense.”
The regulatory debate is mostly focused on the impact of the provision of NAS
by auditors to audit clients on audit quality and on the auditors’ independence. My
analysis suggests that it could be optimal for the investors of a client firm to let the
manager exerts pressure on the auditor with a NAS contract even if this ultimately
leads to a lower audit quality. Nevertheless, regulators may want to maximize audit
34See, e.g., Firth (1997) and Parkash and Venable (1993).
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quality because of negative externalities resulting from this lower audit quality. I
analyze a possible externality resulting from this decrease in audit quality in a model
with multiple firms within the same industry in section 3.5 and I show indeed that
the decrease in the reliability of the financial statements due to the provision of NAS
by the auditor may lead to an inefficient herding behavior. Namely, the investors of
a firm may make an erroneous liquidation decision by relying on low-quality financial
statements of similar firms within the same industry. Therefore, allowing audit fees
contingent on unfavorable audit opinions might be optimal because it would increase
overall audit quality while preserving the ex ante incentives to exert audit effort. The
optimality of contingent audit fees to increase auditor independence is also discussed
by Kornish and Levine (2004).
Another important concern of regulators about the provision of NAS by auditors
is that auditors may be auditing their own work in the future. In this paper, I do
not consider this potential negative impact of NAS. This threat has been partially
addressed by regulators by banning certain NAS which are closely related to external
auditors’ work.35 For example, the external auditor cannot implement internal con-
trols because this work overlaps with the external auditor’s work. Nonetheless, an
interesting extension, which lies beyond the scope of this paper, would be to study
this effect and analyze the interaction with the incentive externality presented in this
paper.
Finally, the provision of NAS by auditors to non-audit clients is also a major
concern of regulators, who consider that the current growth in revenues from NAS
provided to non-audit clients within public accounting firms could also impair audi-
tors’ independence (Harris, 2016). Regulators implicitly assume that auditors could be
influenced in their decisions, even if the individuals within the organization perform
only audit or consulting services. For instance, Kowaleski et al. (2016) provide ex-
perimental evidence that providing NAS increases cooperation with managers. Thus,
having separate audit and consulting departments within the Big Four firms may not
solve the auditor independence concerns.
3.6.2 Empirical implications
The model generates several empirical predictions that I discuss in this subsection.
First, in equilibrium, the auditor provides consulting services to the audit client only
when the auditor detects financial misstatements. This a direct consequence of the op-
timal mechanism for the investors to elicit high audit effort. The empirical implication
is straighforward: the larger the level of non-audit fees, the lower the financial health
of the company. This result could explain the negative reaction of investors when they
learn that the auditor also provides NAS. Indeed, as discussed in the introduction,
studies using perception-based proxies find that investors penalize companies purchas-
ing NAS. For example, NAS is associated with more negative abnormal returns, larger
cost of capital and lower likelihood of auditor ratification (DeFond and Zhang, 2014).
Those results are in line with the main predictions of my model.
35Krishnan et al. (2011) suggest that only harmful NAS banned by SOX may lead to a lower
audit quality. Causholli et al. (2014) provide evidence that selling future NAS could impair auditor
independence, which supports the fact the effect analyzed in this paper may dominate.
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Corollaries 16 and 18 provide the main comparative statics of the model. An im-
portant cross-sectional prediction of the baseline model is that audit quality increases
with the client business risk. Indeed, the optimal mechanism implies that the auditor
is rewarded for detecting financial misstatements. Furthermore, the manager manip-
ulates the financial statements only in case of bad projects. Hence, in industries with
a larger probability of projects’ failures, audit quality should be higher.
Lastly, according to the extension with expected litigation and reputation costs
and no contingent audit fee, the audit effort is larger when the auditor is allowed to
provide consulting services. Obviously, this empirical prediction is very challenging
to test because there exists no perfect proxy to measure audit effort. Otherwise, the
model predicts that a ban of the provision of NAS by auditors would increase auditor
independence but decrease audit quality. This result is important given that many
empirical studies use proxies of audit quality to assess auditor independence. My
analysis underscores that this relation may be more complex.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine how the provision of consulting services by auditors to audit
clients affects the auditors’ incentives to exert ex ante audit effort and how it impacts
audit quality. As commonly argued by opponents of the provision of both auditing
and consulting services by audit companies, I underline that NAS may create conflicts
of interest between the auditor and the audit client, which may in turn decrease audit
quality. Indeed, the manager of the client firm is able to exert pressure on the auditor
with the economic rent attached to the NAS contract to get a favorable audit opinion.
Nevertheless, my analysis also emphasizes that there is a positive incentive effect ex
ante which can dominate the resulting expected loss ex post incurred by the investors.
Namely, the possibility for an auditor of providing NAS contingent on detecting fi-
nancial misstatements increases audit effort. Thus, allowing auditors to provide both
types of services to client firms could be optimal for the investors of client firms even
without considering any knowledge spillover between auditing services and NAS. My
analysis sheds some light on the current growth rate of consulting practices within the
Big Four despite regulatory hurdles.
On the other hand, my results show that the provision of NAS may harm audit
quality when conflicts of interest happen and the auditor gives a favorable audit opinion
after detecting financial misstatements because of client pressure. NAS may decrease
the reliability of financial statements. When multiple firms in the same industry
rely on peers’ financial statements to make their own liquidation decision, there is a
potentially negative ex post informational externality that could dominate the positive
ex ante incentive effect. The regulator should consider this tradeoff when taking the
decision whether to ban the provision of NAS by auditors. Further, if the investors
cannot choose the optimal amount of NAS that the auditor provides in equilibrium,
the positive incentive effect might vanish. In that case, the manager of the client firm
may be able to exert pressure on the auditor too often and banning the provision of
NAS by auditors is always optimal. The model proposed in this paper underscores
some incentives effects of NAS on auditors and provides a framework for understanding
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the tradeoffs at stake for regulators.
My model admits broader interpretations and many other potential applications
of this idea come to mind. This tradeoff between incentives and conflicts of interest
could be applied to other situations such as the revolving doors in the accounting
industry. It has often been argued that letting auditors work for their audit clients
could create potential conflicts of interest. Indeed, auditors would be willing to let a
client hide losses hoping that their favor would be rewarded later in their careers by
being hired by the client. Section 206 of SOX was enacted to increase the independence
of accounting firms whose ex-auditors obtained a senior financial reporting position
with their current audit clients. According to the main intuition of this paper, it could
be optimal for the investors of client firms to let auditors having the possibility to
work for client firms later. Indeed, hiring a former auditor, like hiring a consultant,
can increase a firm’s value because of his valuable experience as an auditor. Therefore,
if the benefit from hiring an auditor is large enough, the investors of a client firm
may find it optimal to commit to let manager hire the auditor when the latter detects
misstatements in the financial statements.
Finally, I believe that this framework could be extended in several directions and
there are many interesting routes for future research. For instance, I have assumed
perfect competition on the audit market to keep the model simple and to focus on
the incentives effects of NAS. It would be interesting to consider the case of imperfect
competition and investigate the interaction between audit competition, provision of
non-audit services and incentives for auditors to exert audit effort.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: proofs
Proof of Proposition 12
I describe the general mechanism (l, lR, wRS, wRF , wL, wB) set by the investors. l is
the probability for the investors to choose continuation and to hire the auditor as
consultant when the auditor reports evidence of financial misstatements. lR is the
probability set by the investors to choose the auditor as consultant after no report of
misstatements from this auditor. The audit fees in case of no report of misstatements
are wRS if the final cash flow is R and wRF if the final cash flow is 0. The audit
fees in case the auditor reports evidence of financial misstatements are wL in case of
liquidation and wB in case of continuation.
The auditor is protected by limited liability (LL), i.e.
wRS ≥ 0, wRF ≥ 0, wB ≥ 0 and wL ≥ 0.
The expected utility of the auditor is
Uauditor(e) = p
[
(q + τ)wRS + (1− q − τ)wRF + lRβ
]
+(1−p)
[
(1−e)
(
τwRS+(1−τ)wRF + lRβ
)
+e
(
l(β+wB)+(1− l)wL
)]
−c1{e=eH}.
(3.3)
The incentive compatibility constraint of the auditor is
Uauditor(e = eH) ≥ Uauditor(e = eL). (3.4)
Lemma 16. If the auditor does not report misstatements (r = ∅), the auditor is not
hired as consultant (l∗R = 0) and there is no contingent audit fee (w
∗
RS = w
∗
RF = 0).
Proof. I can rewrite the incentive compatibility constraint (3.4) using (3.3):
(1− l)(1− p)wL+ l(1− p)(β +wB) ≥
c
∆e
+ (1− p)(τwRS + (1− τ)wRF + lRβ). (3.5)
From (3.5), it is optimal for the investors not to reward the auditor in case of no
report of misstatements. Therefore, in equilibrium, the investors set w∗RS = w
∗
RF =
l∗R = 0.
The intuition of this result is straightforward. Indeed, the auditor is hired to find
hard evidence of financial misstatements. If he makes no report of misstatements,
saying that he does not have hard evidence, it is optimal for the investors not to
reward him. This implies that the auditor is only rewarded when he reports evidence
of financial misstatements. Therefore, in equilibrium, there is no reason for the auditor
to lie and hide financial misstatements.
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Taking this first result into account, the expected utility of the investors is
Uinvestors = p(q+ τ)R+(1− p)
[
(1− eH)τR+ eH
(
(1− l)(L−wL)+ l(τR−wB)
)]
.
Lemma 17. If the auditor reports evidence of financial misstatements and the in-
vestors choose continuation, there is no contingent audit fee, i.e. w∗B = 0.
In case of continuation that is costly to the investors, the auditor receives the
economic rent β via the consulting contract but no contingent audit fee. Taking those
results into account, the new incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is
(1− l)(1− p)wL + l(1− p)β ≥
c
∆e
. (3.6)
There are two ways for the investors to provide incentives to the auditor to exert audit
effort. If the auditor detects and reports financial misstatements, the investors can
either reward him with contingent audit fees wL or with the economic rent β of the
consulting contract. The investors’ optimization problem is
max
l,wR,wL
Uinvestors
subject to the constraints (IC) and (LL).
I do not impose any upper bound on the contingent audit fee wL and the reservation
utility of the auditor is assumed to be zero. Therefore, under the optimal mechanism,
(IC) is binding and is equivalent to
wL =
c
∆e
− l(1− p)β
(1− p)(1− l)
. (3.7)
Reinjecting (3.7) into the objective function, I rewrite the maximization problem of
the investors as
max
l
p(q + τ)R + (1− eH)(1− p)τR + eH(1− p)L
− eH(1− p)l(L− τR)− eH
c
∆e
+ eH l(1− p)β,
which is equivalent to
max
l
eH l(1− p)(τR + β − L).
The problem is linear in l:
• if Wcontinuation > Wliquidation, then the optimal probability of continuation is the
maximal value of l such that (IC) is binding, i.e. l∗ =
c
∆e
(1−p)β
. Moreover, there is
no contingent audit fee (w∗L = 0);
• otherwise, ifWcontinuation < Wliquidation, the optimal probability of providing NAS
is l∗ = 0. The contingent audit fees are set such that (IC) is binding, i.e.
w∗L =
c
∆e
(1−p)
.
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Proof of Proposition 13
The first order condition of the auditor’s maximization effort problem is
C ′(e) = (1− l)(1− p)wL + l(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ) + (1− p)(1− τ)ρ. (3.8)
The right hand side of (3.8) is the marginal benefit of effort for the auditor. By
generating the probability e of detecting financial misstatements in case of a bad firm,
the auditor may receive the audit fees wL or the economic rent β attached to the
consulting contract minus the expected litigation/reputation risk (1 − τ)ρ. The left
hand side of (3.8) is the marginal cost of effort borne by the auditor.
I rewrite the maximization problem of the investors
max
l,e,wL
e(1− l)(L− τR− wL)
subject to
C ′(e) = (1− l)(1− p)wL + l(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ) + (1− p)(1− τ)ρ.
This is equivalent to
max
l,e
e(1− l)(L− τR)(1− p) + el(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ) + e(1− p)(1− τ)ρ− C ′(e)
subject to
C ′(e) = (1− l)(1− p)wL + l(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ) + (1− p)(1− τ)ρ.
There are two cases:
• if β − (1 − τ)ρ < L − τR, then w∗L =
C ′(e∗)
(1− p)
− (1 − τ)ρ, l∗ = 0 and e∗ =
(1− p)(L− τR + (1− τ)ρ)/2k;
• otherwise, if β − (1− τ)ρ > L− τR, then w∗L = 0, l
∗ =
C ′(e∗)− (1− p)(1− τ)ρ
(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ)
and e∗ = (1− p)β/2k.
Proof of Corollary 19
Recall that Wcontinuation > Wliquidation. Hence, allowing the auditor to provide con-
sulting services is optimal. I denote by e∗NC the audit effort when consulting is not
allowed and e∗C the audit effort when consulting is allowed. Corollary 15 implies that
e∗C > e
∗
NC .
In the binary model, audit quality is always lower when it is optimal to incentivize
the auditor with consulting services compared to when it is optimal to incentivize the
auditor with contingent audit fees: eH(1− l∗) < eH . In the continuous effort model, I
compare e∗C(1− l
∗) with e∗NC .
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First,
AQC = e
∗
C(1− l
∗) =
(1− p)β
2k
(
1−
(1− p)β/2− (1− p)(1− τ)ρ
(1− p)(β − (1− τ)ρ)
)
,
which is equivalent to
AQC =
(1− p)β
2k
β
2(β − (1− τ)ρ)
.
Furthermore,
AQNC = e
∗
NC =
(1− p)(L− τR + (1− τ)ρ)
2k
.
As a result, AQNC > AQC is equivalent to
2(β − (1− τ)ρ)(L− τR + (1− τ)ρ) > β2,
which is equivalent to β < β¯, where
β¯ = (L− τR + (1− τ)ρ)
(
1 +
√
L− τR− (1− τ)ρ
L− τR + (1− τ)ρ
)
.
Proof of Corollary 20
If there is a ban on the provision of consulting services by auditors to audit clients,
the audit effort is e∗NC =
1
k
(1− p)(1− τ)ρ and if there is no ban e∗C =
(1− p)β
2k
. As a
result, it always the case that e∗C > e
∗
NC because β > L− τR + (1− τ)ρ > 2(1− τ)ρ.
Furthermore, one can check that e∗C(1− l
∗) > e∗NC is always satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 14
In the first part of the proof, I solve for the optimal mechanism in the one-firm model
when the investors of the firm have access to two types of information to make an
informed decision. There is a public source of information besides the costly report of
the auditor. The public signal s ∈ R is available before the investors set a mechanism
to elicit high audit effort. The distribution of this signal conditional on the type of
the firm y ∈ {G,B} admits a continuous density fy(s) such that the likelihood ratio
L(s) =
fG(s)
fB(s)
is strictly increasing. As a result, the larger the public signal s, the more likely it was
drawn from distribution fG rather than fB, that is, the more likely the firm is good. I
denote by Fy the conditional c.d.f of the signal. The investors have to elicit high audit
effort in order to get an informative audit report. Otherwise, the auditor shirks and
the audit is uninformative because eL = 0.
First, I derive the new optimal mechanism for the investors to elicit high audit
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effort, taking into account the public signal s. Recall that Wcontinuation > Wliquidation,
so that it is optimal for the investors to let the auditor provide consulting services to
the manager.
Lemma 18. The optimal mechanism for the investors is characterized by two thresh-
olds σ1 and σ2 such that σ2 > σ1 and
• if the public signal is smaller than σ1, the investors liquidate the firm;
• if the public signal is larger than σ2, the investors continue the firm;
• otherwise, if s ∈ [σ1; σ2], the investors give incentives to the auditor before mak-
ing the liquidation decision. There is no audit fee but the auditor provides con-
sulting services after detecting financial misstatements with probability
l∗ =
(1− p)fB(s) + pfG(s)
(1− p)fB(s)
c
∆e
β
> 0.
Proof. I denote by x2(s) the probability of liquidating the firm without providing in-
centives to the auditor conditional on signal s.
Similarly, I denote by x1(s) the probability of continuing the firm without providing
incentives to the auditor conditional on signal s.
Given the signal s, the probability to have a good firm is
P (G | s) =
pfG(s)
pfG(s) + (1− p)fB(s)
.
The investors’ optimization problem is
maxx1(s),x2(s),l
∫
[pfG(s)
(
x1(s)(qR+τR)+x2(s)L+(1−x1(s)−x2(s))(qR+τR)
)
+
(1−p)fB(s)
(
x1(s)τR+x2(s)L+(1−x1(s)−x2(s))((1−eH)τR+eH lτR+eH(1−l)L)
)
]ds
such that
l
(1− p)fB(s)
pfG(s) + (1− p)fB(s)
β ≥
c
∆e
.
Taking the first-order condition with respect to x1(s) yields
c
∆e
(pfG(s) + (1− p)fB(s))− (1− p)fB(s)β = 0.
Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to x2(s) yields
(pfG(s)+ (1−p)fB(s))(L− τR)(1+ eH
c
∆e
β
)−pfG(s)qR− (1−p)fB(s)eH(L− τR) = 0.
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Hence, we can define σ2 such that
L(σ2) =
(1− p)
p
β − c
∆e
c
∆e
and define σ1 such that
L(σ1) =
(1− p)
p
1− eH(1−
c
∆e
β
)
qR
L−τR
− (1 + eH
c
∆e
β
)
.
From the first-order conditions, we have
• for s ≤ σ1, x∗2(s) = 1 and x
∗
1(s) = 0;
• for s ≥ σ2, x∗2(s) = 0 and x
∗
1(s) = 1;
• for σ1 ≤ s ≤ σ2, x∗2(s) = x
∗
1(s) = 0.
In words, whenever the public signal is informative enough, it is optimal for the
investors to rely on it rather than acquiring costly information via the auditor.
Lemma 19. If the auditor cannot provide consulting services, the optimal mechanism
is characterized by two thresholds σˆ2 and σˆ1 < σˆ2 such that:
• if the public signal is smaller than σˆ1, the investors liquidate the firm;
• if the public signal is larger than σˆ2, the investors continue the firm;
• otherwise, if s ∈ [σˆ1; σˆ2], the investors give incentives to the auditor before mak-
ing the liquidation decision. There are positive audit fees contingent on an un-
favorable audit opinion
w∗L =
pfG(s) + (1− p)fB(s)
(1− p)fB(s)
c
∆e
.
Proof. Same calculations as in the proof of the previous proposition. The threshold
values are now defined as
L(σˆ1) =
(1− p)
p
1− eH(1−
c
∆e
L−τR
)
qR
L−τR
− (1 + eH
c
∆e
L−τR
)
and
L(σˆ2) =
(1− p)
p
L− τR− c
∆e
c
∆e
.
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When the auditor cannot provide consulting services to its audit clients, I obtain a
similar result as the previous proposition except that it is costlier to give incentives to
the auditor and he is paid via contingent audit fees. Wcontinuation > Wliquidation implies
that L(σˆ1) > L(σ1) and L(σˆ2) < L(σ2). It means that the investors rely more on the
public signal when the auditor cannot provide NAS because it is costlier to provide
incentives to the auditor using contingent audit fees.
In the second step of the proof, I endogenize the public signal s in the two-firm
model as a signal sent by the investors of firm F1. In particular, the public signal
s ∈ {0, 1} observed by the investors of firm F2 is such that
P (s = 1 | G)
P (s = 1 | B)
=
1
1− eH(1− l∗)
and
P (s = 0 | G)
P (s = 0 | B)
= 0.
The investors of firm F2 make the same liquidation decision as the investors of
firm F1 if and only if 0 < σˆ1 < σˆ2 < 1 and 0 < σ1 < σ2 < 1, i.e. s is sufficiently
informative. Hence, I restrict my analysis to the values of the exogenous parameters
such that σ2 < 1 and σˆ2 < 1. The inequality
σ2 < 1
is equivalent to
(1− p)
p
β − c
∆e
c
∆e
<
1
1− eH
. (3.9)
Moreover, the inequality
σˆ2 < 1
is equivalent to
(1− p)
p
L− τR− c
∆e
c
∆e
<
1
1− eH
. (3.10)
Assume that (3.9) and (3.10) are satisfied. Then the investors of firm F2 choose
continuation whenever the investors of firm F1 choose continuation.
Moreover, I also restrict my analysis to the values of the exogenous parameters
such that σ1 > 0 and σˆ1 > 0. This is equivalent respectively to
(1− p)
p
1− eH(1−
c
∆e
β
)
qR
L−τR
− (1 + eH
c
∆e
β
)
> 0 (3.11)
and
(1− p)
p
1− eH(1−
c
∆e
L−τR
)
qR
L−τR
− (1 + eH
c
∆e
L−τR
)
> 0. (3.12)
Assume that (3.11) and (3.12) are satisfied. Then, the investors of firm F2 choose
liquidation whenever the investors of firm F1 choose liquidation.
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Appendix 2: three technical assumptions
In the paper, I have made three assumptions on the parameter values that I explicit
formally below.
• Hiring an auditor is desirable, i.e.
b ≥ eH
c
∆e
+ (1− eH)(1− p)(L− τR). (3.13)
The investors are better-off hiring an auditor rather than transferring b to the
manager if and only if
p(q + τ)R + (1− p)L− b ≤ Uinvestors(e = eH , l = 0).
This is equivalent to
p(q+ τ)R+(1− p)L− b ≤ p(q+ τ)R+(1− eH)(1− p)τR+ eH(1− p)L− eH
c
∆e
,
which leads to (3.13).
• High audit effort by the auditor is desirable, i.e.
L− τR ≥ eH
c
∆e
1
∆e(1− p)
. (3.14)
The investors are better-off when the auditor exerts high audit effort if and only
if
Uinvestors(e = eH , l = 0) ≥ Uinvestors(e = eL, l = 0).
This is equivalent to
p(q + τ)R + (1− eH)(1− p)τR + eH(1− p)L− eH
c
∆e
≥ p(q + τ)R + (1− eL)(1− p)τR + eL(1− p)L,
which leads to (3.14).
• Continuation is optimal for the investors when receiving no report of misstate-
ments from the auditor at t = 1, i.e.
τR +
p
p+ (1− eH)(1− p)
qR > L. (3.15)
The probability of having a good firm, conditional on no report of misstatements
from the auditor, is
P (G|r = ∅) =
p
p+ (1− eH)(1− p)
.
Hence, I assume that the expected continuation cash flow is larger than the
liquidation payoff.
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It is easy to see that the set of parameters under those three assumptions {(3.13), (3.14), (3.15)}
is non-empty. It is sufficient to have a large private benefit b, a low cost from exerting
high audit effort c and an intermediate value for the net gain of liquidation L− τR.
Appendix 3: endogenous rent beta β
I provide in this appendix a way of endogenizing the economic rent β from NAS as an
efficiency wage that the investors need to pay to the consultant.
The consultants face a moral hazard problem. Indeed, they privately choose τ ∈
{τL = 0, τH}. They incur a cost KC if they choose τ = τH .
In order to provide incentives to the consultant choose τ = τH , the investors offers
a contract wC such that
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Online appendix: endogenous reputation cost
The goal of this online appendix is to study the dynamics of audit quality and the
propensity of auditors to provide consulting services along the business cycle. I consider
a dynamic extension of the model with endogenous reputation costs. The players are
now involved in a firm with two consecutive projects. There are two periods with the
same three stages in each period, as in the baseline model. In order to get empirical
predictions, I do not allow for contingent audit fees.
I introduce an endogenous reputation cost by supposing that auditors can be of
two types: poor or good. Before the first period begins, neither the investors nor the
auditor can know whether the auditor is productive in his job. A poor auditor never
detects financial misstatements, while the productivity of a good auditor depends on
his effort e, as in the previous sections. Let u be the probability of having a good
auditor at t = 0.
Suppose that ρ = κUauditor,2 where κ is the cash flow weight attached to the second
period (as, for example in Laffont and Tirole, 1993), where κ may be larger than 1.
The size of the parameter κ represents the importance of future relative to current
profits for auditors. For example, at the onset of a boom, future capitalized profits
are likely to be larger, so that κ is large. In contrast, at the end of a boom and at
the onset of a recession, κ is small because future capitalized profits are likely to be
smaller. I denote by Uauditor,2 the utility of a good auditor in the second period.
The investors live only for one period and there are two generations of investors
who own the firm during the first and the second period respectively. There are
no overlapping projects and investors. I solve the problem by backward induction,
starting from the second-period investors problem. At the end of the first period, the
second-period investors update their beliefs about the auditor’s type after observing
the audit opinion and the outcome of the first project.
Lemma 20. The second-period investors hire a new auditor at the end of the first
period if the auditor gives a favorable audit opinion and the final cash flow of the first
project is 0.
Proof. The conditional probability of having a good auditor after a positive opinion
and a zero cash flow at the end of the first project is
P (good auditor | positive audit opinion and zero cash flow)
=
u
[
p(1− q − τ) + (1− p)(1− e∗1 + e
∗
1l
∗
1)(1− τ)
]
(1− u)
[
p(1− q − τ) + (1− p)(1− τ)
]
+ u
[
p(1− q − τ) + (1− p)(1− e∗1 + e
∗
1l
∗
1)(1− τ)
] < u.
Hence, it is optimal for the second-period investors to hire a new auditor rather
than keeping the first-period auditor.
Therefore, at the end of the first period, an auditor who gave a favorable audit
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opinion to a project with a 0 cash flow does not get any profit in the second period36.
Indeed, it is optimal for the second-period investors to hire for the second period a
new auditor with a probability u of being good, which is larger than the probability
that the first-period auditor is good.
Thus, at the beginning of the second period, the second-period investors believe
the auditor is good with probability u′ ∈ {u, 1}: either this is the first-period auditor
(u′ = 1) or this is a new auditor (u′ = u). As the second period is the last period, there
is no more reputation cost for the auditor in this period. The effort choice problem of
the auditor is
e ∈ argmax
eˆ
eˆu′l(1− p)β − C(eˆ).
Then the optimal mechanism for the second-period investors is such that
l∗2 =
C ′(e∗2)
u′(1− p)β
and e∗2 = u
′(1− p)β/2k.
Therefore, the second-period utility of a good auditor is Uauditor,2 = e∗2C
′(e∗2) −
C(e∗2) > 0. This is the rent from providing auditing services to the firm in the second
period.
I now consider the problem of the first period. Given that the auditor is fired
whenever he gives a favorable audit opinion and the cash flow of the first project is 0
at the end of the first period, the effort problem of the auditor during the first period
is
e ∈ argmax
eˆ
u
(
eˆl(1− p)max(β − (1− τ)κUauditor,2, 0)
− (1− eˆ)(1− p)(1− τ)κUauditor,2
)
− C(eˆ).
Providing incentives to the auditor is less costly for the first-period investors be-
cause of the reputation costs that the auditor may incur at the end of the first period
after a favorable audit opinion if the cash flow of the project is zero. I define the cutoff
value κ¯ =
β
(1− τ)Uauditor,2
. At this cutoff value, the economic rent β from the con-
sulting contract is equal to the expected reputation cost (1 − τ)Uauditor,2 from hiding
financial misstatements, i.e. the rent-liability ratio is equal to one.
Lemma 21. Giving this new incentive constraint, the investors set the following mech-
anism to elicit high effort from the first-period auditor:
• if κ > κ¯, then l∗1 = 0 and C
′(e∗1) = u(1− p)κ(1− τ)Uauditor,2;
• if κ < κ¯, then l∗1 =
C ′(e∗1)− u(1− p)(1− τ)κUauditor,2
u(1− p)(β − (1− τ)κUauditor,2)
and e∗1 = u(1− p)β/2k.
36Note that I assume here that the cost of firing the auditor is negligible. This assumption is
reasonable because it is the decision of new investors. Dao et al. (2011) discuss the voting power of
shareholders to change auditors.
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In the first case, when the project is bad, the auditor is not willing to accept
a consulting contract and to give a favorable audit opinion. Indeed, the expected
reputation cost is larger than the economic rent of providing consulting services to
the firm. In the second case, it is the reverse, the expected reputation cost is smaller
than the economic rent and the auditor is willing to accept a consulting contract
and give a favorable audit opinion to the financial statements even if there are some
misstatements.
Proposition 15. The behavior of the auditor is as follows:
• when future profits are likely to be larger (κ > κ¯), during the first period, the
auditor does not provide consulting services;
• when future profits are likely to be smaller (κ < κ¯), during the first period, the
auditor provides consulting services.
Proof. See the discussion above.
This result predicts that, to the extent that reputation risks for auditors are smaller
towards the end of a boom, auditors provide more NAS towards the end of booms.37
As discussed in section 3.4.2, the provision of consulting services affects audit qual-
ity. Hence, it is interesting to investigate the evolution of audit quality along the
business cycle. To the extent that the reputation risk for auditors of getting caught
giving favorable audit opinions to bad projects is smaller in booms, my model predicts
that audit quality is likely to be smaller in booms than in recessions. This result is
similar to Bolton et al. (2012) and Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013). Both show that
credit rating agencies are more likely to inflate their ratings in booms than in reces-
sions. Although the audit industry has some key differences with the credit ratings
industry, there are some common features.38 For instance, both auditors and credit
ratings agencies are paid by their clients, which might create conflicts of interest.
Further, those industries are both oligopolies. Thus, to the extent that auditors and
credit ratings agencies face the same types of reputation costs, their behaviors along
the business cycle may be similar.
37Towards the end of a boom, the client business risk, 1 − p, could also be larger due to moral
hazard problem. This would increase audit effort and reinforce this prediction.
38For example, a client firm can “shop” for ratings and the ratings are not public as long as they are
not approved by the client firm. Moreover, a firm can disclose several ratings from different CRAs.
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